The Islamic "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy: Half-Heartedly Hunting Terrorists in Pakistan

In presenting his annual assessment of threats facing the United States, outgoing National Intelligence Director John Negroponte warned of the resurgence and rebuilding of Al Qaeda in Pakistan. Speculation on the whereabouts of Al Qaeda leadership has always focused on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan, but Negroponte’s statements, as did Secretary Rice’s yesterday on Iran, indicate an increasing willingness in the Bush administration to confront declared enemies directly, and in Pakistan’s case, alleged allies. In a previous post, I selected Pakistan as one of the top 5 threats to America’s safety in 2007, for reasons including those cited by Negroponte. Director Negroponte, in refreshingly blunt terms, warned Pakistan that while that country has provided valuable assistance in the War on Terror, it continues to be a “secure hide-out” for Al Qaeda leadership, which is rebuilding its organizational infrastructure initially decimated in Afghanistan.

While praising the Pakistani government for its role in capturing several members of Al Qaeda’s leadership, Negroponte made the critical point that Pakistan continues to be “a major source of Islamic extremism.” That extremism is being exported throughout the world, and as it springs forth from a nation possessing nuclear weapons, there should be grave global concern over what else is potentially being exported with those extremists.

Pakistan is a fascinating test case for the premise that Islam, as many claim, is a religion of peace that has merely been hijacked by a small number of radical extremists. With a population of 166 million, 97% of which is Muslim, it is ominous that Pakistan has not succeeded in forcibly removing Al Qaeda from within its borders. The so-called minority of extremists is casting doubt on Pakistan’s true allegiances and intentions in the War on Terror, and is potentially placing the lives of peaceful Pakistani Muslims in danger. Certainly the Pakistani military has the necessary actionable intelligence and weaponry to eliminate Al Qaeda from the mountainous area bordering Afghanistan. What is preventing Pakistan from taking back its “hijacked” national religion from those pesky minority extremists? Pakistan is the nation best positioned in the world for demonstrating that Islam is a religion of peace by cleaning its own house of extremists, yet it chooses not to do so. Pakistan makes this choice because the “extremists” are not a small minority, and their views are not considered extreme.

What is Pakistan’s internal policy toward the extremists “hijacking” Islam from within Pakistan’s borders? Pakistan's Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao, responding to Negroponte’s comments, stated that Pakistan has acted when specific information about a terrorist has been provided. While that sounds appeasing on the surface, the result of such a policy as it applies to finding terrorists in Pakistan is the Islamic version of “don’t ask don’t tell.” Minister Sherpao, perhaps unwittingly, verbalized what most American’s suspect: Pakistan is not conducting self-initiated internal investigations to identify and neutralize Islamic extremists in Pakistan. Pakistan, only when given a specific name and location of a known terrorist, and under sufficient American political pressure (usually including US overtures to India), will reluctantly capture the wanted terrorist and earn praise from President Bush for its role as an ally in the War on Terror.

This is very similar to how Mexico approaches requests from the US to extradite Mexican citizens who commit crimes in America and then return to Mexico for safe haven. Only with sufficient political pressure, public outcry, and talk of closed borders does the Mexican government act. The Mexican government does not aggressively capture its citizens suspected of crimes because it is fraught with corruption and lacks the moral turpitude to do so. Pakistan, however, does not aggressively seek to identify and remove its own Islamic extremists because those extremists wield far more influence and are considered less extreme in that country than the Pakistani government cares (or dares) to admit.

Islamic extremists have infiltrated the Pakistani military in sufficient numbers and at high enough levels that President Musharraf has been the target of an incredible number of assassination attempts, nearly all of them coming from within the Pakistani military. This should frighten even the most optimistic supporter of the War on Terror. Musharraf walks a perilous tightrope between the expectations of Pakistanis and the demands for cooperation in the War on Terror from America, and lives in constant fear for his personal safety. Musharraf is alive today, in no small measure, due to American assistance with his personal security and the Islamic extremists’ preference to be occasionally harassed by Pakistani forces half-heartedly investigating them rather than being lethally pursued by American Special Forces sent by President Bush to aid his declared ally.

The photo at right depicts Negroponte making a point during his threat assessment, but it also can represent the measurement of how close Pakistan is to falling under the control of its Islamic extremists. With alarming infiltration of the Pakistani military and emboldened by America’s self-proclaimed failures in Iraq, Pakistani’s Islamic extremists are poised to seize the government if Musharraf acts too forcefully against them. Yet that is precisely what the Bush administration, through Negroponte, bluntly, and rightly, requested. By vowing to take action against Iranians interfering in Iraq and warning Pakistan that Al Qaeda’s leaders are living among them, the Bush administration is effectively preparing plausible justifications for intelligence and military operations within the borders of both nations.


Technorati Tags: War On Terror Al Qaeda Islamic Extremist Religion of Peace John Negroponte Director of National Intelligence Pakistani military Musharraf terrorism Bush Administration Condoleeza Rice Iraq War