Levin is Surge Report Misinformation Minister

When war news is good, it stands to reason that the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee should be pleased. After all, there should be no question that a senator holding such an important and influential position would want America’s military to win any war it enters. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), who currently chairs the Armed Services Committee is embarking on another “fact finding” trip to Iraq, but he is not going there to be supportive of the troops or to witness firsthand the widely-reported successes of the surge strategy led by General David Petraeus. On the contrary, Levin’s latest trip to Iraq serves, as explained in his own words, only one purpose:

I'm going to try to see if we can't shift the attention of the American people from the report on the military situation to a report on the political situation since everybody acknowledges that it's the failure of the political arena and the political areas that are the cause of the ongoing violence in Iraq.

That was a revealing and disturbing statement. Rarely does a politician so bluntly state that he is engaging in an intentional misinformation campaign designed to “shift the attention of the American people” away from a detailed military report that proves we are making significant progress and can win a war we committed troops to fight. Clearly senior Democrats do not want Americans to read the Petraeus report due in September, and Americans should pause for a moment to ponder the motive behind Levin’s Iraq trip as Minister of Misinformation.

Congressional Democrats are in an unenviable political position: having voted almost unanimously to send troops into Iraq; shifting to a virulent anti-war position; demanding a timetable for troop withdrawals; opposing the surge strategy; and now facing the release of a positive analysis of the surge’s effectiveness and optimism for eventual troop withdrawals under more favorable security and political conditions in Iraq.

During his presidency, media figures and congressional Democrats have insulted President Bush with labels such as “inept,” “incompetent,” “mentally unstable,” and of course “stupid.” Yet no such labels are applied by the media to the Democratic Party as a whole for its remarkable blunder of putting itself in position to profit politically only from military failure. Our troops lose, Democrats win. In that respect at least, the grim and incessant media comparisons between the Vietnam and Iraq wars are appropriate. There is an Iraq quagmire. Democrats stepped in it by investing their political futures in defeat in Iraq, but now they cannot seem to scrape the pesky quagmire ooze from their patent-leather shoes.

It is no wonder that on July 30th House Majority Whip James Clyburn (D-SC) stated that such a report from the military would be “a real big problem for us.” In other words, good news from the front lines in Iraq would be harmful to the Democrats’ political ambitions. To prevent such a “disaster” from occurring, Minister of Misinformation Levin will be working overtime shifting attention away from Petraeus’ report, which is already being dismissed in the media as merely an instrument for communicating what the Bush administration wants. Liberal bloggers have already attacked the report, which none of them have seen even a portion of, as a “fantasy evaluation” and just another Bush “sandbagging” of the American people.

Considering the recent foreign policy and military counterterrorism strategy gaffes by Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama, it appeared that no Democratic senator could be equally as naïve as Obama on those issues. Yet Levin’s explanation of why American’s should pay no attention to the upcoming Iraq progress report by General Petraeus demonstrated a fundamental ignorance or intentional obfuscation of what is causing the current level of violence in Iraq. Is there internal strife within the Iraqi Parliament? Of course there is strife there, just as there is bitter partisan strife within our own Congress. In Iraq, Sunni legislative blocs occasionally withdraw from the government in anger over real or perceived slights and injustices. In our Congress there are filibusters, blocked votes on judicial confirmations or cabinet appointments, and leaks of classified information to embarrass or destroy political rivals. In many respects, our Congress is more dysfunctional than the Iraqi parliament, yet our nation is not awash in suicide bombings, IEDs, and foreign-inspired terrorist groups infesting entire cities, which are all too common in Iraq.

As Iraqi parliamentarians are not detonating themselves in protest or killing each other over political disputes, the explanation for the violence in Iraq must go beyond mere politics. Failure by the Iraqi government to achieve rapid political unity and success, as Levin and his colleagues demand, may cause political discord, but to assert that the war in Iraq centers on political issues is far too simplistic. Religious disputes, more than politics, fan the flames of disunity, but without the violent interference of terrorists pouring in from neighboring nations, Iraqis would be in a much better position to engage in political discourse. That is what we are trying to achieve in Iraq: Remove foreign influences and provide sufficient security and public safety to allow Iraqis to resolve their differences and govern themselves unhindered by neighboring nations.

