NYPD Shoots Own Foot with Terror Report

In most respects, the much publicized NYPD report released yesterday, "Radicalization in the West: The Home-grown Threat," merely reaffirmed long-held concerns in the intelligence and law enforcement communities about the growing ranks and dangers of radicalized American Muslims in the Northeast. In recent years, similar reports and concerns have been shared among intelligence and law enforcement professionals in the Washington, DC and Los Angeles metro areas, among others. The fact that inmates in American prisons, as well as young disaffected Muslims, are converting to radical Islam in increasing numbers and filling the ranks of home grown terror cells with operatives of all races and ethnicities is a sobering truth, not a newly discovered trend.

Several years ago I reviewed a Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office report on the recruitment of Hispanic and African-American inmates in California prisons by radical imams that came to similar conclusions as the new NYPD report. The NYPD report was not surprising, although the depth of knowledge about radicalized American Muslims evidenced in the NYPD report far exceeded the intelligence reported by Los Angeles officials.

However, at least Los Angeles officials, unlike their New York colleagues, were more interested in operational security (OPSEC)and restricted dissemination of their report only to local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies rather than grandstanding for the media to demonstrate it's indispensability for budgetary or political purposes, as NYPD appears to have done. It is true that NYPD is indispensable to the safety of millions and performs its duties well, but it's choice to make the new report on homegrown terror available to the public will prove, in the long run, self-defeating for all law enforcement and intelligence community professionals.

My assessment of NYPD’s decision to release its report to the public through the media may seem harsh. Many will argue that the public has a right to know and can better assist law enforcement if evidences of radicalization are generally known. If the NYPD report had been intended to raise public awareness or to solicit public assistance, I would concede that public release of the document would have been necessary. However, that was not the stated purpose behind NYPD’s report. The document, according to Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Adviser to the President of the Rand Corporation, a powerfully influential government “think tank,” the NYPD report contained sensitive information that would be utilized best only by the intelligence and law enforcement communities. Jenkins, who contributed an “outside expert’s view” to the report itself, assessed the NYPD report and unwittingly provided a strong argument for why the report should have been labeled “law enforcement sensitive” with limited distribution:

The utility of the NYPD model, however, goes beyond analysis. It will inform the training of intelligence analysts and law enforcement personnel engaged in counterterrorist missions. It will allow us to identify similarities and differences, and changes in patterns over time. It will assist prosecutors and courts in the very difficult task of deciding when the boundary between a bunch of guys sharing violent fantasies and a terrorist cell determined to go operational has been crossed. Above all, by identifying key junctions in the journey to terrorist jihad, it should help in the formulation of effective and appropriate strategies aimed at peeling potential recruits away from a dangerous and destructive course.

Of course, now that every current or future radical Muslim can study NYPD’s ninety-page guide to the radicalization process and how law enforcement can detect and deter it, the work of law enforcement and intelligence professionals just became much more difficult. Did NYPD learn nothing from intelligence reports confirming that after the New York Times ill-advisedly exposed the NSA’s terrorist domestic surveillance program in 2005, al Qaeda quickly altered its operational methods and stopped making the types of phone calls the NSA had successfully monitored? The NYPD’s report, and more importantly the choice to release it publicly to bask in the accolades it generated, will certainly render useless all law enforcement training on Islamic radicalization for years to come, as radical American imams and their followers will merely adopt new behaviors and strategies to counter what they now know law enforcement will be looking for.

In NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly’s preface, he clearly established the intended target audience for the intelligence report:

The aim of this report is to assist policymakers and law enforcement officials, both in Washington and throughout the country, by providing a thorough understanding of the kind of threat we face domestically. It also seeks to contribute to the debate among intelligence and law enforcement agencies on how best to counter this emerging threat by better understanding what constitutes the radicalization process.

“Policymakers,” “law enforcement officials,” “debate among intelligence and law enforcement agencies on how to counter this emerging threat.” There was no mention of public awareness or citizen assistance. It is unfortunate that the Commissioner did not display wisdom, OPSEC, or even common sense by disseminating the report only to what he identified above as his target audience.

Now that the report has been released to the public and Commissioner Ray Kelly had his spotlight moments in subsequent press conferences, a brief review of the document is in order, as it provided much food for thought for both the intelligence/law enforcement communities and the general American populace. The report and Commissioner Kelly’s press conferences also contained several controversial paragraphs and statements that revealed as much about the analysts who wrote the report as they did about radicalized American Muslims. Both aspects merit further analysis.

From the NYPD report:

…Much different from the Israeli-Palestinian equation, the transformation of a Western-based individual to a terrorist is not triggered by oppression, suffering, revenge, or desperation.

Rather, it is a phenomenon that occurs because the individual is looking for an identity and a cause and unfortunately, often finds them in the extremist Islam.

The wording of this section contained a blatantly Palestinian-apologist bias, ascribing the motives of Palestinian terrorists to “oppression, suffering, revenge, or desperation,” presumably heaped upon them by Jews in general or Israel in particular. It is the height of irresponsibility to provide terrorists with political or religious justification for their heinous acts, yet the NYPD did exactly that by drawing a non-existent distinction between what motivates Western Muslims and Palestinian Muslims to radicalize.

