For WaPo, 25% is "Balanced" Coverage

The Washington Post has a math problem. The term “balanced” usually implies equal representation, with both sides of an issue presented and the reader given the opportunity to choose between them. However, as today’s Washington Post illustrates, the Post believes that “fair and balanced” is achieved when one side of an issue is given 75 percent representation and the other is afforded only 25 percent. This imbalance did not surprise me given the Post’s well-documents liberal slant, but because the unequal representation of views involved the critical topic of why Islamists hate America, I felt it deserved critical analysis.

In today’s Post, the editors tackled the important issue of America as seen through the eyes of Islam by including articles written by four “Muslim Scholars.” The theme of the Post collection of articles, “One Islam, Many Circles” was clearly designed to create the impression that the articles by these four scholars would represent distinct differences in ideology and help answer the question every American ponders: “Why do they hate us?” One of the articles actually bore that title, and while that particular piece began in an engaging pro-American manner, it quickly degenerated into another blame America first argument, albeit couched in what to some may seem reasonable logic. After reading each of the four articles by these “scholars,” it was obvious that by the Post’s mathematics, three articles blaming America for Islamic terrorism and one article identifying Islam itself as the problem constitutes fair and balanced coverage of an issue.

The first article I examined was “Why Do They Hate Us?” by the author of the novel The Reluctant Fundamentalist, Mohsin Hamid. Hamid’s piece started out with ample pro-American “feel good” sentimentality, wistfully recounting his early childhood in America and his patriotic American roots. Hamid then returns with his family to his native Pakistan as a nine year old boy, and describes his hometown of Lahore as a fun, peaceful, liberal city, with nightclubs, and other western forms of entertainment. In this nearly-idyllic setting, Hamid’s beloved Lahore quickly degenerated into a city filled with Islamic radicals carrying AK-47s who enforced strict codes of dress and morality and terrorized the city with crime waves and brutality. Who was responsible for this terrible transformation of Pakistan? After listing his pro-American credentials in the article, Hamid answered this question with the inevitable liberal response: America was to blame for Lahore’s demise and Pakistan’s radicalization.

Hamid’s description of how America’s role in training and equipping Mujaheddin fighters to battle with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan painted the portrait of a careless America that never should have interfered with that effort to drive out the Soviets. In Hamid’s version of history, America was only concerned about Afghanistan because of its proximity to Persian Gulf oil, and the flow of guns and heroin from the Mujaheddin training camps forever destroyed the liberal peace and fun of Lahore. This analysis begs the question that Hamid ignored rather conveniently in his description of events as he remembered them: what would have happened to Lahore and for that matter all of Pakistan had Afghanistan fallen permanently to the Soviets? How long does Hamid think that Pakistan would have remained untouched or unconsumed by Soviet expansion had the Mujaheddin, with some U.S. support, not convinced the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan? Perhaps Hamid should have directed his blame for the loss of Lahore’s peaceful condition on those who aggressively invaded Afghanistan and created the need for a Mujaheddin uprising in the first place: the Soviets. Was the U.S. supposed to do nothing when its Cold War communist enemy invaded a neighboring and strategically located nation? Apparently Hamid thinks so.

A warning to readers: if you start reading an article by a Muslim “scholar” and the piece opens with a lengthy attempt to establish the author’s pro-American credentials, you can be assured that immediately following that literary ruse you will find that the author’s premise is anything but pro-American. Hamid opens with talk of Star Trek, MASH, and barbeque chicken, but he concludes with warnings that America must educate itself about the foreign policy blunders of its past and that America must stop trying to be a superpower, all while admitting that he no longer lives in America but hopes America will correct its problems. That is what passes as Muslim “scholarship” at the Washington Post. A hint to Post editors: a “Muslim scholar” is not someone who is Muslim, has a PhD or writes novels, and will write opinions that fit your paper’s political bias. A “Muslim scholar” is someone who dedicates his/her educational and professional career to the study of Islam and is willing to challenge its accepted practices.

In fairness, Hamid wrote one very good paragraph during his “pro-America” smokescreen which unintentionally captured what is surely one of the primary reasons why America is hated in many corners of the world:

Part of the reason people abroad resent the United States is something Americans can do very little about: envy. The richest, most powerful country in the world attracts the jealousy of others in much the same way that the richest, most powerful man in a small town attracts the jealousy of others. It will come his way no matter how kind, generous or humble he may be.

The following paragraph, however, contained the first hint that a transition to “blame America first” was coming:

But there is another major reason for anti-Americanism: the accreted residue of many years of U.S. foreign policies. These policies are unknown to most Americans. They form only minor footnotes in U.S. history. But they are the chapter titles of the histories of other countries, where they have had enormous consequences. America's strength has made it a sort of Gulliver in world affairs: By wiggling its toes it can, often inadvertently, break the arm of a Lilliputian.

Hamid then takes the article’s readers to his “sleepy” and peaceful Lahore, Pakistan before, in his opinion, America ruined the region. The troubling truth is that Hamid’s article, of the three “blame America first” Post pieces, was the best presented and most reasoned argument.

The two other Post articles by purported “Muslim scholars” were “As American as You Are,” and “What Went Wrong? Bush Still Doesn’t Get It.” The first of these was an in-your-face “like it or not we’re here to stay and you better get used to it” approach penned by another Muslim novelist (again, novelist and scholar are synonymous only at the Post), and the second is, as its title suggests, a further “blame America first” contribution. These two articles are related to each other in that they both contain misrepresentations of religion. In “As American as You Are,” author Mohja Kahf defends radical Islam (in which she was raised) by trying to put its excesses on an equivalent moral plane with what she considered the extremes of Christianity:

This Muslim squirms whenever secular friends -- tolerant toward believers in Buddhism, Judaism, Hinduism, Islam and Native American spirituality -- dismiss Christians with snorts of contempt. "It's because the Christian right wants to take over this country," they protest.

That may be, but it doesn't justify trashing the religion and its spectrum of believers. Christianity has inspired Americans to the politics of abolition and civil rights, as well as to heinous acts. Christian values have motivated the Ku Klux Klan to burn houses, and Jimmy Carter to build them.

This is not a new argument, but it ignores a profound truth that invalidates this type of moral equivalency defense: when believers of any faith murder under the guise of religion, regardless of self-declared righteous motives, they have moved beyond the tenets of faith and are engaging in pure evil not compatible with belief in any form of higher power. Thus it is error to ascribe even warped Christian values to the KKK or to associate extreme Muslim values with al Qaeda. Both groups are engaged in evil, not in religious fervor.

Kahf also put forth a disingenuous argument that America is too demanding of Muslims in its expectations for assimilation. In her words:

Assimilation is overrated. And it's not what minority religions do in the United States. Did Irish Catholics stop being Catholic when they arrived generations ago? People once believed that devout Catholics and Orthodox Jews could never be "true Americans." Today, I receive e-mails with solemn lists of why Muslims, "according to their own faith," can't possibly be "loyal Americans." The work of nut jobs. Yet purportedly sane people in Washington seem to think it's a valid question.

