Social Media are a Stuxnet for Middle East Freedom

Facebook. Twitter. Google Buzz. Stuxnet? Though the latter is not a social media platform, the events in the Middle East make it clear that social media and sophisticated espionage software have something in common: both have penetrated, and will continue to penetrate, sophisticated ideological and technological defenses established by entrenched dictators or extremist theocracies. Social media are penetrating ideological and political defenses that maintain various regimes' power over their citizens; Stuxnet penetrated military and intelligence networks that maintain secrecy surrounding the true nature and progress of Iran's uranium enrichment facilities. All of these penetrations by modern technology into the ideological and cyber domains of non-democratic governments throughout the Middle East work together to expand and protect freedom in a potentially safer environment for all.

The Stuxnet super worm, or "cyber missile", was a remarkably effective tool designed to accomplish a single mission: jump from computer to computer, penetrating every layer of Iran's complex cyber security systems protecting the computer networks operating the Mullahs' uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Bushehr, and destroy those control systems. Stuxnet embedded commands into the software controlling centrifuges and other key machinery, causing breakdowns, incorrect spinning speeds, and other glitches that damaged more than 1100 centrifuges which had been working 24/7 to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium.  For months, the Iranians had no idea they had been hit by arguably the world's first weaponized computer worm.  It worked silently until its damage was done.  The Iranians made repairs, ordered replacement equipment, scratched their heads, and watched as their uranium production ground to a halt.

Many regimes and governments in the Middle East are likewise scratching their heads over the sudden boiling point their citizens have reached, taking to the streets and demanding reforms, resignations, and even democratic elections.  Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Bahrain, Yemen, Jordan, Iran.  From whence, they wondered, did this viral push for reform spring?  The answer, like Stuxnet in Iran, is found in technology, but not a master work of espionage, but simple social networking platforms that carry discussions and dreams of better lives and more freedom.  Facebook, Twitter, Buzz, and other social media penetrate net filters, arriving on personal devices protesters rely upon to coordinate rallies, launch marches, and direct media attention to brutality. Words of encouragement from around the world, including the U.S., reach into the hearts and homes of protesters for reform via Facebook and Twitter despite the efforts of various oppressive regimes to block citizens from seeing that their protests are known and supported in many lands. The tinderboxes we see today throughout the Middle East may never have spread so broadly, with such speed, and with such effectiveness were it not for the wide availability of social networking and technologically savvy users who, like their more advanced Stuxnet peers, found ways through and around government firewalls and filters to bring reform ideology to the masses, and in some cases, to bring dictators to their knees.

Like Stuxnet, social networking quietly goes about its business, ultimately finding the vulnerabilities of a regime's power and secrets, exploits them, and exposes them to the world. Also, like Stuxnet, social media penetration is not a burden of one nation's people alone, but rather an alliance of like-minded people from any nation intersted in assisting with the ruin of regimes. It is not by coincidence that regimes, when facing protests and international scrutiny, move first to sever communications and Internet access. Yet as Stuxnet and Facebook/Twitter demonstrated, the tech geniuses in the general population always find a way through even the most determined regime's barriers. Freedom, like nature, will always find a way.  Keeping communications open despite clampdowns is a heroic act which has its heart a base desire for human freedom.

Stuxnet crippled Iran's nuclear program for many months, buying nations valuable time to assess the true progress of the Iranian nuclear program and prepare options for an inevitable showdown with the Mullahs. It also reminded Iran that when nations unite their brightest minds for a common cause, anything is possible, even the world's most sophisticated cyber weapon designed for peacefully fighting nuclear proliferation. Social media remind us that likewise, the world's great freedom-loving minds and voices can unite to topple dictators or force reforms that expand human rights and opportunities for self-determination. Technology penetrates barriers to freedom, and carries news of successes to other oppressed peoples who merely need to see what is possible.