Palestinian youth, mirroring their Western counterparts, are also “looking for an identity and a cause,” and they too find it in extreme Islam. The only real difference in the radicalization process between the two is that the Palestinian lives in much closer proximity to his most hated enemy and skirmishes between Jews and Muslims are obviously more frequent and create lasting impressions. Recruitment and indoctrination are much easier among Palestinian youth because they are more likely to know or be related to someone who has died for “the cause,” either during attacks on Israeli soldiers or in a suicide bombing. Such martyrs are treated as religious heroes, and their names are revered.

It is a universal aspiration of youth to be a “hero,” and Palestinian youth are taught from a very young age that there are eternal rewards for terrorism. Not many young Muslims in Michigan collect “martyr cards,” as their Palestinian counterparts do. These cards are similar to American baseball cards but bear the image and pertinent life details of those who detonate themselves to kill “infidels.” Proximity to a conflict and a desire to “fit in” cannot be underestimated in its effect on future radicalization. Unfortunately, NYPD’s analysts not only underestimated those factors among Palestinians, but reinforced the highly questionable assumption that Palestinians are justified in their acts because of the “Israeli-Palestinian equation.” Terrorism, particularly against civilians, never should be given credibility by a law enforcement agency that has witnessed its effects firsthand and will likely do so in the future.

A strong point of the report was its analysis of the role of the Internet in spreading radical jihadist Islamic ideology throughout the world, and more specifically the West:

The jihadist ideology combines the extreme and minority interpretation [jihadi-Salafi] of Islam with an activist-like commitment or responsibility to solve global political grievances through violence. Ultimately, the jihadist envisions a world in which jihadi-Salafi Islam is dominant and is the basis of government.

This ideology is proliferating in Western democracies at a logarithmic rate. The Internet, certain Salafi-based NGO’s (non-governmental organizations), extremist sermons /study groups, Salafi literature, jihadi videotapes, extremist - sponsored trips to radical madrassas and militant training camps abroad have served as “extremist incubators” for young, susceptible Muslims -- especially ones living in diaspora communities in the West.

The Internet is a driver and enabler for the process of radicalization. In the Self-Identification phase, the Internet provides the wandering mind of the conflicted young Muslim or potential convert with direct access to unfiltered radical and extremist ideology.

It also serves as an anonymous virtual meeting place—a place where virtual groups of like-minded and conflicted individuals can meet, form virtual relationships and discuss and share the jihadi-Salafi message they have encountered.

The NYPD report correctly identified the Internet as, what Commissioner Kelly later called it, “the new Afghanistan,” or new battleground against Islamic extremism. The problem is that the Internet is used by countless groups of all political and religious stripes to spread their hateful ideologies. The KKK, Aryan Nation, criminal gangs of all nationalities, cults, and other groups that advocate offensive or dangerous ideologies all have presence on the Internet and communicate with each other through that medium. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the means to obtain legal authorization to monitor traffic on such Internet sites under certain conditions, but can do virtually nothing to prevent young Muslims from visiting the sites and being influenced by what they read there. Commissioner Kelly rightly pointed to the Internet as a critical battleground, but offered no insight into what NYPD’s intelligence division would recommend as an effective strategy to counteract the corrosive influence of the Internet.

The absence of such recommendations likely indicated that NYPD analysts had none to offer, but in their defense, analysts of other agencies are also at a loss. The free-flow of ideas on the Internet is the backbone of its usefulness. All measures to impose content controls or restrict access to the Internet are met with fierce opposition from free speech advocates who argue that once the government assumes control of or censors the Internet on American servers, the freedom and privacy of Internet users will be forfeited. That reality presents the daunting task of formulating a strategy to counter the influence of a radical ideology that threatens our very existence yet can be embraced in the living rooms and bedrooms of any home in America equipped with a computer.

How successful will American law enforcement and intelligence agencies be in detecting and identifying Americans on the path to Islamic extremism? The NYPD report provided an accurate but chilling answer:

The individuals are not on the law enforcement radar. Most have never been arrested or involved in any kind of legal trouble. Other than some commonalities in age and religion, individuals undergoing radicalization appear as “ordinary” citizens, who look, act, talk, and walk like everyone around them. In fact, in the United Kingdom, it is precisely those “ordinary” middle class university students who are sought after by local extremists because they are “clean skins.”

Detecting future terrorists who “look, act, talk, and walk like everyone around them” presents a challenge unlike any previously faced by American law enforcement and Intelligence agencies. The task is further complicated by political correctness and a tendency in the media and among political liberals to accuse the Bush administration of exaggerating the threat that Islamic extremism poses to America and its allies. The NYPD report confirms that the War on Terror, a term Democrats refuse to acknowledge or use today despite their initial enthusiastic embrace of it when it was politically profitable, is increasing in its intensity. What some call a Bush Administration “bumper sticker slogan” is a very real ideological war being waged in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Britain, and in American homes of youths searching for an identity, hero status, and like-minded social contacts.