The Iraqi people have already achieved something Americans have not yet accomplished. Iraqis have united in recognizing that their enemy is al Qaeda rather than each other. Sunni and Shiite Iraqis have joined together in driving al Qaeda out of entire provinces. In contrast, nearly thirty percent of Americans believe that the Bush administration rather than al Qaeda brought down the World Trade Center towers with pre-placed demolition charges. If recognizing who our real enemies are is a sign of national survival instinct, America is woefully lacking, while Iraqis appear capable of uniting when self-preservation is at stake.

Leave it to a career politician like Levin to overestimate politics as the solution to all of Iraq’s current ills while ignoring the critical need for public safety and security in what clearly is a military confrontation with terrorist groups funded, trained, and equipped outside of Iraq and inserted into that nation as a destabilizing influence. The Iraqi government will never succeed in its political duties or live up to Levin’s benchmarks for success until al Qaeda in Iraq and other terrorist insurgents are decisively defeated, disbanded, and their demise displayed to the world as a deterrent from further foreign treachery in Iraq.

That will only happen through victory by our troops there and continued strengthening of the Iraqi military. General Petraeus’s September report will demonstrate that the surge strategy is working, which should be received as welcome news by all Americans. All Americans that is, except for those who, like Harry Reid and his fellow party leaders, have already declared the surge a failure and the war lost. In Reid’s case, he has already determined that he will not believe anything Petraeus reports if it includes good news about the surge . There is an ironic oxymoron in the nation’s highest ranking liberal being so decidedly close-minded. Democratic abandonment of Petraeus and the surge was an abrupt and hypocritical change in Democratic “support” for both considering the fact that earlier this year the senate voted 81-0 to confirm him as the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq knowing precisely what his intended plan of action would be.

Over the next several weeks while congress enjoys its summer recess away from Washington, Americans will be bombarded by media reports of Levin’s “findings” from his current trip to Iraq. We will witness a carefully calculated misinformation campaign that Levin himself admits is meant to distract people from the substance of General Petraeus’ pending war report. When politicians work so hard to discredit a military report or minimize the attention given to it, it should peak our interest in what is reported and why one party’s anti-war base considers it “a big problem.”

Americans should respond by rejecting the misinformation ploys and reading every word of the report, making their own decisions as to its veracity and impact on public support for the war effort.

Technorati Tags:
General Petraeus, Carl Levin, James Clyburn, Surge Strategy, Iraq War, Misinformation, Surge Progress Report, Iraqi Government, Al Qaeda, Barack Obama, Harry Reid, Anti-War Democrats

NYPD Shoots Own Foot with Terror Report

In most respects, the much publicized NYPD report released yesterday, "Radicalization in the West: The Home-grown Threat," merely reaffirmed long-held concerns in the intelligence and law enforcement communities about the growing ranks and dangers of radicalized American Muslims in the Northeast. In recent years, similar reports and concerns have been shared among intelligence and law enforcement professionals in the Washington, DC and Los Angeles metro areas, among others. The fact that inmates in American prisons, as well as young disaffected Muslims, are converting to radical Islam in increasing numbers and filling the ranks of home grown terror cells with operatives of all races and ethnicities is a sobering truth, not a newly discovered trend.

Several years ago I reviewed a Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office report on the recruitment of Hispanic and African-American inmates in California prisons by radical imams that came to similar conclusions as the new NYPD report. The NYPD report was not surprising, although the depth of knowledge about radicalized American Muslims evidenced in the NYPD report far exceeded the intelligence reported by Los Angeles officials.

However, at least Los Angeles officials, unlike their New York colleagues, were more interested in operational security (OPSEC)and restricted dissemination of their report only to local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies rather than grandstanding for the media to demonstrate it's indispensability for budgetary or political purposes, as NYPD appears to have done. It is true that NYPD is indispensable to the safety of millions and performs its duties well, but it's choice to make the new report on homegrown terror available to the public will prove, in the long run, self-defeating for all law enforcement and intelligence community professionals.