Russian Danger and Dollar Signs in Iran

This has been a week for news of surprise common sense actions of great importance by some who previously had demonstrated little such sense. First, congressional Democrats, after more than a year and a half of harsh criticism and accusations against President Bush, made a wise and potentially lifesaving decision by passing legislation authorizing intelligence agencies to utilize warrantless wiretaps to monitor terrorist communications with suspected counterparts in America. Since I addressed that legislation in detail in a previous post published by Reuters I will not do so here. The turnaround by the Democrats was pleasantly surprising, but of equal or greater importance for global security was the stunning action taken by Russia against Iran.

That story received only moderate media attention yesterday, apparently not important or morally shocking enough for sites like the Drudge Report to give it more exposure than tabloid images of Prince Harry looking less than royal seated provocatively in a chair dressed only in his underwear. Prince Harry’s status as a sex symbol may have generated high levels of Internet traffic, but developments in Iran’s status as a potential possessor of nuclear weapons somehow seemed slightly more newsworthy than pictures of the pretty-boy prince.

It was no secret that with the technological and material assistance of Russia, Iran has been constructing a nuclear reactor facility in Bushehr, Iran, ostensibly for peaceful civilian power generation purposes. The Bushehr reactor was slated for completion at the end of this year, which surely not coincidentally agrees with Israeli intelligence warnings that December 31 of this year will be the deadline after which diplomatic solutions must yield to more aggressive options to halt Iran’s nuclear program. Iran had confidently thumbed its nose at UN Security Council resolutions and sanctions, relying on Russia as its business partner to restrain other UN Security Council members pushing for more aggressive actions against Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Until three weeks ago Iran appeared safe from any unanimous actions by the Security Council, with Russia’s veto vote securely in pocket due to the lucrative Bushehr construction contracts between the two countries. In its arrogance, however, Iran made a critical mistake: it failed to pay its bills to money-hungry Russia.

In retaliation for Iran’s falling behind in its Bushehr-related payments, Russia earlier this year brought construction of the reactor site to a screeching halt. Russia expressed no qualms at that time about the morality of allowing the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism to develop nuclear capabilities; the sticking point for Putin’s government was money, or more specifically the lack of it flowing from Iran to Russia’s government coffers. In a twist of irony that only Cold War veterans could appreciate, it was a moment of greedy, irresponsible, amoral Russian capitalism run amok. Russia was doing business and selling sensitive weapons and nuclear technology to any regime willing to pay, without any concern for political ideology or to what uses those weapons or technologies would be put. Yet, as reported publicly for the first time yesterday, three weeks ago Russia changed course in its dealings with Iran over Bushehr.

According to a confidential diplomatic source quoted by AFP, three weeks ago Russia delivered a message to Iran’s mullahs that carried more than the expected demand for timely payment of Bushehr construction debts. The message reportedly warned the mullahs that the nuclear fuel needed to complete and activate the Bushehr reactor would not be delivered until Iran satisfied international concerns, presumably through full inspections and monitoring, over ongoing uranium enrichment at the Natanz facility that appears to be of a military rather than civilian power generation nature. Of course, the Russian message also contained complaints over unpaid debts and other monetary concerns, but as AFP further reported, a second diplomatic source emphasized that “The Russians don't want to be seen as the ones helping the Iranians get a nuclear weapon.”

Despite other actions by Putin’s government to assert Russia’s power on the world stage, such as its latest territorial claim to the North Pole and the region’s natural resources, Russia demonstrated a degree of responsibility and cooperation on an issue far more critical than who should own rights to an undersea continental shelf supporting Santa’s workshop. Russia is the only nation capable of applying sufficient non-military leverage against Iran regarding its nuclear facilities and motives. Only Russia had the economic power to slow or halt construction of the Bushehr reactor or withhold the nuclear fuel necessary for power generation or uranium enrichment.

The importance of Russia’s decision to force Iran to yield to international concerns over military production of nuclear material cannot be overemphasized. Russia’s leverage with Iran reportedly has pushed back the potential completion of the Bushehr reactor until late 2008. Hopefully this setback will convince the Iranian regime to take Russia’s demand seriously, but the world should not count on Iran to act sensibly on an issue central to that regime’s pride and power projection.