As long as there is heroism in terrorism, the ideology will continue to spread at an alarming rate. The NYPD report, like most previous assessments by other agencies, provided little encouragement that an effective counter strategy can be crafted.

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"Sanctuary" Nearly Fatal For Fort Dix

At first glance, the plot by six recently converted Islamic terrorists to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey with automatic weapons seemed like a ridiculous idea. Why attack a target that was defended by armed security and had, within the confines of the military base, tactical response teams that could respond with significant force and firepower to repel the attack? How did they decide to target Fort Dix?

Media coverage of the foiled plot has offered a mixture of praise for the FBI and condemnation of everyone from President Clinton (for intervening in the former Yugoslavia and sheltering uprooted ethnic Albanians in New Jersey) to President Bush (for encouraging terrorism by our presence in Iraq). However, three sources offered even-keeled and informative reporting and analysis.

The first was a good general account of the plot and the arrest operation in the Washington Post yesterday that detailed each participant as well as how an alert video store clerk tipped off the FBI in 2006 after the co conspirators requested that a VHS videotape be converted into DVD format. The file contained video of the group training at a firearms range while calling for Jihad and importuning the name of “Allah.” The article also provided links to the criminal complaint and affidavit filed by the U.S. Attorney’s office and the FBI. Those documents present a complete description of the defendants, their actions, and their intentions.

The second source was a blog I read regularly, In From the Cold, the author of which often has unique perspectives, particularly on issues involving the military or military intelligence. In a post Tuesday titled “Terror Plot Thwarted,” the author, Spook86, addressed the knee-jerk question many likely had when they first read that the terrorists intended to attack a “secure” military base. Spook86 described some of the inner workings of military bases like Fort Dix, and focused on the security weaknesses that are common to all such facilities. Food delivery drivers bringing eagerly anticipated meals are a welcome and mundane sight at military bases and federal buildings for that matter, and entering the base under the guise of pizza delivery was a well selected tactic. Taxis, shuttle buses, food delivery, all of these are so common that they are rarely screened properly, especially if the driver is recognized by security guards. If you thought a military base on American soil was too secure to be a viable target for terrorists, you will reconsider that position after reading In From the Cold’s analysis of the plot’s potential success.

The third source, and certainly the most disturbing, was yesterday's Fox News story that reported the immigration/citizenship status of the terrorists. According to Fox News interviews with a federal law enforcement source, three of the terrorists were living illegally in the United States. While it may not be unusual for known terrorists to enter the United States illegally, the immigration pattern of these previously unknown terrorists will sound familiar to those who are concerned about America's porous borders. Three of the terrorists, the Duka brothers, were apparently smuggled into the United States near Brownsville, Texas in 1984, when they were children between ages 1-6, along with other family members. The family settled in New Jersey, and, to fit the hotly debated stereotype of so many illegal immigrants, worked various blue collar jobs into adulthood. Of the six terrorists arrested for plotting to assault Fort Dix, one was a cab driver, three were roofers, one worked as a 7-11 clerk, and one worked at his father's pizza restaurant. It was as a delivery driver that one of the terrorists obtained extensive knowledge of base operations. These blue collar hard working illegal aliens were seemingly assimilating into American society, just trying to find a better life than the one they left behind in their home country. Stop me if this story sounds familiar.

These young, hard working blue collar illegal immigrants, however, became enamored with the ideology and "heroism" of al Qaeda and were inspired by the recorded last "wills" of the 9/11 hijackers and according to the Fox report, the group watched video footage containing terrorist training instructions, including simulated and actual attacks on U.S. military personnel. In time, the group progressed from embracing ideology to actively plotting attacks on a variety of nearby targets, eventually escalating to the point where they attempted to purchase automatic weapons from an FBI informant who had infiltrated this illegal immigrant terrorist cell. That is when the FBI made its move. The outrageous aspect of this story is that these terrorists were known to local law enforcement (not as terrorists of course) long before they mutated into al-Qaeda wannabes, but because of city ordinances prohibiting police officers from questioning an individual's immigration or citizenship status, they continued living, working, and plotting in their neighborhood rather than being arrested, included in illegal immigrant databases, or deported. Fox News reported:

FOX News has also learned that there were 19 traffic citations against the Duka brothers, but according to a federal law enforcement source, because they operated in so-called "sanctuary cites," where law enforcement does not routinely tell the Homeland Security Department about illegal immigrants in their towns, none of the tickets raised red flags.

The terrorists in this case scouted multiple targets before choosing Fort Dix because of their familiarity with and proximity to it. If you live near a military base or government installation, be extra vigilant and report any suspicious activity immediately, because if you live in a "sanctuary" city, your city government has tied the hands of law enforcement and placed you in danger. It is no exaggeration when the President states that we must be right 100% of the time to prevent an attack, while the terrorists only have to get it right once. This group might have gotten it right had it not been for the DVD request and an alert store clerk’s willingness to take action. In this case, a Circuit City store clerk did more to protect homeland security than the local government. Rather than protect its citizens, local governments instead offered "sanctuary" to America-hating illegal immigrants who came alarmingly close to slaughtering many of America's finest at Fort Dix.