My assessment of NYPD’s decision to release its report to the public through the media may seem harsh. Many will argue that the public has a right to know and can better assist law enforcement if evidences of radicalization are generally known. If the NYPD report had been intended to raise public awareness or to solicit public assistance, I would concede that public release of the document would have been necessary. However, that was not the stated purpose behind NYPD’s report. The document, according to Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Adviser to the President of the Rand Corporation, a powerfully influential government “think tank,” the NYPD report contained sensitive information that would be utilized best only by the intelligence and law enforcement communities. Jenkins, who contributed an “outside expert’s view” to the report itself, assessed the NYPD report and unwittingly provided a strong argument for why the report should have been labeled “law enforcement sensitive” with limited distribution:

The utility of the NYPD model, however, goes beyond analysis. It will inform the training of intelligence analysts and law enforcement personnel engaged in counterterrorist missions. It will allow us to identify similarities and differences, and changes in patterns over time. It will assist prosecutors and courts in the very difficult task of deciding when the boundary between a bunch of guys sharing violent fantasies and a terrorist cell determined to go operational has been crossed. Above all, by identifying key junctions in the journey to terrorist jihad, it should help in the formulation of effective and appropriate strategies aimed at peeling potential recruits away from a dangerous and destructive course.

Of course, now that every current or future radical Muslim can study NYPD’s ninety-page guide to the radicalization process and how law enforcement can detect and deter it, the work of law enforcement and intelligence professionals just became much more difficult. Did NYPD learn nothing from intelligence reports confirming that after the New York Times ill-advisedly exposed the NSA’s terrorist domestic surveillance program in 2005, al Qaeda quickly altered its operational methods and stopped making the types of phone calls the NSA had successfully monitored? The NYPD’s report, and more importantly the choice to release it publicly to bask in the accolades it generated, will certainly render useless all law enforcement training on Islamic radicalization for years to come, as radical American imams and their followers will merely adopt new behaviors and strategies to counter what they now know law enforcement will be looking for.

In NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly’s preface, he clearly established the intended target audience for the intelligence report:

The aim of this report is to assist policymakers and law enforcement officials, both in Washington and throughout the country, by providing a thorough understanding of the kind of threat we face domestically. It also seeks to contribute to the debate among intelligence and law enforcement agencies on how best to counter this emerging threat by better understanding what constitutes the radicalization process.

“Policymakers,” “law enforcement officials,” “debate among intelligence and law enforcement agencies on how to counter this emerging threat.” There was no mention of public awareness or citizen assistance. It is unfortunate that the Commissioner did not display wisdom, OPSEC, or even common sense by disseminating the report only to what he identified above as his target audience.

Now that the report has been released to the public and Commissioner Ray Kelly had his spotlight moments in subsequent press conferences, a brief review of the document is in order, as it provided much food for thought for both the intelligence/law enforcement communities and the general American populace. The report and Commissioner Kelly’s press conferences also contained several controversial paragraphs and statements that revealed as much about the analysts who wrote the report as they did about radicalized American Muslims. Both aspects merit further analysis.

From the NYPD report:

…Much different from the Israeli-Palestinian equation, the transformation of a Western-based individual to a terrorist is not triggered by oppression, suffering, revenge, or desperation.

Rather, it is a phenomenon that occurs because the individual is looking for an identity and a cause and unfortunately, often finds them in the extremist Islam.

The wording of this section contained a blatantly Palestinian-apologist bias, ascribing the motives of Palestinian terrorists to “oppression, suffering, revenge, or desperation,” presumably heaped upon them by Jews in general or Israel in particular. It is the height of irresponsibility to provide terrorists with political or religious justification for their heinous acts, yet the NYPD did exactly that by drawing a non-existent distinction between what motivates Western Muslims and Palestinian Muslims to radicalize.

Palestinian youth, mirroring their Western counterparts, are also “looking for an identity and a cause,” and they too find it in extreme Islam. The only real difference in the radicalization process between the two is that the Palestinian lives in much closer proximity to his most hated enemy and skirmishes between Jews and Muslims are obviously more frequent and create lasting impressions. Recruitment and indoctrination are much easier among Palestinian youth because they are more likely to know or be related to someone who has died for “the cause,” either during attacks on Israeli soldiers or in a suicide bombing. Such martyrs are treated as religious heroes, and their names are revered.