Much can still change in this volatile situation. If Iran provided full payment to Russia in short order, there is always a risk that Russia might back down from its demand that Iran openly comply with the UN sanctions it has thus far ignored. The sources for the AFP report also have no indication that Russia will shift from its previous stance which supported Iran’s right to develop “peaceful” civilian nuclear power for electricity generation purposes only. The other members of the UN Security Council and obviously Israel oppose the very idea of Iran’s development of nuclear power for any purposes due to the undeniable links between Iran and Islamic terrorist groups as well as apocalyptic pronouncements against the United States and Israel by Iran’s current leaders.

Russia’s position on Iranian civilian nuclear power has thus far been irreconcilable with the other Security Council members, but its message to the mullahs at least temporarily demonstrated what may be a good faith effort by Russia to win goodwill in the West and keep nuclear weapons out of a radical regime’s hands.

Praising congressional democrats and Putin’s government in the same week for making wise decisions regarding domestic counterterrorism surveillance and blocking Iran’s potential production of nuclear weapons could almost lead me to consider, as two Brookings Institution fellows wrote of Iraq last week, that this is “a war we just might win.”

Technorati Tags:
Bushehr Reactor, Iranian Nuclear Program, Vladimir Putin, Russia, UN Security Council, Nuclear Proliferation, Drudge Report, Nuclear Power, Mullahs

IAEA, Dems Prefer Iran Nukes to "Warmongers"

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a highly specialized international nuclear watchdog has apparently branched out into other fields and now feels qualified to offer unsolicited military tactical advice and political policy recommendations to world governments, particularly the United States. With no access to classified intelligence obtained by the U.S. and its allies regarding Iran’s nuclear weapons program development or the feasibility of dismantling it with military action, the IAEA nevertheless now presumes to tell world powers what they should and should not do in their own defense rather than sticking with the allegedly neutral task it was created to perform, namely nuclear facility inspections.

Late last week IAEA chief Mohamed El-Baradei warned world powers that an attack on Iran over its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons despite UN Security Council resolutions would be "an act of madness." According to the Jerusalem Post report, the indirect warnings appeared to be directed towards the United States and Israel.

El-Baradei, after offering what was clearly his personal political opinion of military action in Iran also reportedly stated that Iran would likely be operating nearly 3,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges by the end of July. The 3,000 centrifuge total is critical because IAEA officials have made clear in past statements that once Iran has that many centrifuges in operation, Iran will have reached a point of no return after which it could enrich uranium in quantities and enrichment levels sufficient for large-scale production of weapons-grade material.

The IAEA performed its primary function well in identifying a potential point of no return and estimating, based on inspections, when that point could be reached. Reporting the results of its inspections to the UN, however, should have been the limit of IAEA involvement in the discussions of Iran’s nuclear program. Instead, El-Baradei felt it necessary to editorialize on military and political strategies neither he nor the IAEA are privy to, or qualified to discuss. El-Baradei apparently feels that preventing Iran from completing its development of nuclear weapons would be “an act of madness,” but allowing Iran, the world’s largest sponsor of terrorism, to possess nuclear weapons would be acceptable to him.

It is beyond disconcerting that a man with such an obvious lack of common sense is responsible for inspecting the world’s nuclear facilities. Then again, many Democrats express views similar to El-Baradei’s and label conservatives who speak openly about confronting Iran before it reaches the IAEA point of no return as “warmongers.” Last week on Fox News’ Hannity and Colmes, White House Adviser John Bolton (former ambassador to the UN), was a guest, and after he made a sensible and firm statement about not permitting Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, Alan Colmes attacked Bolton for being a “warmonger” because of his position on Iran. It was clear after the “debate” (and I use that term loosely) that Bolton made a much stronger case for action than Colmes did for inaction, which was based largely on personal attacks and “you got it wrong on Iraq now you want to attack Iran,” but it would be useful for Colmes and other Democrats to examine their use of the term “warmonger” in the context of Iran.

Was Winston Churchill a warmonger because while Hitler was building massive armies and weaponry Churchill was urging his disbelieving colleagues in parliament to begin arming Britain to matching levels? Churchill foresaw the danger of allowing Germany to rearm in violation of Treaty of Versailles terms, but PM Neville Chamberlain and many others in parliament dismissed Churchill’s agitations in much the same manner that Colmes berated Bolton as a warmonger. This is how Churchill was relegated to the humiliating status of "backbencher" in parliament.

