Intel "Experts" vs. Magic 8 Balls

Get out your Ouija boards, Tarot cards, Magic 8-Balls, and tea leaves, because with these you could predict with as much accuracy as any “expert” how long it will take for Iran to produce a functional nuclear weapon. The dynamics of the debate over Iran’s capabilities change from week to week. The divergent opinions of nuclear “experts” and intelligence agencies signal a frightening admission that when it comes to estimating when Iran will master the uranium enrichment and warhead production processes, the only certain thing is uncertainty.

In January I warned that America’s intelligence analysts were underestimating Iran’s determination and aggressive overtures to accomplice nations such as Russia, and North Korea. At that time, the consensus among intelligence analysts was that Iran could not construct a nuclear weapon earlier than 2015. On April 3rd I alerted readers that Iran’s unprecedented speed in building 3,000 centrifuges forced intelligence experts to revise earlier estimates and point to 2009 rather than 2015 as the year by which Iran would weaponize uranium. On April 10th I wrote about the revised revisions of WMD specialists alarmed by reports and video footage from within the Natanz nuclear facility south of Tehran. At that time “experts” warned that Iran, if all factors fell into place and centrifuge construction continued at a torrid pace, might produce sufficient enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon by the end of this year. Following this pattern, it would seem logical to predict that the next revised estimate might warn of Iran weaponizing uranium before Alex Rodriguez hits his 20th home run of this young season (he has hit 14 in 18 games in April thus far).

So much for patterns or analysts’ credibility! An esteemed British theoretical physics professor and Israel’s intelligence service, Mossad, now agree that Iran is actually three or four years away from producing deployable weapons grade uranium. After interviewing Professor Norman Dombey, the UK Telegraph reported:

But the smallest particle of dust - even a fingerprint - can disrupt enrichment. Iran will have to spin all the centrifuges inside a vacuum without any interruption for a period of about one year.

If any machine breaks down - or if dust enters the system or if the power supply is lost - the process must halt and start again.

Prof Dombey estimates that Iran will need about two years simply to master the process of running centrifuges. Then, making allowances for interruptions caused by breakdowns, it could take another two years to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb.

The Telegraph article also asserted that even if Iran eventually masters the enrichment process, it will still be faced with the task of building a warhead and fitting it to a missile delivery system. I do not separate this task from the more complex enrichment problem. Iran’s role as provider of 20% of the world’s crude oil places it in a strong position to purchase warhead delivery missile technology from a number of willing nations already doing business in Iran. Iran need not “figure out” how to build the missiles. It can simply buy them and clear that hurdle while the centrifuges are spinning straw into gold, as it were.

Intelligence analysts have now changed their estimates to read quite differently than just two years ago. Then, the consensus was that Iran would not be capable of producing sufficient uranium for 10 years. Now, analysts no longer speculate about capability to produce. That has become, apparently, an accepted fact. Estimates now focus only on whether Iran will encounter technological glitches that will hamper production. The UN and the U.S. missed the opportunity to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions decisively before they moved from construction to production. Now our intelligence “experts” are counting on Iran’s centrifuges to break down or work less efficiently than planned to buy time for negotiations and sanctions. What these “experts” will not predict is how soon Iran will have sufficient enriched uranium if all the centrifuges operate perfectly, because they apparently refuse to believe in that possibility. According to Gary Samore, Vice President of the Council on Foreign Relations, "The belief in Western intelligence circles is that a large portion of these machines are likely to break if Iran attempts to operate them at high speeds necessary for enrichment."

Counting on machinery to malfunction is not a strategy that will keep nuclear arms out of the mullahs’ hands. Analysts are uncertain how well the centrifuges were constructed. They are uncertain whether the machinery will withstand the rigors of high enrichment. They are uncertain how many centrifuges have been or are currently being constructed in facilities other than Natanz. They are uncertain what technological and material assistance has been provided by nations with valuable investments in Iran, such as China and Russia. They are uncertain how many years (or is it months?) it will take for Iran to enrich weaponized uranium.

The only factor of which analysts are certain is that the mullahs will do and say anything to buy time for their ultimate goal: Annihilating Israel and wielding nuclear weapons over cowering Middle East and Europe populations. Perhaps our policies toward Iran should operate on that premise rather than on psychics, palm readers, or nuclear intelligence “experts”, all of whom seem to be equally reliable sources when making important strategic decisions.

Pakistan Wheels and Deals with Taliban: Pirated U.S. Missile Technology Used Against NATO Aircraft

Have you ever wondered what happened to the cruise missiles fired on orders of then-President Clinton into Afghanistan in 1998 in his less than half-hearted attempt to strike at Osama Bin Laden? According to Afghani Taliban and Al Qaeda sources interviewed by the Asia Times Online, some of those high tech missiles never detonated and were then retrieved by Pakistani military units near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. If you have read Tom Clancy’s novel The Sum of All Fears, in which Arab terrorists (not the ridiculous Hollywood version with white supremacist villains) acquire a nuclear bomb when an Israeli Air Force fighter jet loses a nuclear bomb that does not detonate on an Arab farm, you can envision what Pakistan did with these armed and fully intact U.S. cruise missiles.

Pakistani military scientists took note of the sophisticated sensors utilized in the cruise missiles and reportedly did what China has been doing with Microsoft software and Motion Picture Association recordings for years: they made illegal copies. The copied sensors were then successfully fitted to an unknown number and variety of existing Pakistani missiles, which greatly enhanced the capabilities of Pakistani offensive and defensive weaponry.