It is a universal aspiration of youth to be a “hero,” and Palestinian youth are taught from a very young age that there are eternal rewards for terrorism. Not many young Muslims in Michigan collect “martyr cards,” as their Palestinian counterparts do. These cards are similar to American baseball cards but bear the image and pertinent life details of those who detonate themselves to kill “infidels.” Proximity to a conflict and a desire to “fit in” cannot be underestimated in its effect on future radicalization. Unfortunately, NYPD’s analysts not only underestimated those factors among Palestinians, but reinforced the highly questionable assumption that Palestinians are justified in their acts because of the “Israeli-Palestinian equation.” Terrorism, particularly against civilians, never should be given credibility by a law enforcement agency that has witnessed its effects firsthand and will likely do so in the future.

A strong point of the report was its analysis of the role of the Internet in spreading radical jihadist Islamic ideology throughout the world, and more specifically the West:

The jihadist ideology combines the extreme and minority interpretation [jihadi-Salafi] of Islam with an activist-like commitment or responsibility to solve global political grievances through violence. Ultimately, the jihadist envisions a world in which jihadi-Salafi Islam is dominant and is the basis of government.

This ideology is proliferating in Western democracies at a logarithmic rate. The Internet, certain Salafi-based NGO’s (non-governmental organizations), extremist sermons /study groups, Salafi literature, jihadi videotapes, extremist - sponsored trips to radical madrassas and militant training camps abroad have served as “extremist incubators” for young, susceptible Muslims -- especially ones living in diaspora communities in the West.

The Internet is a driver and enabler for the process of radicalization. In the Self-Identification phase, the Internet provides the wandering mind of the conflicted young Muslim or potential convert with direct access to unfiltered radical and extremist ideology.

It also serves as an anonymous virtual meeting place—a place where virtual groups of like-minded and conflicted individuals can meet, form virtual relationships and discuss and share the jihadi-Salafi message they have encountered.

The NYPD report correctly identified the Internet as, what Commissioner Kelly later called it, “the new Afghanistan,” or new battleground against Islamic extremism. The problem is that the Internet is used by countless groups of all political and religious stripes to spread their hateful ideologies. The KKK, Aryan Nation, criminal gangs of all nationalities, cults, and other groups that advocate offensive or dangerous ideologies all have presence on the Internet and communicate with each other through that medium. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the means to obtain legal authorization to monitor traffic on such Internet sites under certain conditions, but can do virtually nothing to prevent young Muslims from visiting the sites and being influenced by what they read there. Commissioner Kelly rightly pointed to the Internet as a critical battleground, but offered no insight into what NYPD’s intelligence division would recommend as an effective strategy to counteract the corrosive influence of the Internet.

The absence of such recommendations likely indicated that NYPD analysts had none to offer, but in their defense, analysts of other agencies are also at a loss. The free-flow of ideas on the Internet is the backbone of its usefulness. All measures to impose content controls or restrict access to the Internet are met with fierce opposition from free speech advocates who argue that once the government assumes control of or censors the Internet on American servers, the freedom and privacy of Internet users will be forfeited. That reality presents the daunting task of formulating a strategy to counter the influence of a radical ideology that threatens our very existence yet can be embraced in the living rooms and bedrooms of any home in America equipped with a computer.

How successful will American law enforcement and intelligence agencies be in detecting and identifying Americans on the path to Islamic extremism? The NYPD report provided an accurate but chilling answer:

The individuals are not on the law enforcement radar. Most have never been arrested or involved in any kind of legal trouble. Other than some commonalities in age and religion, individuals undergoing radicalization appear as “ordinary” citizens, who look, act, talk, and walk like everyone around them. In fact, in the United Kingdom, it is precisely those “ordinary” middle class university students who are sought after by local extremists because they are “clean skins.”

Detecting future terrorists who “look, act, talk, and walk like everyone around them” presents a challenge unlike any previously faced by American law enforcement and Intelligence agencies. The task is further complicated by political correctness and a tendency in the media and among political liberals to accuse the Bush administration of exaggerating the threat that Islamic extremism poses to America and its allies. The NYPD report confirms that the War on Terror, a term Democrats refuse to acknowledge or use today despite their initial enthusiastic embrace of it when it was politically profitable, is increasing in its intensity. What some call a Bush Administration “bumper sticker slogan” is a very real ideological war being waged in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Britain, and in American homes of youths searching for an identity, hero status, and like-minded social contacts.