Had anyone listened to the "warmonger" Churchill before Hitler began invading territories and neighboring nations in Europe, untold millions might have been spared the ravages of WWII. Iranian president Ahmadinejad shares many personality traits and racial views with Hitler, and it is not warmongering to believe the world should take him at his word when he states that no one can stop Iran from building nuclear bombs and that Israel must be annihilated in a glowing fireball. In today's world of rampant political correctness, where are the ACLU, the Democrats, and the gay and minority rights groups and their condemnations of "hate speech?" These groups seek severe penalties for "hate speech" and "hate crimes" directed toward specific races or lifestyles, but when the world's most radical anti-American and anti-Semitic regime vows to destroy a nation of Jews, the political correctness crowd stands in a puddle of its own cold sweat of cowardice and chastises conservatives who want to confront the threat before "hate speech" becomes a "hate crime" in the form of a mushroom cloud.

Is someone a warmonger whose stated goal is to prevent the ultimate weapon, a weapon with potential to kill millions with each detonation and befoul the entire world with radiation (the ultimate man-made global warming) from being produced, stored, and utilized by a radical terror-sponsoring regime? Is it warmongering to advocate tactical strikes on nuclear sites even with some civilian loss if doing so would spare millions of lives from nuclear annihilation in the name of jihad? If so, I choose the warmonger over the pacifist appeaser with no regrets.

Fortunately, our current president, regardless of what one thinks of his handling of Iraq or immigration, is no Colmes or El-Baradei. The only act of madness here would be to allow Iran to reach its point of no return and being high-level enrichment of uranium for nuclear weapons. Israel has already recognized this and as reported previously on Capital Cloak, considers December 31, 2007 as the date after which sanctions and political solutions will no longer be considered sufficient action.

In the meantime, El-Baradei and the IAEA should continue inspecting facilities and reporting on the construction and operation of centrifuges in Natanz and other sites in Iran, and not move beyond that function by offering unsolicited opinions of the sanity of attacking Iran before it is too late. Each nation should consider the available intelligence, determine what it will and will not tolerate when it comes to a potentially nuclear Iran, and then take appropriate action to preserve its national interests and security. There is no nation on earth that would be immune from the fallout, literal and figurative, from a nuclear armed Iran. To allow it to happen through “peace mongering” would be a fatal act of madness.

Technorati:
El-Baradei IAEA Alan Colmes John Bolton Warmonger Peace Monger Ahmadinejad Iranian Nuclear Program Centrifuges Inspections

Iran Plays America Like A Fiddle On Nukes

America is being played like a fiddle, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s performance is worthy of virtuoso acclaim. Pitting the American media against the Bush administration while simultaneously duping America’s intelligence analysts into believing Iran remains years away from a viable nuclear weapon, Ahmadinejad has convinced half the world that Iran is a ticking nuclear time bomb and the other half that Iran’s intentions are peaceful and the country is open to negotiations. Since both halves can only be proven right over time, neither seems inclined to take any decisive action, relying on impotent UN sanctions and resolutions to resolve an issue with incredible ramifications for global security.

Capital Cloak has reported extensively on the Iranian nuclear weapons program saga, focusing specifically on the wildly fluctuating assessments of anticipated time frames submitted by intelligence analysts. With each report, Capital Cloak warned that analysts were underestimating Iran’s progress, capabilities, and commitment, and thus far analysts have been proven wrong with each new revelation uncovered by international media. In the most recent post on this topic published at Capital Cloak, I observed that “counting on machinery to malfunction is not a strategy that will keep nuclear arms out of the mullahs’ hands.” At that time, experts and analysts insisted that Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities were dependent on the durability and maintenance of its centrifuges, and these experts likewise insisted that it would take Iran four or five years to overcome the routine glitches that would surely occur. Once again the “experts” were wrong, as reported in today’s New York Times.

