FBI's Terror Cold Shoulder to ICE Justified

Congressmen and citizens are outraged that six years after 9/11, government agencies investigating suspected terrorists continue to stonewall each other. Specifically, allegations citing a lack of cooperation on terror investigations between Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and FBI agents sparked a Senate Judiciary Committee investigation conducted by the Inspector General offices of the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice. The results of that joint investigation into failed cooperation were the focus of an AP report picked up by Fox News yesterday, and after reviewing the story Americans likely developed feelings of sympathy for victimized ICE agents while simultaneously forming harsh judgments of the FBI for its seeming refusal to share information on terror investigations with ICE. Both of those conclusions are wrong. While the FBI certainly holds its terrorist information close to the vest due the sensitive and even classified nature of those investigations, the FBI sometimes does so for good reason.

A news story today, seemingly unrelated to the AP story described above, served to illustrate why the FBI may have been reluctant to work closely and share sensitive investigative details with ICE agents. The Washington Times article, “U.S. Agents Accused of Aiding Islamist Scheme,” opened with the following paragraphs:

A criminal investigations report says several U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services employees are accused of aiding Islamic extremists with identification fraud and of exploiting the visa system for personal gain.

The confidential 2006 USCIS report said that despite the severity of the potential security breaches, most are not investigated "due to lack of resources" in the agency's internal affairs department.

"Two District Adjudications Officers are allegedly involved with known (redacted) Islam terrorist members," said the internal document obtained by The Washington Times.

The fact that USCIS employees have provided Islamic radicals with visas, travel documents, and counterfeit identification, as reported by the Times, should have spurred Congress to act quickly and decisively to establish effective oversight of USCIS. Instead, Congress allowed USCIS to investigate itself, and in typical “fox guarding the hen house” fashion, to date it has conducted no investigations.

Although USCIS and ICE are technically separate agencies, ICE is the law enforcement arm of USCIS and the two agencies utilize a free flow of information including joint access to Customs and Immigration computer databases. In reality, USCIS and ICE are the law enforcement equivalent of conjoined twins, separate entities that share the same organs and would not survive if separated. Infection, or in this case corruption, in one was certain to spread to the other, and it did so. The Times further reported:

Another investigation involved more than seven USCIS and Immigration and Custom's Enforcement (ICE) employees — including special agents and senior district managers — who were moving contraband via "diplomatic pouches" to the United States from China.

ICE — the original investigating agency — downgraded the criminal investigation to a managerial problem, and the case was never prosecuted, a source close to the investigation said.

Given this relationship it is easy to see why FBI agents conducting counterterrorism investigations are reticent in their cooperation with ICE or flatly decline to share investigative data. If an agent cannot be sure that the information he has been asked to share with ICE will not end up in the hands of USCIS or ICE employees in a position to aid Islamic radicals, he would be justified in withholding that information.

Further reinforcing the FBI’s suspicions of ICE/USCIS is the troubling fact that in March USCIS established an Office of Security and Integrity to crack down on internal corruption, but as of today’s Times report, none of the sixty-five vacancies for internal investigators first advertised in March had been filled. With that shoddy record of internal corruption reform hanging over its head, it is no wonder that the FBI and other agencies targeting potential terrorists in America are more than a little reluctant to collaborate with ICE/USCIS.

Placed in the context of ICE/USCIS corruption and assistance with legal identification documents for Islamic radicals posing as Hispanics, The AP story accusing the FBI of failing to cooperate with ICE/USCIS should be looked at in a different light. The first two paragraphs, that yesterday created the impression that the FBI was simply being irrationally uncooperative toward ICE on terror investigations, make much more sense today to those unfamiliar with the core issue between the two agencies:

Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents ignored or dropped leads and at times entire cases involving terrorist activities because of disputes with the FBI, says a report by federal officials released Monday.

In examining 10 cases that began at ICE and were taken over by the FBI, the inspectors general of the Homeland Security and the Justice departments found that seven suffered from lack of cooperation until they were taken over by the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which the FBI controls.

