"Let men be wise by instinct if they can, but when this fails be wise by good advice." -Sophocles
Showing posts with label Pakistani Military. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistani Military. Show all posts

Thursday, July 19, 2007

Pakistan a Moderate Muslim Test Case

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf could not have been more clear: "We are in direct confrontation with the extremist forces - it is moderates versus extremists." Yet instead of being encouraged by Musharraf's newly launched war to reform Islam from within, Lee Hamilton, former 9/11 Commission and Iraq Study Group member, recommended that the U.S. strike at al Qaeda in its Pakistani mountain safe haven on the Afghanistan border without Musharraf's consent. Hamilton cited several good reasons for taking unilateral action, specifically the importance of keeping al Qaeda on the run and unable to replenish itself. Hamilton also expressed evident disdain for Musharraf's insistence that Pakistani military forces conduct all raids against radical Islamist groups operating in Pakistan, an arrangement that Hamilton described as unacceptable. Hamilton joined Fox News Military analyst Colonel David Hunt in the "Musharraf is not our friend" chorus, and if Americans continue to sing that tune long and loudly enough, we will soon find few friends among the moderate Muslim leaders of the world.

Hamilton and Col. Hunt want what we all want: to see al Qaeda hunted down ruthlessly in their mountain sanctuaries as a deterrent to the rest of the world's radical Islamic terrorists and their potential recruits. The problem is that both men are fixated on the American "right" to conduct military operations within Pakistan even though Pakistan's moderate Muslim president and military leader has declared war on the extremists in his own nation and has now promised to confront radical Islamists in every corner of Pakistan.

Of course we want to strike al Qaeda, but doing so unilaterally without the consent of the president of the world's only Muslim nuclear nation would send precisely the wrong message to Muslims everywhere. Americans complain that not enough moderate Muslims are working to reform Islam by confronting its extremists, yet when we find one who happens to be a powerful figure with control of a small nuclear arsenal, Hamilton and Col. Hunt question his friendship and urge our leaders to ignore Musharraf's promise to purge the terrorists internally. Either we want Islam to reform itself or we don't. Hamilton and Col. Hunt cannot have it both ways.

I wrote previously about Musharraf's need for sovereignty, further postulating that the United States would never allow a foreign military to conduct strikes within our borders, as we would, like Musharraf, exercise our sovereignty and insist that our military remove the enemy from within our borders. It is no small matter for a president to permit a foreign military to cross his nation's borders and attack members, albeit radical ones, of his national religion. Therein lays the danger inherent in circumventing Musharraf's authority. His decision to publicly distinguish between moderate and extreme Islam, and further vow to "fight against extremism and terrorism no matter what province," has worsened his already precarious political position because a long-term battle against terrorists in Pakistan will require Musharraf to not relinquish command of the Pakistani military, a power he has personally retained despite calls for separation of his political and military role as President-General. Musharraf's military command, if he continues on the moderate path, is of great benefit to global security, as he keeps nuclear weapons in moderate hands.

Meanwhile, radicals within Pakistan salivate at the prospect of electing a president who shares their views and might use that arsenal to intimidate or annihilate their enemies. America finds itself in the position of having a moderate Muslim president-military dictator as perhaps its most valuable and vulnerable ally in the War on Terror.

Musharraf has successfully remained in power because of his strong hold on Pakistan's military establishment, though he faces danger in that realm from radical infiltration. If the United States were to ignore Musharraf's sovereign authority and send our military to conduct operations within Pakistan, it would directly challenge the one core strength he possesses: electorates rarely choose to change leaders in war time or when military confrontation is imminent. A U.S. strike, rather than a sustained Pakistani operation, would convince Pakistanis that Musharraf did not wield any international influence and could be replaced, since the U.S. would have shown little regard for whomever was Pakistan's president by handling the matter unilaterally. Musharraf is receiving criticism from every political party in Pakistan, some opposing his combative stance against radical Islam, and others decrying his determination to run for re-election without relinquishing control of the military.

Impatience is our sorest affliction in Iraq, as the House and Senate worked feverishly and at least for one night, sleeplessly, to withdraw from Iraq long before the full results of the surge strategy can be evaluated. That same impatience must not dictate precipitous U.S. action in Pakistan before allowing Musharraf's confrontation strategy to yield tangible results. Arguably the most militarily and politically powerful moderate Muslim in the world, Musharraf embodies the great question the non-Muslim world wants answered: Is Islam truly a moderate religion of peace, or does radical Islam hold sway in the hearts and minds of the majority?

If Musharraf's declared war against extremism within Islam succeeds in Pakistan, it would set a precedent to be followed in Muslim nations worldwide. If it is also true that moderate Muslims live in fear of the radicals in their midst, then we, and they, should sing Musharraf's praises for pitting himself squarely against the terrorists, rather than forming choruses that shriek about his perceived limitations.