The opening sentence of today’s article, “Atomic Agency Concludes Iran is Stepping Up Nuclear Work,” directly nullified the expert predictions of nuclear physicists, as well as Israeli and American intelligence analysts who were so certain Iran would need several years to resolve glitches other nations experienced during uranium enrichment. The article began with the following revelation:

Inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency have concluded that Iran appears to have solved most of its technological problems and is now beginning to enrich uranium on a far larger scale than before, according to the agency’s top officials.

The findings may change the calculus of diplomacy in Europe and in Washington, which aimed to force a suspension of Iran’s enrichment activities in large part to prevent it from learning how to produce weapons-grade material.

In a short-notice inspection of Iran’s operations in the main nuclear facility at Natanz on Sunday, conducted in advance of a report to the United Nations Security Council due early next week, the inspectors found that Iranian engineers were already using roughly 1,300 centrifuges and were producing fuel suitable for nuclear reactors, according to diplomats and nuclear experts here.

Until recently, the Iranians were having difficulty keeping the delicate centrifuges spinning at the tremendous speeds necessary to make nuclear fuel and were often running them empty or not at all.

Now, those roadblocks appear to have been surmounted. “We believe they pretty much have the knowledge about how to enrich,” said Mohammed ElBaradei, the director general of the energy agency, who clashed with the Bush administration four years ago when he declared that there was no evidence that Iraq had resumed its nuclear program. “From now on, it is simply a question of perfecting that knowledge. People will not like to hear it, but that’s a fact.”

Once again the Iranians have made advances the nuclear physics community thought unlikely and at a faster pace than intelligence analysts considered possible.

While not so quietly speeding toward nuclear weapons development and his avowed goal of annihilating Israel, Ahmadinejad continues to manipulate international public opinion about how best to deal with Iran by sweet talking world leaders with pleasant sounding references to negotiations. This skillful media guru clearly understands that as long as he leaves the door open to occasional IAEA inspections and negotiations over peaceful use of nuclear power for electricity, few, if any, world leaders will rally sufficient political support to take decisive action. While he whispers what the Washington Post generously described as “reassurances” into the ears of world diplomats, claiming Iran welcomes and is prepared for negotiations with the U.S., he is stealthily unsheathing a nuclear sword that will one day behead the major democracies while their attention is focused on the glittering fool’s gold alluringly embedded in nuclear negotiations with a terror sponsor.

There remains hope that President Bush, an avid reader of historical biography and a self-proclaimed admirer of Winston Churchill, has taken to heart Churchill’s famous warning about negotiating with a dangerous evil: “an appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.” If there is a world leader who has the courage to act against Iran before it is too late, it is the current occupant of the White House. Unfortunately, President Bush may be the victim of ignorant advisers, some of whom apparently do not take Ahmadinejad or the mullahs seriously. The previously cited New York Times article provided this chilling account of think-tank theorizing run amok:

The inspectors have tested the output and concluded that Iran is producing reactor-grade uranium, enriched to a little less than 5 percent purity. But that still worries American officials and experts here at the I.A.E.A. If Iran stores the uranium and later runs it through its centrifuges for another four or five months, it can raise the enrichment level to 90 percent — the level needed for a nuclear weapon.

In the arcane terminology of nuclear proliferation, that is known as a “breakout capability,” the ability to throw inspectors out of the country and then produce weapons-grade fuel, as North Korea did in 2003.

Some Bush administration officials and some nuclear experts here at the I.A.E.A. and elsewhere suspect that the Iranians may not be driving for a weapon but rather for that “breakout capability,” because that alone can serve as a nuclear deterrent. It would be a way for Iran to make clear that it could produce a bomb on short notice, without actually possessing one.

These same administration officials, if their memories go back that far, likely thought that during the Cold War the Soviets were filling their missile silos with empty rocket housings as a deterrent, since those missiles would look real to our satellite imagery, as the Soviets could then bully the world without actually possessing the number of missiles they boastfully reported. The “breakout capability” theory requires twists of logic in the extreme. “Breakout capability” would be a deterrent only for Iran’s neighbors, none of whom except Israel have the military capability to strike and disarm Iran, and thus would not likely provoke an enemy possessing enough uranium to rapidly produce a bomb if needed. However, the United States, Russia, Britain, and China have the capacity to strike Iran without warning, thus denying Iran the necessary time to quickly produce a bomb on short notice. None of these powers would be deterred merely by Iran’s capability to produce something. That capability could be destroyed and thus removed from the deterrent equation. Should the world make the assumption that Ahmadinejad and the mullahs only want the capability to produce the ultimate terror weapon rather than actually holding tangible proof of their power?

