"Let men be wise by instinct if they can, but when this fails be wise by good advice." -Sophocles
Showing posts with label Uranium. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Uranium. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 15, 2007

Iran Plays America Like A Fiddle On Nukes

America is being played like a fiddle, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s performance is worthy of virtuoso acclaim. Pitting the American media against the Bush administration while simultaneously duping America’s intelligence analysts into believing Iran remains years away from a viable nuclear weapon, Ahmadinejad has convinced half the world that Iran is a ticking nuclear time bomb and the other half that Iran’s intentions are peaceful and the country is open to negotiations. Since both halves can only be proven right over time, neither seems inclined to take any decisive action, relying on impotent UN sanctions and resolutions to resolve an issue with incredible ramifications for global security.

Capital Cloak has reported extensively on the Iranian nuclear weapons program saga, focusing specifically on the wildly fluctuating assessments of anticipated time frames submitted by intelligence analysts. With each report, Capital Cloak warned that analysts were underestimating Iran’s progress, capabilities, and commitment, and thus far analysts have been proven wrong with each new revelation uncovered by international media. In the most recent post on this topic published at Capital Cloak, I observed that “counting on machinery to malfunction is not a strategy that will keep nuclear arms out of the mullahs’ hands.” At that time, experts and analysts insisted that Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities were dependent on the durability and maintenance of its centrifuges, and these experts likewise insisted that it would take Iran four or five years to overcome the routine glitches that would surely occur. Once again the “experts” were wrong, as reported in today’s New York Times.

The opening sentence of today’s article, “Atomic Agency Concludes Iran is Stepping Up Nuclear Work,” directly nullified the expert predictions of nuclear physicists, as well as Israeli and American intelligence analysts who were so certain Iran would need several years to resolve glitches other nations experienced during uranium enrichment. The article began with the following revelation:
Inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency have concluded that Iran appears to have solved most of its technological problems and is now beginning to enrich uranium on a far larger scale than before, according to the agency’s top officials.

The findings may change the calculus of diplomacy in Europe and in Washington, which aimed to force a suspension of Iran’s enrichment activities in large part to prevent it from learning how to produce weapons-grade material.

In a short-notice inspection of Iran’s operations in the main nuclear facility at Natanz on Sunday, conducted in advance of a report to the United Nations Security Council due early next week, the inspectors found that Iranian engineers were already using roughly 1,300 centrifuges and were producing fuel suitable for nuclear reactors, according to diplomats and nuclear experts here.

Until recently, the Iranians were having difficulty keeping the delicate centrifuges spinning at the tremendous speeds necessary to make nuclear fuel and were often running them empty or not at all.

Now, those roadblocks appear to have been surmounted. “We believe they pretty much have the knowledge about how to enrich,” said Mohammed ElBaradei, the director general of the energy agency, who clashed with the Bush administration four years ago when he declared that there was no evidence that Iraq had resumed its nuclear program. “From now on, it is simply a question of perfecting that knowledge. People will not like to hear it, but that’s a fact.”

Once again the Iranians have made advances the nuclear physics community thought unlikely and at a faster pace than intelligence analysts considered possible.

While not so quietly speeding toward nuclear weapons development and his avowed goal of annihilating Israel, Ahmadinejad continues to manipulate international public opinion about how best to deal with Iran by sweet talking world leaders with pleasant sounding references to negotiations. This skillful media guru clearly understands that as long as he leaves the door open to occasional IAEA inspections and negotiations over peaceful use of nuclear power for electricity, few, if any, world leaders will rally sufficient political support to take decisive action. While he whispers what the Washington Post generously described as “reassurances” into the ears of world diplomats, claiming Iran welcomes and is prepared for negotiations with the U.S., he is stealthily unsheathing a nuclear sword that will one day behead the major democracies while their attention is focused on the glittering fool’s gold alluringly embedded in nuclear negotiations with a terror sponsor.

There remains hope that President Bush, an avid reader of historical biography and a self-proclaimed admirer of Winston Churchill, has taken to heart Churchill’s famous warning about negotiating with a dangerous evil: “an appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.” If there is a world leader who has the courage to act against Iran before it is too late, it is the current occupant of the White House. Unfortunately, President Bush may be the victim of ignorant advisers, some of whom apparently do not take Ahmadinejad or the mullahs seriously. The previously cited New York Times article provided this chilling account of think-tank theorizing run amok:
The inspectors have tested the output and concluded that Iran is producing reactor-grade uranium, enriched to a little less than 5 percent purity. But that still worries American officials and experts here at the I.A.E.A. If Iran stores the uranium and later runs it through its centrifuges for another four or five months, it can raise the enrichment level to 90 percent — the level needed for a nuclear weapon.

In the arcane terminology of nuclear proliferation, that is known as a “breakout capability,” the ability to throw inspectors out of the country and then produce weapons-grade fuel, as North Korea did in 2003.