Examined through the lens of the AP story only, the FBI seemed overly territorial at a time when information sharing between agencies is considered the most critical tool in the War on Terror. Yet when viewed together with today’s Times report on USCIS/ICE corruption, the puzzle pieces fall into place. It should surprise no one that the FBI was more comfortable cooperating when the investigations were taken over by an investigative task force under its own control, and through which it could track the dissemination of sensitive information. That level of operational security (OPSEC) is essential to any agency responsible for national security-related information.

There are always two sides to a story, and in the case of alleged FBI non-cooperation with USCIS/ICE, it takes the melding of two stories to form a complete explanation for why that non-cooperation may have been justified and continues to occur. It is rare to find an example of a situation in which information sharing between agencies may not be in the best interests of America. However, until USCIS/ICE produces tangible evidence of internal corruption reform including indictments, employment terminations, arrests, and prosecutions, the FBI would be wise to continue its tight controls over terrorism-related investigations.

Technorati Tags:
FBI, USCIS, ICE, Islamic Radicals, Aiding Terrorists, Information Sharing, Joint Investigations, Government Corruption, Congressional Oversight, OPSEC, War on Terror

Musharraf Orders to Attack Known Terrorists Ignored by Pakistani Military: Military, Government Officials Too Cozy with Radicals

In a fascinating but ultimately disturbing illustration of the internal struggles facing President Musharraf of Pakistan, adnkronosinternational recently reported a growing rift between Musharraf and the Pakistani military, particularly the Pakistani Air Force. Though noticed by Counterterrorism Blog, this particular incident has received surprisingly little media attention despite its ramifications.

To establish the context, last week terrorist bombings were carried out in Peshawar and Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital city. Two Pakistani Taliban leaders, Ghazi Abdul Rasheed and Maulana Abdul Aziz, determined by Pakistani Intelligence to be responsible for the bombings, subsequently took shelter in the compound housing Islamabad’s largest radical madrassa. Thus within the capital city, two known terrorist leaders were hiding in plain sight. Musharraf has been provoked significantly in recent years by Rasheed and Aziz. For example, in 2004 Rasheed and Aziz issued a religious decree, signed by 500 Pakistani “Islamic scholars”, against Pakistani military personnel battling with Al Qaeda in South Waziristan. The decree, which included a refusal to allow Muslim burials in Muslim cemeteries for Pakistani soldiers killed in South Waziristan, resulted in a large number of Pakistani forces refusing to fight Al Qaeda in that region.

In 2005, following the London subway bombings, Musharraf attempted to reign in the radical madrassas in Pakistan, as British investigators determined that the perpetrators of those bombings had been radicalized in the very madrassas challenging Musharraf's anti-terror efforts. Washington and London have since demanded Rasheed and Aziz be arrested, and Pakistani security obtained warrants for both clerics, who cannot leave the Islamabad madrassa for fear of being taken into custody.

Incensed by last weeks attacks, particularly the strike in the capital city, Musharraf weighed his military options and according to a US military intelligence source consulted by Counterterrorism Blog, ordered the Pakistani Army to attack the madrassa and capture or kill Rasheed and Aziz. The Pakistani Army reportedly refused because such an assault would be met with massive resistance from students of the radical clerics. Musharraf this week ordered the Pakistani Air Force to conduct surgical air strikes against the Islamabad madrassa harboring Rasheed and Aziz., but the Air Force refused. As a useful comparison, an equivalent would be a scenario in which terrorists detonated a bomb in Washington, DC, and those responsible for ordering the bombing were hiding in a known location in Washington protected by thousands of loyal radical religious students, many heavily armed, who support the terrorists. President Bush orders the US Army to attack the building and capture or kill the terrorists and the US Army refuses. President Bush then orders a surgical air strike against the building, and the US Air Force refuses. What would be the reason for the refusal? In Pakistan’s case, it was because the military forces have close ties to the radical groups of the same religion to which the soldiers and pilots belong.