Having a nuclear plant stocked with enriched uranium will not make Iran a feared nuclear force. Only the actual possession of a stockpile of deployable nuclear bombs will accomplish that. If the president is actually receiving advice from officials who think Iran’s nuclear intentions are peaceful and only for show, the White House should encourage them to explore employment opportunities in the private sector as soon as possible. They have been played like a fiddle by a master media manipulator who, if appeased, will buck Churchill’s idiom and eat us first.

Intel "Experts" vs. Magic 8 Balls

Get out your Ouija boards, Tarot cards, Magic 8-Balls, and tea leaves, because with these you could predict with as much accuracy as any “expert” how long it will take for Iran to produce a functional nuclear weapon. The dynamics of the debate over Iran’s capabilities change from week to week. The divergent opinions of nuclear “experts” and intelligence agencies signal a frightening admission that when it comes to estimating when Iran will master the uranium enrichment and warhead production processes, the only certain thing is uncertainty.

In January I warned that America’s intelligence analysts were underestimating Iran’s determination and aggressive overtures to accomplice nations such as Russia, and North Korea. At that time, the consensus among intelligence analysts was that Iran could not construct a nuclear weapon earlier than 2015. On April 3rd I alerted readers that Iran’s unprecedented speed in building 3,000 centrifuges forced intelligence experts to revise earlier estimates and point to 2009 rather than 2015 as the year by which Iran would weaponize uranium. On April 10th I wrote about the revised revisions of WMD specialists alarmed by reports and video footage from within the Natanz nuclear facility south of Tehran. At that time “experts” warned that Iran, if all factors fell into place and centrifuge construction continued at a torrid pace, might produce sufficient enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon by the end of this year. Following this pattern, it would seem logical to predict that the next revised estimate might warn of Iran weaponizing uranium before Alex Rodriguez hits his 20th home run of this young season (he has hit 14 in 18 games in April thus far).

So much for patterns or analysts’ credibility! An esteemed British theoretical physics professor and Israel’s intelligence service, Mossad, now agree that Iran is actually three or four years away from producing deployable weapons grade uranium. After interviewing Professor Norman Dombey, the UK Telegraph reported:

But the smallest particle of dust - even a fingerprint - can disrupt enrichment. Iran will have to spin all the centrifuges inside a vacuum without any interruption for a period of about one year.

If any machine breaks down - or if dust enters the system or if the power supply is lost - the process must halt and start again.

Prof Dombey estimates that Iran will need about two years simply to master the process of running centrifuges. Then, making allowances for interruptions caused by breakdowns, it could take another two years to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb.

The Telegraph article also asserted that even if Iran eventually masters the enrichment process, it will still be faced with the task of building a warhead and fitting it to a missile delivery system. I do not separate this task from the more complex enrichment problem. Iran’s role as provider of 20% of the world’s crude oil places it in a strong position to purchase warhead delivery missile technology from a number of willing nations already doing business in Iran. Iran need not “figure out” how to build the missiles. It can simply buy them and clear that hurdle while the centrifuges are spinning straw into gold, as it were.

Intelligence analysts have now changed their estimates to read quite differently than just two years ago. Then, the consensus was that Iran would not be capable of producing sufficient uranium for 10 years. Now, analysts no longer speculate about capability to produce. That has become, apparently, an accepted fact. Estimates now focus only on whether Iran will encounter technological glitches that will hamper production. The UN and the U.S. missed the opportunity to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions decisively before they moved from construction to production. Now our intelligence “experts” are counting on Iran’s centrifuges to break down or work less efficiently than planned to buy time for negotiations and sanctions. What these “experts” will not predict is how soon Iran will have sufficient enriched uranium if all the centrifuges operate perfectly, because they apparently refuse to believe in that possibility. According to Gary Samore, Vice President of the Council on Foreign Relations, "The belief in Western intelligence circles is that a large portion of these machines are likely to break if Iran attempts to operate them at high speeds necessary for enrichment."