Rational Americans don’t expect Muslim immigrants to stop being Muslim during their naturalization process, and Kahf was misleading in her analogies with the assimilation of Catholic or Jewish immigrants. What Americans do expect, however, is that Muslims cooperate with law enforcement and purge the extremists among them who are engaged in treasonous activity. That is what Americans consider assimilation: loyalty to and preservation of America and its governmental system.

The related article, “What Went Wrong,” by Akbar Ahmed, the only actual Muslim scholar of the three authors, contained the typical anti-Bush talking points: U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq “poured gallons of fuel on a worldwide fire”; anti-Muslim rhetoric from the administration convince Muslims that they are under attack; the American media attacks on Islam. I guess Ahmed missed Hollywood’s intentional rewrite of Tom Clancy’s The Sum of All Fears, which replaced the terrorists who detonated a nuclear device at the Super Bowl, originally written by Clancy as Islamists, with white South African nationals in order to avoid casting Muslims in a bad light. Despite these less than scholarly liberal talking points, Ahmed did provide an interesting research conclusion about Islam. According to Ahmed, the Bush administration has erroneously stereotyped Islam as violent. Ahmed’s own studies actually indicated that Islam consists of more than just moderates or extremists:

...In fact, we discovered three broad categories of Muslim responses to the modern world: the mystics, the modernists and the literalists.

The mystics are the most tolerant and the least political, defined by a universalist worldview that embraces difference rather than resisting it. Muslims in this group look to sages such as the great Sufi poet Rumi for inspiration. "I go to a synagogue, church and a mosque, and I see the same spirit and the same altar," Rumi once said. You'll find today's mystics in such places as Iran, Morocco and Turkey.

That paragraph is a fascinating statement of Islamic scholarship. Ahmed wrote that “mystics” are the “most tolerant and the least political” division of Islam, yet when he listed the nations in which “mystics” are predominant, Iran is front and center. If Iran’s mullahs and President Ahmadinejad represent the most tolerant division of worldwide Islam, then a war against terrorism will see horrific escalations in the future. The government that has vowed to annihilate Israel in an atomic fireball, is the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorist groups, and is ignoring UN sanctions to develop nuclear weapon capabilities is the “most tolerant.” I wonder if Ahmed has considered what Iran would be like if it were not so “tolerant.” Ahmed surely did not intend to do so, but his own research merely served to validate the Bush administration’s stance: Islamic extremism is the single greatest danger to America and its allies.

Ahmed showed his liberal political stripes throughout his article, but beyond political ideology, he also revealed a profoundly pro-radical agenda in his caricature of Pakistani President Musharraf. Musharraf, as I have previously reported, last week declared war on Islamic extremists within Pakistan, openly pitting moderate and radical Islam against each other in what could be a battle royal for Islam’s future as a world faith. Musharraf declared himself with the moderates, yet Ahmed claimed Musharraf does not represent Pakistanis and the U.S. should work for his ouster from power. Either Ahmed wants to see radical Islam put in its place by more moderate elements or he does not, and if he does not, one must question his reasoning.

The fourth article, “Losing My Jihadism,” the only one of the four that offered any actual Muslim introspection, was authored by Mansour al-Nogaidan, a writer for a Bahraini newspaper. This author had the audacity to suggest that the problem of Islamists twisting doctrines to justify suicide bombings and attacks on innocent civilians was actually an internal problem solvable only within Islam. He called for an Islamic version of Marin Luther to lead Islam into a period of reform in which its extremes could be purged. Nowhere in this article was there any hint of the “blame America for terrorism” arguments so prominently featured in the other three, and in that light it was refreshing reading.

It would have been all the more refreshing had it been accompanied by a companion article by a Muslim scholar self-critical of Islam’s reluctance to rise up and quench its internal fires of extremism. Unfortunately in the mathematics of the Washington Post, one out of four constitutes journalistic balance.

Technorati Tags:
Islam, Mujaheddin, Terrorism, Pakistan, Musharraf, Lahore, Afghanistan, Mohsin Hamid, Mohja Kahf, Akbar Ahmed, Mansour al-Nogaidan, Islamic Reform

Pakistan a Moderate Muslim Test Case

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf could not have been more clear: "We are in direct confrontation with the extremist forces - it is moderates versus extremists." Yet instead of being encouraged by Musharraf's newly launched war to reform Islam from within, Lee Hamilton, former 9/11 Commission and Iraq Study Group member, recommended that the U.S. strike at al Qaeda in its Pakistani mountain safe haven on the Afghanistan border without Musharraf's consent. Hamilton cited several good reasons for taking unilateral action, specifically the importance of keeping al Qaeda on the run and unable to replenish itself. Hamilton also expressed evident disdain for Musharraf's insistence that Pakistani military forces conduct all raids against radical Islamist groups operating in Pakistan, an arrangement that Hamilton described as unacceptable. Hamilton joined Fox News Military analyst Colonel David Hunt in the "Musharraf is not our friend" chorus, and if Americans continue to sing that tune long and loudly enough, we will soon find few friends among the moderate Muslim leaders of the world.

Hamilton and Col. Hunt want what we all want: to see al Qaeda hunted down ruthlessly in their mountain sanctuaries as a deterrent to the rest of the world's radical Islamic terrorists and their potential recruits. The problem is that both men are fixated on the American "right" to conduct military operations within Pakistan even though Pakistan's moderate Muslim president and military leader has declared war on the extremists in his own nation and has now promised to confront radical Islamists in every corner of Pakistan.

Of course we want to strike al Qaeda, but doing so unilaterally without the consent of the president of the world's only Muslim nuclear nation would send precisely the wrong message to Muslims everywhere. Americans complain that not enough moderate Muslims are working to reform Islam by confronting its extremists, yet when we find one who happens to be a powerful figure with control of a small nuclear arsenal, Hamilton and Col. Hunt question his friendship and urge our leaders to ignore Musharraf's promise to purge the terrorists internally. Either we want Islam to reform itself or we don't. Hamilton and Col. Hunt cannot have it both ways.

I wrote previously about Musharraf's need for sovereignty, further postulating that the United States would never allow a foreign military to conduct strikes within our borders, as we would, like Musharraf, exercise our sovereignty and insist that our military remove the enemy from within our borders. It is no small matter for a president to permit a foreign military to cross his nation's borders and attack members, albeit radical ones, of his national religion. Therein lays the danger inherent in circumventing Musharraf's authority. His decision to publicly distinguish between moderate and extreme Islam, and further vow to "fight against extremism and terrorism no matter what province," has worsened his already precarious political position because a long-term battle against terrorists in Pakistan will require Musharraf to not relinquish command of the Pakistani military, a power he has personally retained despite calls for separation of his political and military role as President-General. Musharraf's military command, if he continues on the moderate path, is of great benefit to global security, as he keeps nuclear weapons in moderate hands.

Meanwhile, radicals within Pakistan salivate at the prospect of electing a president who shares their views and might use that arsenal to intimidate or annihilate their enemies. America finds itself in the position of having a moderate Muslim president-military dictator as perhaps its most valuable and vulnerable ally in the War on Terror.