As long as there is heroism in terrorism, the ideology will continue to spread at an alarming rate. The NYPD report, like most previous assessments by other agencies, provided little encouragement that an effective counter strategy can be crafted.

Technorati Tags:
NYPD, Homegrown terror, Commissioner Ray Kelly, Rand Corporation, Islamic Radicalization, Counterterrorism, Palestinian Terrorists, Terrorist ideology, OPSEC, Law Enforcement, Intelligence, War on Terror

FBI's Terror Cold Shoulder to ICE Justified

Congressmen and citizens are outraged that six years after 9/11, government agencies investigating suspected terrorists continue to stonewall each other. Specifically, allegations citing a lack of cooperation on terror investigations between Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and FBI agents sparked a Senate Judiciary Committee investigation conducted by the Inspector General offices of the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice. The results of that joint investigation into failed cooperation were the focus of an AP report picked up by Fox News yesterday, and after reviewing the story Americans likely developed feelings of sympathy for victimized ICE agents while simultaneously forming harsh judgments of the FBI for its seeming refusal to share information on terror investigations with ICE. Both of those conclusions are wrong. While the FBI certainly holds its terrorist information close to the vest due the sensitive and even classified nature of those investigations, the FBI sometimes does so for good reason.

A news story today, seemingly unrelated to the AP story described above, served to illustrate why the FBI may have been reluctant to work closely and share sensitive investigative details with ICE agents. The Washington Times article, “U.S. Agents Accused of Aiding Islamist Scheme,” opened with the following paragraphs:

A criminal investigations report says several U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services employees are accused of aiding Islamic extremists with identification fraud and of exploiting the visa system for personal gain.

The confidential 2006 USCIS report said that despite the severity of the potential security breaches, most are not investigated "due to lack of resources" in the agency's internal affairs department.

"Two District Adjudications Officers are allegedly involved with known (redacted) Islam terrorist members," said the internal document obtained by The Washington Times.

The fact that USCIS employees have provided Islamic radicals with visas, travel documents, and counterfeit identification, as reported by the Times, should have spurred Congress to act quickly and decisively to establish effective oversight of USCIS. Instead, Congress allowed USCIS to investigate itself, and in typical “fox guarding the hen house” fashion, to date it has conducted no investigations.

Although USCIS and ICE are technically separate agencies, ICE is the law enforcement arm of USCIS and the two agencies utilize a free flow of information including joint access to Customs and Immigration computer databases. In reality, USCIS and ICE are the law enforcement equivalent of conjoined twins, separate entities that share the same organs and would not survive if separated. Infection, or in this case corruption, in one was certain to spread to the other, and it did so. The Times further reported:

Another investigation involved more than seven USCIS and Immigration and Custom's Enforcement (ICE) employees — including special agents and senior district managers — who were moving contraband via "diplomatic pouches" to the United States from China.

ICE — the original investigating agency — downgraded the criminal investigation to a managerial problem, and the case was never prosecuted, a source close to the investigation said.

Given this relationship it is easy to see why FBI agents conducting counterterrorism investigations are reticent in their cooperation with ICE or flatly decline to share investigative data. If an agent cannot be sure that the information he has been asked to share with ICE will not end up in the hands of USCIS or ICE employees in a position to aid Islamic radicals, he would be justified in withholding that information.

Further reinforcing the FBI’s suspicions of ICE/USCIS is the troubling fact that in March USCIS established an Office of Security and Integrity to crack down on internal corruption, but as of today’s Times report, none of the sixty-five vacancies for internal investigators first advertised in March had been filled. With that shoddy record of internal corruption reform hanging over its head, it is no wonder that the FBI and other agencies targeting potential terrorists in America are more than a little reluctant to collaborate with ICE/USCIS.

Placed in the context of ICE/USCIS corruption and assistance with legal identification documents for Islamic radicals posing as Hispanics, The AP story accusing the FBI of failing to cooperate with ICE/USCIS should be looked at in a different light. The first two paragraphs, that yesterday created the impression that the FBI was simply being irrationally uncooperative toward ICE on terror investigations, make much more sense today to those unfamiliar with the core issue between the two agencies:

Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents ignored or dropped leads and at times entire cases involving terrorist activities because of disputes with the FBI, says a report by federal officials released Monday.