Counting on machinery to malfunction is not a strategy that will keep nuclear arms out of the mullahs’ hands. Analysts are uncertain how well the centrifuges were constructed. They are uncertain whether the machinery will withstand the rigors of high enrichment. They are uncertain how many centrifuges have been or are currently being constructed in facilities other than Natanz. They are uncertain what technological and material assistance has been provided by nations with valuable investments in Iran, such as China and Russia. They are uncertain how many years (or is it months?) it will take for Iran to enrich weaponized uranium.

The only factor of which analysts are certain is that the mullahs will do and say anything to buy time for their ultimate goal: Annihilating Israel and wielding nuclear weapons over cowering Middle East and Europe populations. Perhaps our policies toward Iran should operate on that premise rather than on psychics, palm readers, or nuclear intelligence “experts”, all of whom seem to be equally reliable sources when making important strategic decisions.

Will Iran Have Bomb in Months?

My, how things change in a week! One week ago, I wrote about reports that U.S. intelligence analysts had revised their estimates for the earliest date by which Iran could develop a nuclear bomb from the year 2015 to 2009. Now, a scant 7 days later, World Net Daily is reporting that after yesterday’s “nuclear day” announcement by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, intelligence analysts have again revised their estimates of Iran’s capabilities and warn that Iran could potentially produce sufficient weapons-grade Uranium in a matter of months. This would change the estimated target date from sometime in 2009 to late 2007-mid 2008. Maybe moving up the dates of all those big state primaries was a good idea after all, as the candidates may be forced to directly state what they would do about Iran even as Iran’s WMD program reaches critical mass.

According to WND, analysts were taken by surprise by yesterday’s announcement that Iran had successfully constructed and placed in operation 3,000 centrifuges, ten times the number of centrifuges previously known, at the underground Natanz facility. The Chief of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization stated after yesterday’s announcement that within the next 20 days, Iran will announce the number of centrifuges injected with uranium at Natanz.

Because Iran has prevented IAEA inspectors access to the Natanz facility and other less publicized sites, it is currently unknown how many centrifuges are operational throughout Iran or what improvements have been made on the original centrifuge technology Iran acquired from Pakistani scientist Abdul Kahn.

In one week, intelligence analysts shaved 7-8 years off of their estimates of Iran’s nuclear weapons program capabilities. The only surprise involved in Iran’s announcement yesterday is that analysts were taken by surprise. On January 24, I wrote the following paragraphs in a post here at Spy The News!, which in light of yesterday’s announcement and analysts’ reactions, seems prescient:

One wonders, given this incredible underestimation of China, a nation we know much more about and can monitor more closely than Iran, how accurate are analysts’ assessments that Iran will not have nuclear weapon capabilities until 2015? That estimate was made after a “major US intelligence review” in 2005, and analysts concluded that Iran was 10 years away from possessing the capability to produce a nuclear bomb.

These analysts were wrong about North Korea, wrong about China’s space weaponry, and it is prudent for current and future administrations to assume that the 10 year prediction for Iran is another dangerous underestimation. Ahmadinejad refuses to allow IAEA inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities, and he openly challenges America, the only obstacle to the goal of Iranian nuclear weaponry, to try to stop him. With the technological assistance of North Korea and the UN Security Council vetoes of China and Russia confidently in pocket, Iran will surely produce a deployable nuclear weapon much sooner than analysts predict.

Revising a WMD estimate from years to months is a significant act in the intelligence community. At least we know one thing for certain: Ahmadinejad does not yet have a nuclear bomb. We know this because no mushroom clouds have appeared over Israel yet. Hopefully our intelligence on Iran will improve so that that will not be our first official notification of Iran’s capabilities. While it is true that leaders such as Ahamdinejad often employ bluster as a propaganda tool, it has become clear that there is significant technology and determination operating behind the bombast. Iran is perilously close to bringing online sufficient enrichment capabilities to produce weapons grade uranium and is daring the UN and particularly the U.S. to intervene.