Musharraf has successfully remained in power because of his strong hold on Pakistan's military establishment, though he faces danger in that realm from radical infiltration. If the United States were to ignore Musharraf's sovereign authority and send our military to conduct operations within Pakistan, it would directly challenge the one core strength he possesses: electorates rarely choose to change leaders in war time or when military confrontation is imminent. A U.S. strike, rather than a sustained Pakistani operation, would convince Pakistanis that Musharraf did not wield any international influence and could be replaced, since the U.S. would have shown little regard for whomever was Pakistan's president by handling the matter unilaterally. Musharraf is receiving criticism from every political party in Pakistan, some opposing his combative stance against radical Islam, and others decrying his determination to run for re-election without relinquishing control of the military.

Impatience is our sorest affliction in Iraq, as the House and Senate worked feverishly and at least for one night, sleeplessly, to withdraw from Iraq long before the full results of the surge strategy can be evaluated. That same impatience must not dictate precipitous U.S. action in Pakistan before allowing Musharraf's confrontation strategy to yield tangible results. Arguably the most militarily and politically powerful moderate Muslim in the world, Musharraf embodies the great question the non-Muslim world wants answered: Is Islam truly a moderate religion of peace, or does radical Islam hold sway in the hearts and minds of the majority?

If Musharraf's declared war against extremism within Islam succeeds in Pakistan, it would set a precedent to be followed in Muslim nations worldwide. If it is also true that moderate Muslims live in fear of the radicals in their midst, then we, and they, should sing Musharraf's praises for pitting himself squarely against the terrorists, rather than forming choruses that shriek about his perceived limitations.

Musharraf left no doubt about his commitment to victory in Pakistan's new war on extremism, reassuring his countrymen, "We will finish it off in every corner of the country." What greater victory could there be in a war against extremist terrorism than for a Muslim nation to clean its own house of terrorists? Let us not allow our national epidemic of impatience to cripple in Pakistan what may be the ultimate death knell for radical Islam: internal reform, by ideology if possible, but by the sword if necessary.

Technorati Tags:
Musharraf, Lee Hamilton, Colonel David Hunt, Pakistan, Al Qaeda, War on Terror, Moderate Muslims, Radical Islam

Musharraf: I Will Not Allow Extreme Islam

I had no sooner published my previous post about Colonel David Hunt’s assessment that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf “is not our friend,” titled “Fox Analyst Flays ‘Friend’ Musharraf,” when I came across today’s UK Telegraph article “Musharraf Declares War on Muslim Extremists.” After reading my earlier post and the following excerpts from the Telegraph story, it should be clear which side Musharraf is on in the War on Terror. While he may not be the perfect “friend” Col. Hunt apparently expects, his efforts to battle terrorists within Pakistan are exactly what we need from the leaders of all Muslim nations if Islamic extremism is ever to be defeated. In that light, Musharraf is our imperfect but certainly welcome friend despite Col. Hunt’s low opinion of him. Readers should decide whether these words published in the Telegraph are those of a friend or of an enemy, as Col. Hunt implied, in the War on Terror (Reuters photo courtesy of UK Telegraph):

…In a televised address to the nation, Gen Musharraf said that those inside the mosque and its adjacent madrassa, or Muslim college, were "terrorists" who directly threatened Pakistan's security. They had also tarnished Islam's reputation as a tolerant and peaceful religion.

"What do we as a nation want?" he asked. "What kind of Islam do these people represent? In the garb of Islamic teaching they have been training for terrorism. They prepared the madrassa as a fortress for war and housed other terrorists in there."

Gen Musharraf praised the army for wresting the mosque and its madrassa "from the hands of terrorists" and said: "I will not allow any madrassa to be used for extremism."

Isn’t this precisely what we have longed to hear from every Muslim leader in the world, a call to Muslims from Muslims to reject extremism and fight against those who tarnish Islam’s reputation? Other than allowing direct U.S. military action in Pakistan, which I discussed in more detail in my post earlier today, what more could Col. Hunt and other Musharraf critics hope for out of an embattled but courageous leader of the world’s only Muslim nuclear nation? For critics like Col. Hunt, what’s not to like about a moderate Muslim leader who raids radical mosques, kills barricaded extremist clerics firing upon government forces, and tells a nationwide audience that extremism is not consistent with true Islam and must be destroyed?

Musharraf’s televised address contained the strongest and most specific condemnation of extremism yet heard from a Muslim political figure, but perhaps more important than the condemnation was the call for Pakistani’s to ask themselves what kind of Pakistan and brand of Islam they want to represent, to themselves and the rest of the world.

Pakistan is rapidly careening towards a crossroads in its place in world history. It is a complicated combination of technological scientific achievement on the one hand and radical anti-modernization and religious oppression on the other. Musharraf’s statements and actions, placing his personal safety at continuous risk, clearly establish that he wants to help Pakistan develop into a modern and moderate Islamic nation. America and her allies should help Musharraf in every way possible to help Pakistan purge itself of the scourge of radical Islam rather than criticize him for not doing as much as we think he should within his own nation. If he invites U.S. military support in raiding the northern tribal areas infested with al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, then we should do so with relish. If, however, he continues to request that only Pakistani forces conduct these operations in Pakistan, then we should respect his authority and assist in every other way available.

It may well be crucial for Pakistan’s internal stability in the future that the nation purges its own Islamic extremist elements rather than allowing the U.S. to do so. Such a purge, conducted by Muslims against other Muslims by their own forces would be a clear statement of national purpose and unity in the name of preserving moderate Islam.

President Musharraf is a brave man who needs stalwart and patient friends to stand by him while he attempts to lead Pakistan through a period of nationwide religious introspection on the future direction of Islam in Pakistan. His address to his people, consistent with his continued contributions to the War on Terror, will hopefully silence Col. Hunt’s and other critics’ complaints that Musharraf is not “friend” enough for their liking.

Technorati Tags:
Musharraf, Pakistan, Red Mosque, Islamic Extremism, Televised Address, Madrassas, Terrorists, War on Extremists, War on Terror, Colonel David Hunt, Moderate Islam

Fox Analyst Flays "Friend" Musharraf

It is a rare occurrence when I must side with the usually left-leaning State Department on any issue that directly involves national security. However, when it comes to calls from certain quarters for the Bush administration to aggressively pressure Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to wage all out war on Islamic radicals hiding in the mountainous Afghanistan/Pakistan border, I found myself siding with Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs rather than Fox News military analyst Colonel David Hunt. Ordinarily I appreciate Col. Hunt’s blunt assessments and aggressive posture towards engaging the enemy with full purpose and force rather than limited rules of engagement, but Col. Hunt’s recommendations for conducting the War on Terror within Pakistan are fraught with dangers that he either minimizes or ignores in his online columns and cable news interviews.