The Taliban, meanwhile, had long sought more sophisticated weapons to utilize against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan after 2001 in their efforts to return to power and oust President Karzai. According to the Asia Times Taliban sources, the Taliban acquired older Soviet model SAM-7s (Surface to Air Missile) in 2005, and received immediate training from Al Qaeda operatives. However, those ancient anti-aircraft missiles were largely ineffective against high tech coalition fighter jets and bombers because they lacked an important technological capability: heat-signature tracking and exhaust decoy sensors. The Taliban needed to seek help with resolving this sensor disadvantage and they turned to their natural ally and protector, Pakistan, the alleged American ally in the War on Terror, and its stock of pirated U.S. cruise missile sensors. In a new deal struck between Pakistan's government and the Taliban, Pakistan has reportedly provided the Taliban with pirated sensor technology the Taliban is using to upgrade its arsenal of SAM-7s.

As Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief, noted: the introduction of SAM-7s equipped with the copied sensors ironically could alter the dynamics of the NATO battle with the Taliban. This shift could give the Taliban important advantages in much the same fashion as the Afghani resistance forces benefited from the U.S. gift of Stinger missiles in their historic fight against Soviet occupation. American and NATO planes would be under constant threat from American sensor equipped SAMs. For a stunning series of photos of a next-generation SAM-7 (SAM-14) terrorist attack on a DHL courier jet in Iraq, click here. These photos and the accompanying account of the attack on an Airbus 300, illustrate that terrorists in Iraq, equipped by Iran (and by some accounts, Pakistan), are in possession of even more sophisticated SAMs than the Taliban’s modified version.

Shahzad reported that the Pakistani government (he does not specify at what level) has formed an alliance with the Taliban:

Using Pakistani territory and with Islamabad's support, the Taliban will be able safely to move men, weapons and supplies into southwestern Afghanistan. The deal. . . will serve Pakistan's interests in re- establishing a strong foothold in Afghanistan (the government in Kabul leans much more toward India). . . . Despite their most successful spring offensive last year since being ousted in 2001, the Taliban realize they need the assistance of a state actor if they are to achieve "total victory".

Taliban commanders planning this year's spring uprising acknowledged that as an independent organization or militia, they could not fight a sustained battle against state resources. They believed they could mobilize the masses, but this would likely bring a rain of death from the skies and the massacre of Taliban sympathizers. Their answer was to find their own state resources, and inevitably they looked toward their former patron, Pakistan.

Interestingly, also reported today was the announcement by Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell that the CIA has “compelling” evidence that Bin Laden and his second in command Ayman al Zawahri are currently in Pakistan and are reestablishing al Qaeda training camps in the provinces bordering Afghanistan. While Pakistan makes mostly symbolic occasional arrests in the War on Terror to placate America and retain enormous amounts of financial aid, it is simultaneously forming logistical alliances with and providing pirated weapons technology to our Taliban enemy. While playing this duplicitous game of “(Evil) Axis and (Naïve) Allies,” Pakistan may also be providing Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership safe haven within Pakistan’s borders with the tacit approval of the Islamabad government. These factors should make more clear the reasons why Vice President Cheney and Stephen Kappes, CIA Deputy Director, made separate visits this week to Islamabad to confront President General Musharraf, presumably with a diplomatic pouch full of satellite imagery and ultimatums.

Spy the News! has previously documented Pakistan’s growing threat to the region, its minimal efforts to capture and extradite Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, and its fear of radical Islam within its population. Pakistan’s pirating of U.S. missiles to improve its own defense capabilities occurred pre-9/11 and, while patently dishonest, should have been a predictable response to the recovery of abandoned multi-million dollar missiles that, like their mission itself, failed spectacularly. However, Pakistan’s provision of this missile technology to the Taliban in its fight against the Karzai government and American and NATO forces is inexcusable for an alleged post 9/11 ally.

The Bush administration, beyond the personal visits and verbal warnings of the Vice President and CIA Deputy Director, must send a clear message to Pakistan that not $1 in U.S. financial aid (Pakistan is the second leading recipient of U.S. financial aid) will be given to Pakistan until Pakistan, with NATO assistance if requested, destroys every Taliban and Al Qaeda camp within Pakistan’s borders, including all mobile anti-aircraft batteries infesting the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan pirated the sensors for those SAMs and must now atone for the traitorous act of supplying them to terrorists engaged in conflict with the U.S. and NATO.

Pakistan currently meets most of the criteria set forth by President Bush to justify the invasion of Iraq: Offering safe haven to terrorists; documented proliferation of nuclear weapons technology or materials; arming and funding known terrorist organizations (state sponsor of terror), including the new cooperative agreement described in this post and in the Asia Time Online. Clearly, generous American financial aid has not moved Pakistan reliably into the American camp in the War on Terror. It is time to invest elsewhere until Pakistan reforms itself and swings both legs over the fence it has been straddling. President Bush received much liberal criticism for the following ultimatum in November 2001, but it should be repeated to and accountability demanded from the country that holds the key to defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda but refuses to turn it or provide it to those who will:

A coalition partner must do more than just express sympathy, a coalition partner must perform. . . . That means different things for different nations. Some nations don't want to contribute troops and we understand that. Other nations can contribute intelligence-sharing. ... But all nations, if they want to fight terror, must do something.

Over time it's going to be important for nations to know they will be held accountable for inactivity. . . . You're either with us or against us in the fight against terror.

It is time for Pakistan to give its final answer.