According to adnkronosinternational, while meeting with senior Pakistani officials, Musharraf stated the following regarding Rasheed and Aziz, "I don’t want them in federal capital. If you are unable to arrest them…shoot them." Considering the number of assassination attempts Musharraf has survived, mainly from Al Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban followers, the air strike order is understandable. To tolerate the presence of known terrorists responsible for bombings within the capital city would further weaken Musharraf's already tenuous control of his own government. Musharraf’s air strike order was reportedly met with the following reaction:

Those attending reportedly disagreed categorically with the idea of an air strike in the capital city, and pointed out that the students of the influential clerics have already staged a powerful protest in the past few days against the demolition of two mosques in Islamabad and they are a force to be reckoned with.

In essence, the Pakistani Air Force refused the order out of fear of reprisal and protest from radical Islamic students in the capital city. Musharraf appears to be in political peril, unable even to strike or arrest terrorists who bomb Islamabad and take shelter in a nearby building. More ominously, his military commanders are largely operating independently, shaping the intensity, or lack thereof, of Pakistani efforts in the War on Terror. In a previous post I discussed at length the issue of Pakistan’s half-hearted investigations and arrests of known terrorists within that country. Considering the level of control the radical Islamists are exerting over the government and military of Pakistan, the question of how long Musharraf can continue to function as president becomes of grave concern, particularly to the future of neighboring Afghanistan. Emboldened by the political emasculation of Musharraf and operating with virtually no fear of opposition, Talibani and Al Qaeda leaders will likely increase internal pressure on President Karzai.

Counterterrorism Blog crystallized into one sentence the troubling concern this incident raises, “if Musharraf is unable to order an air strike in his own capital city, how can he control his nuclear arsenal?”

What President Bush considers a staunch ally in the War on Terror is impotent to eradicate or even suppress radical Islam within is borders. If the War on Terror can only be won through internal reform of Islam itself, Pakistan provides cause for pessimism that reform is desired or even possible in one of Islam’s largest nations.


Technorati Search Tags: Islamabad Bombing Pakistani Air Force Ghazi Abdul Rasheed Maulana Abdul Aziz Radical Madrassas Islamic Terrorists London Subway Bombings Pakistani military Musharraf Al Qaeda Islamic Extremist

4 Hand Grenades, 1 handgun and a Partridge . . .

Yesterday, the FBI thwarted a plot by an Illinois man to acquire 4 grenades and a handgun, and detonate the grenades on December 22nd in the CherryVale shopping mall in Rockford, Illinois. The 22 year old suspect, Talib Abu Salam Ibn Shareef, claimed he wanted to conduct “violent jihad” during what he believed would be the busiest evening for Christmas shopping, as the 22nd would be the Friday of Christmas weekend. The date and target site were selected with the desire to inflict maximum casualties among shoppers. Shareef reportedly met with an undercover FBI agent in the mall parking lot and attempted to trade 2 stereo speakers for 4 grenades (which were of course inert) and a handgun.

It seems this self-proclaimed terrorist has not been monitoring the news lately, because he seems to have missed the Iraq Study Group (ISG) report, which should have pacified any terrorist who still believed our nation had the stomach to fight terrorists. Since the Iraq study group came to the laughable conclusion that we are creating terrorism by our presence in Iraq, and that if we leave Iraq, terrorists will stop plotting to kill Americans, their recommendation to tuck tail and flee Iraq in shame should have doused the flame of radical Islam roaring in Shareef. Apparently radical Islam did not get the congratulatory memo from the ISG granting victory to the terrorists, since they are still fomenting terrorist acts against America despite our obvious move toward a withdrawal. Will leaving Iraq end the radical Islamic desire to kill Americans? Of course not. Shareef is living proof of this fact.