A summary of a new threat assessment leaked to the Associated Press this week highlighted the reality that the Taliban and al Qaeda have regrouped and regained strength nearly on par with pre-9/11 levels, thriving in their mountain hideouts in the tribal regions of Pakistan’s northwestern border with Afghanistan. What to do about that reality is, next to Iraq, the most hotly debated issue in Washington. Counterterrorism and intelligence officials believe Musharraf has not done enough to root out the terrorists while accepting $100 million from the U.S. each month ostensibly to develop the local economy in the tribal areas where many find the money alternatively offered by terror groups and border smugglers irresistible. Musharraf has insisted that Pakistani forces execute all counterterrorism raids and operations within Pakistan, and the amount of success he has achieved forms the crux of the debate between the State Department’s approach toward Pakistan and the approach favored by Col. Hunt and others.

In his latest column at FoxNews.com, Col. Hunt wrote the following:

This week, we learned that in 2005, great guys from Seal Team 6, Special Forces, and other terrific Special Operations Organizations were sitting on a runway in Afghanistan, all geared up, ready to go and capture and or kill much of al Qaeda's top leadership. You remember al Qaeda; they’re the ones who killed us on September 11, 2001. Our supremely brave, conditioned and trained men were fully rehearsed, totally committed and ready to kick some serious al Qaeda [expletive].

They call him Rummy … or at least I do. He's the former and totally incompetent Secretary of Defense, who less than two years after 9/11 — two years after the president says “we will hunt them down” — decides that this mission was to be canceled. He makes this bone-headed decision because it might be “dangerous” and it might piss off the president of Pakistan. ARE YOU KIDDING ME? Hey, Mr. “Ask and Answer Your Own Questions,” everything about war is dangerous and General Musharraf is not our friend.

I do not fault Col. Hunt for his dislike of former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld or for his desire for Special Forces operations like the one he described to act swiftly and lethally to eliminate Bin Laden or other terrorist leaders. From a counterterrorism and military perspective, the idea that a Special Forces team had a specific location to hit within Pakistan and was prepared to strike but was denied the opportunity for political reasons is incredibly frustrating. It is easy for those of us who work in intelligence or related fields to conclude that though such an operation might anger Musharraf, the ends would justify the means, especially if Bin Laden were captured or killed. Yet that is precisely where Col. Hunt’s assessment of the missed opportunity and the risk to Musharraf drifts from understandable disappointment to dangerous miscalculation.

Col. Hunt’s assessment that “General Musharraf is not our friend” is shared by many within the intelligence and counterterrorism community, but it is based on unrealistic expectations for “friendship” in the War on Terror, as well as a dangerous underestimation of the Muslim power vacuum that would occur in nuclear-armed Pakistan should Musharraf lose control or be assassinated. Although Musharraf may not be the “friend” that Col. Hunt understandably hopes for, considering the seething cauldron of Islamic radicalism that surrounds him within his own population it is remarkable that he has survived to assist the U.S. as long as he has. Assistant Sec. of State Boucher defended Musharraf’s contributions to the War on Terror during a House committee hearing yesterday, as excerpted from the Washington Post:

At the hearing, Boucher said that Pakistan has "captured more al-Qaeda than any country in the world, and lost more people doing that." He added that Pakistani authorities had killed or captured three of the top 10 Taliban commanders in the border area over the past six to nine months -- and caught several more in the past week.

Boucher said that Pakistan has about 85,000 troops stationed in the border area, with Washington reimbursing Islamabad for its $100 million monthly expenses. Musharraf has promised the tribal leaders $100 million annually for 10 years, and the United States has pledged another $150 million annually for five years, in an effort to promote economic development as an alternative to smuggling and terrorism.

"These were all joint efforts with Pakistan that led to the elimination of some of the top Taliban leaders who had been operating from Pakistan to support the insurgency in Afghanistan," Boucher said.

He said that there are signs "every now and then that there's not a wholehearted effort at all levels in all institutions in Pakistan" -- a reference to news accounts of Pakistani intelligence officials supporting terrorists.

"We've raised those when we need to," Boucher said. When asked about Musharraf's role, he said, "I think if Pakistan was not fighting terrorism, there'd be no way we could succeed in Afghanistan or in terms of the security of our homeland."

The State Department and intelligence community are nearly always at odds over strategy and alliance issues, and nowhere is that more evident than in the debate over how much pressure the U.S. should apply to Musharraf to wage war against Islamic radicals within his own country. In addition to the contributions Musharraf has made as outlined in part by Asst. Secretary Boucher, Musharraf recently showed courage in raiding a radical mosque and killing a barricaded Islamic radical cleric, actions that were wildly unpopular In Islamabad and caused riots. He has reportedly survived fourteen assassination attempts, and yet continues to mount Pakistani military operations against Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in the tribal regions. In this precarious position reality dictates that losing Musharraf, regardless of his perceived level of “friendship” with the U.S., would be far more dangerous to world stability and our national security than his continued allegedly half-hearted engagement in the War on Terror.

Col. Hunt was quick to criticize Musharraf and to call for American military strikes within Pakistan regardless of the potential ramifications for Musharraf’s continued control over Pakistan’s nuclear weaponry and resources. Such rash action might satisfy our desire for revenge on Bin Laden and it might very well weaken al Qaeda greatly for many years. However, as recent plots in Britain, Indonesia, the Philippines, and other nations have demonstrated, al Qaeda’s leadership may be holed up in Pakistan’s mountains, but its ideology and followers have formed a global movement. By striking within Pakistan without the consent of President Musharraf, America would undermine his authority and control over his country and embolden radical Islamists to gain control of Pakistan’s military and nuclear weapons through a coup or other violent action. Would America be safer with a Pakistani leader who, though far from being a perfect “friend”, at least keeps nuclear weapons and material out of the hands of Islamic terrorists, or with the alternative; a radical Islamist Pakistani leader who opens Pakistan’s nuclear resources to the highest bidding terrorist organization?

If a U.S. War on Terror, waged by the U.S. inside Pakistan, would create no other repercussions than making Musharraf angry, as Col. Hunt simplistically assumed, then it would be well worth doing, and doing immediately. Unfortunately, war carries multiple dangers, and angering Musharraf is not the reason we have forestalled sending our Special Forces into Pakistan. The simple truth is that Musharraf’s stability in Pakistan has earned him the right to demand that Pakistan’s military conduct all operations within its border. One wonders how Col. Hunt might respond if he were President of the United States and a terrorist group, later discovered to be holed up in the Rocky Mountains near Denver, flew planes into government buildings in Islamabad, killing 3,000 Pakistanis. Would “President Hunt,” when contacted by an angry Musharraf, agree to allow Pakistani forces to operate inside the U.S. and attack the terrorists hiding in the Rocky Mountains? It is not likely. “President Hunt” would rightfully expect to be respected and would likewise rightfully assure Musharraf that the U.S. military would handle any such operation within our borders. Why would Col. Hunt expect Musharraf to act any differently when given the same type of request?