In examining 10 cases that began at ICE and were taken over by the FBI, the inspectors general of the Homeland Security and the Justice departments found that seven suffered from lack of cooperation until they were taken over by the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which the FBI controls.

Examined through the lens of the AP story only, the FBI seemed overly territorial at a time when information sharing between agencies is considered the most critical tool in the War on Terror. Yet when viewed together with today’s Times report on USCIS/ICE corruption, the puzzle pieces fall into place. It should surprise no one that the FBI was more comfortable cooperating when the investigations were taken over by an investigative task force under its own control, and through which it could track the dissemination of sensitive information. That level of operational security (OPSEC) is essential to any agency responsible for national security-related information.

There are always two sides to a story, and in the case of alleged FBI non-cooperation with USCIS/ICE, it takes the melding of two stories to form a complete explanation for why that non-cooperation may have been justified and continues to occur. It is rare to find an example of a situation in which information sharing between agencies may not be in the best interests of America. However, until USCIS/ICE produces tangible evidence of internal corruption reform including indictments, employment terminations, arrests, and prosecutions, the FBI would be wise to continue its tight controls over terrorism-related investigations.

Technorati Tags:
FBI, USCIS, ICE, Islamic Radicals, Aiding Terrorists, Information Sharing, Joint Investigations, Government Corruption, Congressional Oversight, OPSEC, War on Terror

Anti-Military Obama "Swift-Boats" Own Campaign

A widely read news article this morning quite successfully concealed an insulting and inaccurate statement presidential candidate Barack Obama directed at U.S. military personnel fighting al Qaeda and Taliban remnants in Afghanistan. The AP story, “Obama Gets Warning From Friendly Voter,” reported that “voter” Maggie North of Claremont, New Hampshire, warned Obama that he needed to avoid public disputes and nasty exchanges with his Democratic rivals if he wanted to be considered different or a “fresh” alternative to the usual political nastiness associated with Washington DC. All but one paragraph of the AP story dealt with Obama’s verbal exchanges with opponents, how campaigns “thicken a candidate’s skin,” and the evil influence of Washington lobbyists.

The one paragraph that should have stood out to readers and received the most attention was not analyzed at all in the AP report or challenged in any way as to its accuracy by the news organs that published it. It contained a slap in the face to U.S. troops in Afghanistan but was effectively obscured by the report’s focus only on the naïve and ill-advised confrontations Obama has engaged in with his party rivals.

Obama has frequently criticized the war effort in Iraq, claiming that he would pull troops out of Iraq and redeploying them in Afghanistan or sending them into Pakistan in pursuit of the Taliban and al Qaeda. His Democratic rivals and conservatives alike rightfully repudiated his stated intent to send troops into Pakistan with or without Pakistani President Musharraf’s approval. Yet during a campaign stop in Nashua, NH yesterday, Obama made a specious claim against U.S. troops in Afghanistan, accusing them in John Kerry-esque manner, of murdering innocents in a foreign land. When asked about pulling troops out of Iraq to fight elsewhere, Obama made the following comment about Afghanistan:

We've got to get the job done there and that requires us to have enough troops so that we're not just air-raiding villages and killing civilians, which is causing enormous pressure over there.

The question that reporters and potential voters who speak to Obama on the campaign trail should be asking is, “Where do you get your information about what our troops are doing in Afghanistan?” The oft-repeated and never proven claim that our troops are bombing and killing civilians in Afghanistan or Iraq are mainstays of anti-American news sources such as Al-Jazeera, but do not match U.S. military reports of daily actions in either of those countries. On this issue perhaps more than any other, Obama demonstrated knowledge starvation while a virtual feast of front line data was available to him from those actually doing the fighting.