Musharraf left no doubt about his commitment to victory in Pakistan's new war on extremism, reassuring his countrymen, "We will finish it off in every corner of the country." What greater victory could there be in a war against extremist terrorism than for a Muslim nation to clean its own house of terrorists? Let us not allow our national epidemic of impatience to cripple in Pakistan what may be the ultimate death knell for radical Islam: internal reform, by ideology if possible, but by the sword if necessary.

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Thursday, February 1, 2007

Musharraf Orders to Attack Known Terrorists Ignored by Pakistani Military: Military, Government Officials Too Cozy with Radicals



In a fascinating but ultimately disturbing illustration of the internal struggles facing President Musharraf of Pakistan, adnkronosinternational recently reported a growing rift between Musharraf and the Pakistani military, particularly the Pakistani Air Force. Though noticed by Counterterrorism Blog, this particular incident has received surprisingly little media attention despite its ramifications.

To establish the context, last week terrorist bombings were carried out in Peshawar and Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital city. Two Pakistani Taliban leaders, Ghazi Abdul Rasheed and Maulana Abdul Aziz, determined by Pakistani Intelligence to be responsible for the bombings, subsequently took shelter in the compound housing Islamabad’s largest radical madrassa. Thus within the capital city, two known terrorist leaders were hiding in plain sight. Musharraf has been provoked significantly in recent years by Rasheed and Aziz. For example, in 2004 Rasheed and Aziz issued a religious decree, signed by 500 Pakistani “Islamic scholars”, against Pakistani military personnel battling with Al Qaeda in South Waziristan. The decree, which included a refusal to allow Muslim burials in Muslim cemeteries for Pakistani soldiers killed in South Waziristan, resulted in a large number of Pakistani forces refusing to fight Al Qaeda in that region.

In 2005, following the London subway bombings, Musharraf attempted to reign in the radical madrassas in Pakistan, as British investigators determined that the perpetrators of those bombings had been radicalized in the very madrassas challenging Musharraf's anti-terror efforts. Washington and London have since demanded Rasheed and Aziz be arrested, and Pakistani security obtained warrants for both clerics, who cannot leave the Islamabad madrassa for fear of being taken into custody.

Incensed by last weeks attacks, particularly the strike in the capital city, Musharraf weighed his military options and according to a US military intelligence source consulted by Counterterrorism Blog, ordered the Pakistani Army to attack the madrassa and capture or kill Rasheed and Aziz. The Pakistani Army reportedly refused because such an assault would be met with massive resistance from students of the radical clerics. Musharraf this week ordered the Pakistani Air Force to conduct surgical air strikes against the Islamabad madrassa harboring Rasheed and Aziz., but the Air Force refused. As a useful comparison, an equivalent would be a scenario in which terrorists detonated a bomb in Washington, DC, and those responsible for ordering the bombing were hiding in a known location in Washington protected by thousands of loyal radical religious students, many heavily armed, who support the terrorists. President Bush orders the US Army to attack the building and capture or kill the terrorists and the US Army refuses. President Bush then orders a surgical air strike against the building, and the US Air Force refuses. What would be the reason for the refusal? In Pakistan’s case, it was because the military forces have close ties to the radical groups of the same religion to which the soldiers and pilots belong.

According to adnkronosinternational, while meeting with senior Pakistani officials, Musharraf stated the following regarding Rasheed and Aziz, "I don’t want them in federal capital. If you are unable to arrest them…shoot them." Considering the number of assassination attempts Musharraf has survived, mainly from Al Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban followers, the air strike order is understandable. To tolerate the presence of known terrorists responsible for bombings within the capital city would further weaken Musharraf's already tenuous control of his own government. Musharraf’s air strike order was reportedly met with the following reaction:



Those attending reportedly disagreed categorically with the idea of an air strike in the capital city, and pointed out that the students of the influential clerics have already staged a powerful protest in the past few days against the demolition of two mosques in Islamabad and they are a force to be reckoned with.


In essence, the Pakistani Air Force refused the order out of fear of reprisal and protest from radical Islamic students in the capital city. Musharraf appears to be in political peril, unable even to strike or arrest terrorists who bomb Islamabad and take shelter in a nearby building. More ominously, his military commanders are largely operating independently, shaping the intensity, or lack thereof, of Pakistani efforts in the War on Terror. In a previous post I discussed at length the issue of Pakistan’s half-hearted investigations and arrests of known terrorists within that country. Considering the level of control the radical Islamists are exerting over the government and military of Pakistan, the question of how long Musharraf can continue to function as president becomes of grave concern, particularly to the future of neighboring Afghanistan. Emboldened by the political emasculation of Musharraf and operating with virtually no fear of opposition, Talibani and Al Qaeda leaders will likely increase internal pressure on President Karzai.

Counterterrorism Blog crystallized into one sentence the troubling concern this incident raises, “if Musharraf is unable to order an air strike in his own capital city, how can he control his nuclear arsenal?”

What President Bush considers a staunch ally in the War on Terror is impotent to eradicate or even suppress radical Islam within is borders. If the War on Terror can only be won through internal reform of Islam itself, Pakistan provides cause for pessimism that reform is desired or even possible in one of Islam’s largest nations.


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