For a military man steeped in the culture of respect for authority, it is surprising that Col. Hunt would demonstrate so much contempt for the authority of a foreign president of a nuclear power with a population of 165 million who has, lest it be forgotten, taken high profile terrorists like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed into custody and turned them over to American intelligence operatives. The information gleaned from those prisoners has been the most significant contribution to our knowledge of the enemy in the War on Terror, and Musharraf’s military operations against al Qaeda in Pakistan made that possible. While Musharraf holds onto his fragile control over Pakistan, America should patiently assist this “friend” rather than cast stones at him. Who among world leaders is a perfect “friend?” Let him cast the first stone. Secretary Rumsfeld, also a far from perfect Defense Secretary, clearly had more significant reasons for not sending Special Ops into Pakistan than making Musharraf angry, reasons that continue to shape current American restraint in order to preserve a known and stable leadership in Pakistan.

Technorati Tags:
Musharraf, Pakistan, al Qaeda, War on Terror, Bush Administration, Colonel David Hunt, State Department, Richard Boucher, Taliban, Counterterrorism

Gut Check: Chertoff v. Threat Assessment

A U.S. counterterrorism official leaked portions of a new classified report to the media this morning warning that al Qaeda has regrouped to near pre-9/11 strength and may be poised for significant attacks. No, wait, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff insisted to the media this morning that the threat posed by al Qaeda has NOT returned to pre-9/11 levels. What is wrong with this picture? The anonymous counterterrorism official “familiar with” the contents of a classified report titled “Al-Qaida Better Positioned to Strike the West” stated that the report would be included in a meeting today at the White House to discuss a pending National Intelligence Estimate. This raises a crucial question; had Secretary Chertoff already read the summary report about al Qaeda’s renewed strength before he claimed to have a “gut feeling” that America may be attacked this summer and before he later assured Americans via ABC and NBC appearances that al Qaeda does not pose as great a threat today as it did in the summer of 2001?

The contradictions between the AP’s counterterrorism source and Secretary Chertoff are curious. If Secretary Chertoff’s widely ridiculed comment Tuesday about his “gut feeling” that America faces a heightened risk of attack this summer came after he had reviewed the summary report leaked by the AP’s anonymous source, then what did Chertoff really mean with his “gut feeling” remark? One could interpret Chertoff’s remarks as a call to vigilance, as he later characterized them, and not as indicating knowledge of specific threats or plots. On the surface that could pass as a somewhat logical explanation. However, if Chertoff had already reviewed the classified report later leaked to the Post, then that report constituted the basis for his “gut feeling” about our increased risk of a summer attack. The logical conclusion here is that Chertoff would only state that his “gut” told him al Qaeda was likely to attempt an attack in America this summer if he had read classified reports describing al Qaeda’s strength and activity now as approaching the level of summer 2001.

He later explained away his “gut feeling” remarks as merely a general call for Americans to be vigilant and observant, but if that is true, then why downplay the current risk from al Qaeda? Americans are traditionally entertained by things that revolve, such as doors, merry-go-rounds, or carousels, but do not expect government terror warnings to revolve by being issued, contradicted, retracted, and reissued like a carnival ride.

When intelligence community and counterterrorism officials contradict statements by the Homeland Security secretary, we should all sit up and take notice. The reality is that a classified document reportedly confirms that al Qaeda is nearly as strong as it was prior to 9/11 and may be prepared to strike us with operations rivaling 9/11 in scope and ambition, but our Homeland Security secretary assures us that al Qaeda is actually not that strong while simultaneously warning that his “gut” tells him we may be attacked this summer. Chertoff’s Potomac two-step on this assessment of al Qaeda would be a humorous example of political double-speak if it merely involved politics, but since it involves national security there is nothing funny about the mixed messages coming out of Washington in advance of today’s intelligence meeting at the White House.

Americans do not mind requests to be vigilant. Such warnings appeal to our individualism and desire to add a small personal contribution to winning the War on Terror. However, Americans become justifiably cynical of all such warnings and grow to distrust the government officials who issue them when warnings are given in a disingenuous manner. Chertoff’s comment that he just had a “gut feeling” when it appears now that it was actually a now-leaked classified report that stirred his gut was both disingenuous and unnecessary. Instead of hinting at classified reports or using a smokescreen “gut feeling” comment that he should have known would bring him only ridicule, Chertoff could have stated something like the following:

“While we have been fortunate to have avoided another attack in America since 9/11, we do not underestimate the capabilities and determination of al Qaeda. Tourist attractions and vacation sites are crowded and popular during the summer months and may present attractive targets for terrorists wishing to inflict mass casualties. I urge Americans to be vigilant and observant as they vacation and travel this summer, and to report anything suspicious. Together, we can all work to keep each other safe.”

The above statement would have delivered the message Chertoff intended to convey, namely to be vigilant for a possible summer attack, without hinting at any specific intelligence or creating the impression that he was withholding information. Unfortunately, instead he chose to mention his “gut feeling” and then promptly backtracked on his position when assessments of the capabilities of al Qaeda were leaked to the media. These are not actions that secure the trust and united vigilance of Americans that Chertoff and other government officials rightly desire.

The assessments of al Qaeda’s current strength and operational abilities as leaked to the AP, if they were cited correctly by the anonymous source, paint a different portrait of al Qaeda’s current capabilities than Chertoff offered in his Good Morning America statement that the threat is not as great as it was pre-9/11. According to the AP source:

A new threat assessment from U.S. counterterrorism analysts says that al-Qaida has used its safe haven along the Afghan-Pakistan border to restore its operating capabilities to a level unseen since the months before Sept. 11, 2001.

...Al-Qaida is "considerably operationally stronger than a year ago" and has "regrouped to an extent not seen since 2001," the counterterrorism official said, paraphrasing the report's conclusions. "They are showing greater and greater ability to plan attacks in Europe and the United States."

The group also has created "the most robust training program since 2001, with an interest in using European operatives," the official quoted the report as saying.
…The threat assessment says that al-Qaida stepped up efforts to "improve its core operational capability" in late 2004 but did not succeed until December of 2006 after the Pakistani government signed a peace agreement with tribal leaders that effectively removed government military presence from the northwest frontier with Afghanistan.

The agreement allows Taliban and al-Qaida operatives to move across the border with impunity and establish and run training centers, the report says, according to the official.

It also says that al-Qaida is particularly interested in building up the numbers in its middle ranks, or operational positions, so there is not as great a lag in attacks when such people are killed.

If the AP source quoted the report accurately, it appears that al Qaeda is not only rapidly approaching pre 9/11 strength but is becoming more formidable and less detectable as it recruits more European followers willing to carry out attacks. A buildup of its middle ranks also signifies a shift in strategy away from occasional spectacular attacks like 9/11 to frequent mid or small-scale attacks on softer targets, such as nightclubs, shopping malls, or other public gathering places. The middle ranks of a terrorist cell would not be entrusted with planning major attacks, but with sufficient training they could operate as independent cells with discretion on choice of small-attack venues. The doctors involved in the recent attempted bombings in London and Glasgow are examples of al Qaeda’s middle ranks. They operated locally, unsuspected by the community, and had it not been for a wireless phone issue the bombings would have been successful.

If al Qaeda is working to flood its organization with “middle ranks” then the strategy has shifted to a sustained campaign of attrition much like it is conducting in Iraq. That effort has already produced a growing American desire to withdraw from Iraq. Imagine the chaos and finger-pointing that will ensure in America when a seemingly endless wave of smaller bombings and other forms of terror attacks begins in earnest in this country.