It is no small thing for a presidential candidate to accuse the military of killing civilians and fanning the flames of anti-Americanism in Afghanistan, but the AP apparently felt his comments about lobbyists and having “thick skin” during a campaign were more newsworthy than the knife he plunged into the backs of our troops on the front lines in the War on Terror. Perhaps such daggers have become so common from Obama’s party that certain news organizations no longer consider them unusual or significant enough to cover properly. Our troops, on the other hand, have long memories and do not suffer lightly such accusations or blatant disrespect.

John Kerry “swift-boated” his own 2004 presidential campaign by opening his mouth in 1971 and falsely accusing his fellow Vietnam servicemen of committing atrocities against, and killing, civilians. That well-documented testimony to Congress was replayed throughout 2004 on conservative talk radio and served as a constant reminder to potential voters of Kerry’s true feelings toward the military and those who served in the Vietnam War far longer and with more honor than he did. Obama’s false accusation that our troops are now killing civilians in Afghanistan should likewise hang as a proverbial albatross around his campaign’s neck throughout his presumptuous run for the presidency.

Technorati Tags:
Barack Obama, Afghanistan, US Troops, Redeployment, Civilian Deaths, John Kerry, War Crimes, Swift Boat Veterans, US Military, Presidential Candidates, New Hampshire

VA's Campus Gun Laws Punish Adults

Students carry many necessities with them to class each day, toting backpacks filled with everything from textbooks to virtual over-the-counter drug stores stocked with every pain reliever and stay-awake medication known to man. Most students look for ways to reduce the number of items they must carry across campus, but a determined group of college students in Virginia are making national headlines not for what they carry in their backpacks but for what they want to carry under the concealment of clothing: handguns.

The debate over a student’s legal right to carry concealed handguns on college campuses did not begin with the tragic Virginia Tech shooting spree in April, but that event more than any other has provided the impetus students needed to push this issue to the forefront of public awareness. While officials at various levels and parents of Virginia Tech students immediately engaged in the blame game over actions that might have minimized the death toll from Seung-hui Cho’s rampage, students at George Mason University organized Students for Concealed Carry on Campus and have worked to overturn the Virginia law that allows colleges to dictate whether students, faculty, or staff members with valid concealed-carry permits from carrying their firearms on campus.

Emotional levels skyrocket when conversations turn to guns on school campuses, and the debate over this issue in Virginia has been quite spirited. The initial reaction by schools nationwide has been to oppose any measures permitting concealed weapons on campuses, and Virginia’s colleges have, with the backing of Governor Timothy Kaine (D), reaffirmed their desire to retain authority to ban handguns from Virginia campuses. As this debate will likely escalate and venture into Supreme Court case territory, an analysis of the arguments on both sides should prove useful.

State and university administration arguments against allowing concealed handguns on campuses revolve around one central concern: safety. These concerns encompass a host of already dangerous and irresponsible behaviors by college students that administrators foresee as becoming even more potentially lethal with the introduction of concealed handguns to the mix: parties, alcohol, drugs, DUI, student fights or altercations, domestic disputes, grudges over grading issues, accidental discharges, and others.

From a law enforcement perspective, these are all valid concerns, but there is a significant flaw in the logic behind the safety concern, and that is the fact that at most universities and colleges, the majority of students live in off-campus housing, where by state law they are permitted to carry their concealed handguns to all of these types of activities. Very few students actually engage in the type of behaviors listed above while on campus because most campuses have behavioral restrictions and students seek to avoid running afoul of them. Thus, enforcing campus bans on handguns does nothing to prevent students from involving themselves in potentially dangerous behaviors while enrolled as students but performing them off campus.

I found the official position of The International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, which represents campus public-safety officials, very questionable from a 2nd Amendment viewpoint. The association claimed that:

…the presence of students carrying concealed weapons "has the potential to dramatically increase violence on our college and university campuses."

Allowing concealed weapons brings the potential for accidental gun discharge or misuse of firearms at parties, including those where alcohol or drugs are used, and the possibility for guns to be used to settle students' disputes, the group said.

That argument deserves careful scrutiny. In most states, campus police are POST certified police officers with full police powers in a limited jurisdictional area, within a university’s geographical boundaries. They naturally like to know who within their jurisdiction is known to possess weapons. Yet when those officers go home, off campus, and go out to dinner or to the store, they do not know who else in these establishments might be legally carrying a concealed weapon. If these campus police officers feel that the very presence of students carrying concealed weapons “has the potential to dramatically increase violence on our college and university campuses,” what is the basis of that conclusion or belief?