The ISG also declared that settling the eternal war between Israel and its neighbors will end terrorism. Oh! I thought ending terrorism required something challenging, but if all it takes is ending the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, then we should have that wrapped up before Christmas, right James Baker? To the members of the ISG, if our tremendous military could not eliminate the “insurgents,” why should anyone believe the Iraqi military and police forces will succeed in protecting and preserving this newly established democratically elected government? We rushed to push Sadaam out of Kuwait because he was supplanting an existing government, not even a democracy. Now in Iraq, millions braved suicide bombers and IEDs and snipers to vote and establish a democracy, and you recommend leaving this fledgling government to protect itself because things are tough there? Sadly, the ISG proved that countless years of experience (who knew Sandra Day O’Connor was a military and counter-terrorism expert?) do not automatically produce wisdom to match.

What is surprising is that despite all of the political thriller books, television programs, and movies depicting small cells of terrorists in the USA carrying out acts like the one planned by Shareef, none have occurred. Yet. Israel has borne the brunt of shopping mall and restaurant bombings, largely due to its proximity to its enemies. We have been fortunate to avoid such widespread, small-scale attacks. Yet during our period of good fortune, our enemies have made deep inroads into American culture and have become experts in using our personal liberties to conceal their true intentions. The question no one wants to think about, the nightmare for the intelligence and law enforcement communities is “how many Talib Shareefs are there among us?” The chilling follow-up question is “can we catch them all before they strike?” As anyone in the intelligence or law enforcement field will admit, the answer is no. We cannot be right 100% of the time, and the resources are simply not sufficient (nor is the public willing) to secure all potential targets. One need only look at the public paranoia (encouraged by the MSM) over surveillance provisions of the Patriot Act to know we will eventually be defeated from within, not from without. No global power will land on our shores and conquer us. We will fold from within, as we have been doing since Vietnam and continue to do at an ever increasing rate in the War on Terror.

This raises a critical issue that receives insufficient attention. Since terrorism is a product of ideology, can we really wage war on it? Our military and intelligence personnel have discovered that killing “insurgents” does not serve as a sufficient deterrent when fighting an enemy that views martyrdom and suicide bombing as a path to eternal glory. They will never openly confront our far superior military on any battlefield, but will continue to strike with small scale but lethal tactics until they frustrate their mighty opponent in Iraq and convince the American public (with ample and gleeful assistance from the MSM) that the fight is not worth it (which has already been accomplished). Perhaps we have all forgotten that whether or not the Iraq Conflict is a cornerstone in the larger War on Terror, the name of the military operation there was, and remains, Operation Iraqi Freedom. The name is not “Operation Iraqi Freedom Unless it Becomes Difficult or Grave.” Iraqi Freedom. How long is too long to fight to preserve freedom?

Complicating the matter is the fact that conversion of young Islamic radicals to a Jihad-ready ideology is occurring at an alarming rate in America. The home grown terrorist poses enormous investigative and prosecutorial nightmares in a society based on individual liberties. The FBI and other agencies are relatively proficient at tracking persons with known terrorist ties who visit the US. However, as the Shareef mall grenade plot demonstrates, attacks planned by home grown terrorists usually are discovered only when an informant (a friend, neighbor, or family member) reports them to law enforcement. Many assassins and attackers in the planning stages cannot help but boast of what they intend to do. It is an often irrepressible human urge. Islamic radicals, if they discuss their planned attacks, will not boast to “infidels” but to others of their faith and, they hope, sympathetic brothers and sisters in that faith. This is the key to winning the War on Terror. Muslims need to demonstrate that they truly belong to a religion of peace by policing their communities and yes, informing on those with ties to radical factions espousing violence. Until this happens regularly and as a matter of course in predominantly Muslim communities, the potential for attacks like Shareef’s will only increase.

An eternal debt of gratitude is owed to the friend who contacted the FBI in time to prevent a Christmas tragedy in Illinois.

FBI CSAG Iraq Jihad James Baker War On Terror Iraq Study Group radical Islam