While Chertoff was correct in stating that al Qaeda is not precisely as strong as it was prior to 9/11, that fact should in no way comfort America and its allies. Often when a bone is broken, it heals and becomes stronger in the area of the break than it was before because of the addition of new and vital tissues. Al Qaeda appears to be healing its broken bones and becoming potentially stronger than it was before the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, with the addition of new European, and one would logically assume American, operatives. That prospect should cause all of us to experience a “gut feeling” that we will be increasingly at risk.

Technorati Tags:
al Qaeda, War on Terror, National Intelligence Estimates, Michael Chertoff, Homeland Security, Gut Feeling, Pakistan, Counterterrorism

Pakistan Wheels and Deals with Taliban: Pirated U.S. Missile Technology Used Against NATO Aircraft

Have you ever wondered what happened to the cruise missiles fired on orders of then-President Clinton into Afghanistan in 1998 in his less than half-hearted attempt to strike at Osama Bin Laden? According to Afghani Taliban and Al Qaeda sources interviewed by the Asia Times Online, some of those high tech missiles never detonated and were then retrieved by Pakistani military units near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. If you have read Tom Clancy’s novel The Sum of All Fears, in which Arab terrorists (not the ridiculous Hollywood version with white supremacist villains) acquire a nuclear bomb when an Israeli Air Force fighter jet loses a nuclear bomb that does not detonate on an Arab farm, you can envision what Pakistan did with these armed and fully intact U.S. cruise missiles.

Pakistani military scientists took note of the sophisticated sensors utilized in the cruise missiles and reportedly did what China has been doing with Microsoft software and Motion Picture Association recordings for years: they made illegal copies. The copied sensors were then successfully fitted to an unknown number and variety of existing Pakistani missiles, which greatly enhanced the capabilities of Pakistani offensive and defensive weaponry.

The Taliban, meanwhile, had long sought more sophisticated weapons to utilize against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan after 2001 in their efforts to return to power and oust President Karzai. According to the Asia Times Taliban sources, the Taliban acquired older Soviet model SAM-7s (Surface to Air Missile) in 2005, and received immediate training from Al Qaeda operatives. However, those ancient anti-aircraft missiles were largely ineffective against high tech coalition fighter jets and bombers because they lacked an important technological capability: heat-signature tracking and exhaust decoy sensors. The Taliban needed to seek help with resolving this sensor disadvantage and they turned to their natural ally and protector, Pakistan, the alleged American ally in the War on Terror, and its stock of pirated U.S. cruise missile sensors. In a new deal struck between Pakistan's government and the Taliban, Pakistan has reportedly provided the Taliban with pirated sensor technology the Taliban is using to upgrade its arsenal of SAM-7s.

As Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief, noted: the introduction of SAM-7s equipped with the copied sensors ironically could alter the dynamics of the NATO battle with the Taliban. This shift could give the Taliban important advantages in much the same fashion as the Afghani resistance forces benefited from the U.S. gift of Stinger missiles in their historic fight against Soviet occupation. American and NATO planes would be under constant threat from American sensor equipped SAMs. For a stunning series of photos of a next-generation SAM-7 (SAM-14) terrorist attack on a DHL courier jet in Iraq, click here. These photos and the accompanying account of the attack on an Airbus 300, illustrate that terrorists in Iraq, equipped by Iran (and by some accounts, Pakistan), are in possession of even more sophisticated SAMs than the Taliban’s modified version.

Shahzad reported that the Pakistani government (he does not specify at what level) has formed an alliance with the Taliban:

Using Pakistani territory and with Islamabad's support, the Taliban will be able safely to move men, weapons and supplies into southwestern Afghanistan. The deal. . . will serve Pakistan's interests in re- establishing a strong foothold in Afghanistan (the government in Kabul leans much more toward India). . . . Despite their most successful spring offensive last year since being ousted in 2001, the Taliban realize they need the assistance of a state actor if they are to achieve "total victory".

Taliban commanders planning this year's spring uprising acknowledged that as an independent organization or militia, they could not fight a sustained battle against state resources. They believed they could mobilize the masses, but this would likely bring a rain of death from the skies and the massacre of Taliban sympathizers. Their answer was to find their own state resources, and inevitably they looked toward their former patron, Pakistan.

Interestingly, also reported today was the announcement by Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell that the CIA has “compelling” evidence that Bin Laden and his second in command Ayman al Zawahri are currently in Pakistan and are reestablishing al Qaeda training camps in the provinces bordering Afghanistan. While Pakistan makes mostly symbolic occasional arrests in the War on Terror to placate America and retain enormous amounts of financial aid, it is simultaneously forming logistical alliances with and providing pirated weapons technology to our Taliban enemy. While playing this duplicitous game of “(Evil) Axis and (Naïve) Allies,” Pakistan may also be providing Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership safe haven within Pakistan’s borders with the tacit approval of the Islamabad government. These factors should make more clear the reasons why Vice President Cheney and Stephen Kappes, CIA Deputy Director, made separate visits this week to Islamabad to confront President General Musharraf, presumably with a diplomatic pouch full of satellite imagery and ultimatums.

Spy the News! has previously documented Pakistan’s growing threat to the region, its minimal efforts to capture and extradite Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, and its fear of radical Islam within its population. Pakistan’s pirating of U.S. missiles to improve its own defense capabilities occurred pre-9/11 and, while patently dishonest, should have been a predictable response to the recovery of abandoned multi-million dollar missiles that, like their mission itself, failed spectacularly. However, Pakistan’s provision of this missile technology to the Taliban in its fight against the Karzai government and American and NATO forces is inexcusable for an alleged post 9/11 ally.

The Bush administration, beyond the personal visits and verbal warnings of the Vice President and CIA Deputy Director, must send a clear message to Pakistan that not $1 in U.S. financial aid (Pakistan is the second leading recipient of U.S. financial aid) will be given to Pakistan until Pakistan, with NATO assistance if requested, destroys every Taliban and Al Qaeda camp within Pakistan’s borders, including all mobile anti-aircraft batteries infesting the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan pirated the sensors for those SAMs and must now atone for the traitorous act of supplying them to terrorists engaged in conflict with the U.S. and NATO.

Pakistan currently meets most of the criteria set forth by President Bush to justify the invasion of Iraq: Offering safe haven to terrorists; documented proliferation of nuclear weapons technology or materials; arming and funding known terrorist organizations (state sponsor of terror), including the new cooperative agreement described in this post and in the Asia Time Online. Clearly, generous American financial aid has not moved Pakistan reliably into the American camp in the War on Terror. It is time to invest elsewhere until Pakistan reforms itself and swings both legs over the fence it has been straddling. President Bush received much liberal criticism for the following ultimatum in November 2001, but it should be repeated to and accountability demanded from the country that holds the key to defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda but refuses to turn it or provide it to those who will:

A coalition partner must do more than just express sympathy, a coalition partner must perform. . . . That means different things for different nations. Some nations don't want to contribute troops and we understand that. Other nations can contribute intelligence-sharing. ... But all nations, if they want to fight terror, must do something.