Do those same officers feel that the presence of concealed weapons among private citizens off campus dramatically increases violence among the general population? If a 21 year-old Virginia man who is not a college student obtains required training and a concealed-carry permit and carries his concealed handgun to the local mall, does this association feel that he “dramatically increases” the potential for violence in that mall? If so, the association may be the only law enforcement organization I am aware of that is uniformly opposed to the 2nd Amendment right to bear arms.

All of the risks that guns on campus would present as cited above by this association would be present in any population that permits concealed weapons, but what the association cannot or will not explain is why it believes college students who must be 21 years-old to obtain such a permit are considered potentially dangerous, while the 21 year-old non-college student can carry his gun onto any college campus simply because he is considered a citizen and not a student. That is the crux of the Virginia law. It does not provide equal treatment between students who meet all the criteria for a concealed weapons permit and those who meet the same criteria but are non-students. In essence, Virginia students are singled out for restrictions on handguns simply because they are enrolled in school, which should be considered a sign of their desire to be responsible rather than a label that marks them as too immature or potentially dangerous to safely carry their concealed handguns.

I understand the position of the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators. Law enforcement always, from a tactical perspective, wants to know who is carrying weapons in their jurisdiction, because that knowledge could prevent a tragic accidental shooting due to mistaken identity and is considered essential to officer safety. Yet it is not the law-abiding, permit holding, concealed carry-trained citizen or student that is likely to present a threat to police officers. Crime statistics do not support any argument that legally owned firearms increase crime. On the contrary, most crimes are committed using unlicensed and illegally acquired handguns, because using “anonymous” weapons reduces the risk of being caught later.

In the case of the Virginia Tech shootings, it is quite possible that students carrying concealed weapons might have killed Seung-hui Cho and reduced the number of his eventual victims. It is also possible that SWAT teams responding to the scene might have shot those students brandishing firearms. The key issue here, though, is not what might have happened in that one incident. The issue is much larger. The central point of this debate over campus firearms is the legal reasoning involved in allowing non-students to carry concealed weapons on campus, which Virginia state law currently permits, while denying students who hold the same concealed weapons permit from carrying their firearms on those same campuses.

Emotional appeals against permitting legal handguns on campuses seem to be the political weapons of choice for educators and Virginia Democrats. Dismissing the legal arguments raised by Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, Virginia Tech spokesman Larry Hincker clouded the issue with appeals to sentiment rather than logic:

We don't believe that guns have any place in the classroom," Mr. Hincker said. "We've experienced far more of guns in the classroom than any university should have to endure."

What Hincker refuses to address is that guns in the classroom was not what caused the Virginia Tech tragedy. The tragedy was that Seung-hui-Cho’s were the only guns present on that terrible April morning. Twenty-one year old students can vote; they can drive; they can drink legally; they can own handguns and qualify for concealed carry permits. They are, under the laws of all states, adults. Virginia’s legislators have only two legal options available to resolve this debate over the right to carry handguns on college campuses: Either the law needs to be changed to forbid anyone but campus police to possess firearms on campuses, or the law needs to be changed to give adult students the same right to carry firearms on campuses that non-students currently enjoy. Educators and Democratic legislators find both options unpalatable, as one would certainly be challenged constitutionally, and the other would increase the number of guns present on campuses. There is nothing more fearsome to these groups than lawsuits and an armed populace.

As these entities and campus law enforcement administrators have demonstrated through their statements, they do not trust 21 year-old college students to be responsible with their legal right to carry handguns on or off campus, but they do trust 21 year-olds who chose not to attend college to be responsible while carrying their firearms on campus. The disparity is stunning, but is overshadowed by emotional pleas from Virginia Tech administrators, who insist that guns, and not a mentally ill individual, were responsible for the tragedy on that campus. As a result, they hold hostage the right of adult students at all Virginia universities and colleges to be treated the same as non-student adults when it comes to firearms.


Technorati Tags:
Seung-hui Cho, Virginia Tech, School Shootings, Concealed Carry, Virginia, Students for Concealed Carry on Campus, International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators, 2nd Amendment, Gun Control