Over time it's going to be important for nations to know they will be held accountable for inactivity. . . . You're either with us or against us in the fight against terror.

It is time for Pakistan to give its final answer.

Musharraf Orders to Attack Known Terrorists Ignored by Pakistani Military: Military, Government Officials Too Cozy with Radicals

In a fascinating but ultimately disturbing illustration of the internal struggles facing President Musharraf of Pakistan, adnkronosinternational recently reported a growing rift between Musharraf and the Pakistani military, particularly the Pakistani Air Force. Though noticed by Counterterrorism Blog, this particular incident has received surprisingly little media attention despite its ramifications.

To establish the context, last week terrorist bombings were carried out in Peshawar and Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital city. Two Pakistani Taliban leaders, Ghazi Abdul Rasheed and Maulana Abdul Aziz, determined by Pakistani Intelligence to be responsible for the bombings, subsequently took shelter in the compound housing Islamabad’s largest radical madrassa. Thus within the capital city, two known terrorist leaders were hiding in plain sight. Musharraf has been provoked significantly in recent years by Rasheed and Aziz. For example, in 2004 Rasheed and Aziz issued a religious decree, signed by 500 Pakistani “Islamic scholars”, against Pakistani military personnel battling with Al Qaeda in South Waziristan. The decree, which included a refusal to allow Muslim burials in Muslim cemeteries for Pakistani soldiers killed in South Waziristan, resulted in a large number of Pakistani forces refusing to fight Al Qaeda in that region.

In 2005, following the London subway bombings, Musharraf attempted to reign in the radical madrassas in Pakistan, as British investigators determined that the perpetrators of those bombings had been radicalized in the very madrassas challenging Musharraf's anti-terror efforts. Washington and London have since demanded Rasheed and Aziz be arrested, and Pakistani security obtained warrants for both clerics, who cannot leave the Islamabad madrassa for fear of being taken into custody.

Incensed by last weeks attacks, particularly the strike in the capital city, Musharraf weighed his military options and according to a US military intelligence source consulted by Counterterrorism Blog, ordered the Pakistani Army to attack the madrassa and capture or kill Rasheed and Aziz. The Pakistani Army reportedly refused because such an assault would be met with massive resistance from students of the radical clerics. Musharraf this week ordered the Pakistani Air Force to conduct surgical air strikes against the Islamabad madrassa harboring Rasheed and Aziz., but the Air Force refused. As a useful comparison, an equivalent would be a scenario in which terrorists detonated a bomb in Washington, DC, and those responsible for ordering the bombing were hiding in a known location in Washington protected by thousands of loyal radical religious students, many heavily armed, who support the terrorists. President Bush orders the US Army to attack the building and capture or kill the terrorists and the US Army refuses. President Bush then orders a surgical air strike against the building, and the US Air Force refuses. What would be the reason for the refusal? In Pakistan’s case, it was because the military forces have close ties to the radical groups of the same religion to which the soldiers and pilots belong.

According to adnkronosinternational, while meeting with senior Pakistani officials, Musharraf stated the following regarding Rasheed and Aziz, "I don’t want them in federal capital. If you are unable to arrest them…shoot them." Considering the number of assassination attempts Musharraf has survived, mainly from Al Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban followers, the air strike order is understandable. To tolerate the presence of known terrorists responsible for bombings within the capital city would further weaken Musharraf's already tenuous control of his own government. Musharraf’s air strike order was reportedly met with the following reaction:

Those attending reportedly disagreed categorically with the idea of an air strike in the capital city, and pointed out that the students of the influential clerics have already staged a powerful protest in the past few days against the demolition of two mosques in Islamabad and they are a force to be reckoned with.

In essence, the Pakistani Air Force refused the order out of fear of reprisal and protest from radical Islamic students in the capital city. Musharraf appears to be in political peril, unable even to strike or arrest terrorists who bomb Islamabad and take shelter in a nearby building. More ominously, his military commanders are largely operating independently, shaping the intensity, or lack thereof, of Pakistani efforts in the War on Terror. In a previous post I discussed at length the issue of Pakistan’s half-hearted investigations and arrests of known terrorists within that country. Considering the level of control the radical Islamists are exerting over the government and military of Pakistan, the question of how long Musharraf can continue to function as president becomes of grave concern, particularly to the future of neighboring Afghanistan. Emboldened by the political emasculation of Musharraf and operating with virtually no fear of opposition, Talibani and Al Qaeda leaders will likely increase internal pressure on President Karzai.

Counterterrorism Blog crystallized into one sentence the troubling concern this incident raises, “if Musharraf is unable to order an air strike in his own capital city, how can he control his nuclear arsenal?”

What President Bush considers a staunch ally in the War on Terror is impotent to eradicate or even suppress radical Islam within is borders. If the War on Terror can only be won through internal reform of Islam itself, Pakistan provides cause for pessimism that reform is desired or even possible in one of Islam’s largest nations.


Technorati Search Tags: Islamabad Bombing Pakistani Air Force Ghazi Abdul Rasheed Maulana Abdul Aziz Radical Madrassas Islamic Terrorists London Subway Bombings Pakistani military Musharraf Al Qaeda Islamic Extremist

US Vulnerability Growing, Allies and Foes Note: Chinese General Warns Space "to be Weaponized"

In a timely and well researched commentary yesterday , UPI Editor at Large Arnaud De Borchgrave concisely portrayed China’s growing international economic, political, and technological capabilities while also warning that even our perceived allies are convinced the US cannot win in Iraq largely due to partisan discord in America. Truly China’s reputation is shining more brightly than America’s, and in that light America’s vulnerabilities are illuminated for allies and foes alike to examine closely.

The commentary echoes concerns about intelligence estimates on China expressed in a recent post here at Spy the News! The description of China’s powerful cyberwarfare capabilities lends further credence to concerns that the US intelligence community has underestimated China, to the detriment of our military preparations to combat a foe with equal or perhaps superior technological capabilities, as China’s recent successful test of an anti-satellite missile demonstrated. De Borchgrave delves deeper into the financial strength of China, which is increasing at the expense of America’s former dominance in world markets. While America fights global terrorism, China, unfettered by such drains on its economy, is investing in raw materials and international trade alliances that will ensure sustained growth far into the future.

The entire UPI article is valuable reading, but I wanted to highlight certain portions that will be of interest to Spy the News! readers:


1. US allies, such as Pakistani President Musharraf, are intently watching “the defection of some of President Bush’s Congressional supporters” and see eventual defeat in Iraq because of America’s internal politics.

2. World leaders will perceive premature US withdrawal from Iraq as a defeat for the US.

3. De Borchgrave quoted the following from the Financial Times: "As authority drains from Mr. Bush, so Washington is losing its capacity to determine outcomes elsewhere. Iran is the principal beneficiary."

4. Musharraf and other allies in the War on Terror are “reappraising” their commitments to the US and NATO because US debate on troop withdrawal from Iraq is also convincing them that neither the US nor NATO will complete the mission in Afghanistan, in which Musharraf has invested his political capital and personal safety.

5. America’s dependence on satellites for civilian and military communications and navigation is a largely undefended vulnerability that could fall prey to the so-called E-bomb or Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), which would cripple US communications except for small handheld self transmitting/receiving radio units. [Consider that in 2004, a panel appointed by Congress tasked with evaluating the threat of EMP attack on the US concluded, “While the US military has grown increasingly dependent on computers, electronics and information systems, it has relaxed requirements for EMP-hardened systems since the end of the Cold War and its overall record of adherence to its guidelines for such robust equipment ‘has been spotty’ . . . . This trend continues ‘in the wrong direction’.”]

The US should take at face value the statement of one-star general Yao Yunzhu, director of China's Asia-Pacific Office at the Academy of Military Science in Beijing: “Outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime.” As De Borchgrave advises, Yao is 52 years old. Clearly China recognized long ago the need to develop space weaponry, offensive and defensive, and, with enormous economic reserves to invest, has developed them much faster than intelligence analysts predicted.

China’s growing global influence, combined with its cozy import/export oil for weapons trade alliances in the Middle East, particularly Iran, provide ample reason for the US to reevaluate favored nation trade status for China and other economic leverage until that nation ceases funding and equipping the state sponsors of terrorism that the US is spending heavily to defeat.

While John “Pariah” Kerry was in Davos, Switzerland bashing America and the Bush Administration at the World Economic Forum, General Yao Yunzhu attended the same forum and proudly declared China’s primacy in the rush to weaponize space. Democrats and a growing number of Republicans criticize President Bush for concentrating on Iraq and allegedly taking our focus off of the War on Terror. Such critics are guilty of waging war so intensely on President Bush that they are incapable or unwilling to recognize how that internal conflict is affecting world perception of American vulnerability. Our allies and enemies have noticed and are making plans to abandon or attack us accordingly.

Technorati Search Tags: Yao Yunzhu Arnaud De Borchgrave cyberwarfare Electromagnetic Pulse EMP National Intelligence Estimates Davos Switzerland World Economic Forum Chinese Military Intelligence Analysts Space Weapons Satellite Killer Musharaff Iraq War Global War On Terror

The Islamic "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy: Half-Heartedly Hunting Terrorists in Pakistan

In presenting his annual assessment of threats facing the United States, outgoing National Intelligence Director John Negroponte warned of the resurgence and rebuilding of Al Qaeda in Pakistan. Speculation on the whereabouts of Al Qaeda leadership has always focused on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan, but Negroponte’s statements, as did Secretary Rice’s yesterday on Iran, indicate an increasing willingness in the Bush administration to confront declared enemies directly, and in Pakistan’s case, alleged allies. In a previous post, I selected Pakistan as one of the top 5 threats to America’s safety in 2007, for reasons including those cited by Negroponte. Director Negroponte, in refreshingly blunt terms, warned Pakistan that while that country has provided valuable assistance in the War on Terror, it continues to be a “secure hide-out” for Al Qaeda leadership, which is rebuilding its organizational infrastructure initially decimated in Afghanistan.

While praising the Pakistani government for its role in capturing several members of Al Qaeda’s leadership, Negroponte made the critical point that Pakistan continues to be “a major source of Islamic extremism.” That extremism is being exported throughout the world, and as it springs forth from a nation possessing nuclear weapons, there should be grave global concern over what else is potentially being exported with those extremists.

Pakistan is a fascinating test case for the premise that Islam, as many claim, is a religion of peace that has merely been hijacked by a small number of radical extremists. With a population of 166 million, 97% of which is Muslim, it is ominous that Pakistan has not succeeded in forcibly removing Al Qaeda from within its borders. The so-called minority of extremists is casting doubt on Pakistan’s true allegiances and intentions in the War on Terror, and is potentially placing the lives of peaceful Pakistani Muslims in danger. Certainly the Pakistani military has the necessary actionable intelligence and weaponry to eliminate Al Qaeda from the mountainous area bordering Afghanistan. What is preventing Pakistan from taking back its “hijacked” national religion from those pesky minority extremists? Pakistan is the nation best positioned in the world for demonstrating that Islam is a religion of peace by cleaning its own house of extremists, yet it chooses not to do so. Pakistan makes this choice because the “extremists” are not a small minority, and their views are not considered extreme.

What is Pakistan’s internal policy toward the extremists “hijacking” Islam from within Pakistan’s borders? Pakistan's Interior Minister Aftab Sherpao, responding to Negroponte’s comments, stated that Pakistan has acted when specific information about a terrorist has been provided. While that sounds appeasing on the surface, the result of such a policy as it applies to finding terrorists in Pakistan is the Islamic version of “don’t ask don’t tell.” Minister Sherpao, perhaps unwittingly, verbalized what most American’s suspect: Pakistan is not conducting self-initiated internal investigations to identify and neutralize Islamic extremists in Pakistan. Pakistan, only when given a specific name and location of a known terrorist, and under sufficient American political pressure (usually including US overtures to India), will reluctantly capture the wanted terrorist and earn praise from President Bush for its role as an ally in the War on Terror.

This is very similar to how Mexico approaches requests from the US to extradite Mexican citizens who commit crimes in America and then return to Mexico for safe haven. Only with sufficient political pressure, public outcry, and talk of closed borders does the Mexican government act. The Mexican government does not aggressively capture its citizens suspected of crimes because it is fraught with corruption and lacks the moral turpitude to do so. Pakistan, however, does not aggressively seek to identify and remove its own Islamic extremists because those extremists wield far more influence and are considered less extreme in that country than the Pakistani government cares (or dares) to admit.

Islamic extremists have infiltrated the Pakistani military in sufficient numbers and at high enough levels that President Musharraf has been the target of an incredible number of assassination attempts, nearly all of them coming from within the Pakistani military. This should frighten even the most optimistic supporter of the War on Terror. Musharraf walks a perilous tightrope between the expectations of Pakistanis and the demands for cooperation in the War on Terror from America, and lives in constant fear for his personal safety. Musharraf is alive today, in no small measure, due to American assistance with his personal security and the Islamic extremists’ preference to be occasionally harassed by Pakistani forces half-heartedly investigating them rather than being lethally pursued by American Special Forces sent by President Bush to aid his declared ally.

The photo at right depicts Negroponte making a point during his threat assessment, but it also can represent the measurement of how close Pakistan is to falling under the control of its Islamic extremists. With alarming infiltration of the Pakistani military and emboldened by America’s self-proclaimed failures in Iraq, Pakistani’s Islamic extremists are poised to seize the government if Musharraf acts too forcefully against them. Yet that is precisely what the Bush administration, through Negroponte, bluntly, and rightly, requested. By vowing to take action against Iranians interfering in Iraq and warning Pakistan that Al Qaeda’s leaders are living among them, the Bush administration is effectively preparing plausible justifications for intelligence and military operations within the borders of both nations.


Technorati Tags: War On Terror Al Qaeda Islamic Extremist Religion of Peace John Negroponte Director of National Intelligence Pakistani military Musharraf terrorism Bush Administration Condoleeza Rice Iraq War