Some Bush administration officials and some nuclear experts here at the I.A.E.A. and elsewhere suspect that the Iranians may not be driving for a weapon but rather for that “breakout capability,” because that alone can serve as a nuclear deterrent. It would be a way for Iran to make clear that it could produce a bomb on short notice, without actually possessing one.

These same administration officials, if their memories go back that far, likely thought that during the Cold War the Soviets were filling their missile silos with empty rocket housings as a deterrent, since those missiles would look real to our satellite imagery, as the Soviets could then bully the world without actually possessing the number of missiles they boastfully reported. The “breakout capability” theory requires twists of logic in the extreme. “Breakout capability” would be a deterrent only for Iran’s neighbors, none of whom except Israel have the military capability to strike and disarm Iran, and thus would not likely provoke an enemy possessing enough uranium to rapidly produce a bomb if needed. However, the United States, Russia, Britain, and China have the capacity to strike Iran without warning, thus denying Iran the necessary time to quickly produce a bomb on short notice. None of these powers would be deterred merely by Iran’s capability to produce something. That capability could be destroyed and thus removed from the deterrent equation. Should the world make the assumption that Ahmadinejad and the mullahs only want the capability to produce the ultimate terror weapon rather than actually holding tangible proof of their power?

Having a nuclear plant stocked with enriched uranium will not make Iran a feared nuclear force. Only the actual possession of a stockpile of deployable nuclear bombs will accomplish that. If the president is actually receiving advice from officials who think Iran’s nuclear intentions are peaceful and only for show, the White House should encourage them to explore employment opportunities in the private sector as soon as possible. They have been played like a fiddle by a master media manipulator who, if appeased, will buck Churchill’s idiom and eat us first.

Tuesday, April 24, 2007

Intel "Experts" vs. Magic 8 Balls


Get out your Ouija boards, Tarot cards, Magic 8-Balls, and tea leaves, because with these you could predict with as much accuracy as any “expert” how long it will take for Iran to produce a functional nuclear weapon. The dynamics of the debate over Iran’s capabilities change from week to week. The divergent opinions of nuclear “experts” and intelligence agencies signal a frightening admission that when it comes to estimating when Iran will master the uranium enrichment and warhead production processes, the only certain thing is uncertainty.

In January I warned that America’s intelligence analysts were underestimating Iran’s determination and aggressive overtures to accomplice nations such as Russia, and North Korea. At that time, the consensus among intelligence analysts was that Iran could not construct a nuclear weapon earlier than 2015. On April 3rd I alerted readers that Iran’s unprecedented speed in building 3,000 centrifuges forced intelligence experts to revise earlier estimates and point to 2009 rather than 2015 as the year by which Iran would weaponize uranium. On April 10th I wrote about the revised revisions of WMD specialists alarmed by reports and video footage from within the Natanz nuclear facility south of Tehran. At that time “experts” warned that Iran, if all factors fell into place and centrifuge construction continued at a torrid pace, might produce sufficient enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon by the end of this year. Following this pattern, it would seem logical to predict that the next revised estimate might warn of Iran weaponizing uranium before Alex Rodriguez hits his 20th home run of this young season (he has hit 14 in 18 games in April thus far).

So much for patterns or analysts’ credibility! An esteemed British theoretical physics professor and Israel’s intelligence service, Mossad, now agree that Iran is actually three or four years away from producing deployable weapons grade uranium. After interviewing Professor Norman Dombey, the UK Telegraph reported:
But the smallest particle of dust - even a fingerprint - can disrupt enrichment. Iran will have to spin all the centrifuges inside a vacuum without any interruption for a period of about one year.

If any machine breaks down - or if dust enters the system or if the power supply is lost - the process must halt and start again.

Prof Dombey estimates that Iran will need about two years simply to master the process of running centrifuges. Then, making allowances for interruptions caused by breakdowns, it could take another two years to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb.

The Telegraph article also asserted that even if Iran eventually masters the enrichment process, it will still be faced with the task of building a warhead and fitting it to a missile delivery system. I do not separate this task from the more complex enrichment problem. Iran’s role as provider of 20% of the world’s crude oil places it in a strong position to purchase warhead delivery missile technology from a number of willing nations already doing business in Iran. Iran need not “figure out” how to build the missiles. It can simply buy them and clear that hurdle while the centrifuges are spinning straw into gold, as it were.

Intelligence analysts have now changed their estimates to read quite differently than just two years ago. Then, the consensus was that Iran would not be capable of producing sufficient uranium for 10 years. Now, analysts no longer speculate about capability to produce. That has become, apparently, an accepted fact. Estimates now focus only on whether Iran will encounter technological glitches that will hamper production. The UN and the U.S. missed the opportunity to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions decisively before they moved from construction to production. Now our intelligence “experts” are counting on Iran’s centrifuges to break down or work less efficiently than planned to buy time for negotiations and sanctions. What these “experts” will not predict is how soon Iran will have sufficient enriched uranium if all the centrifuges operate perfectly, because they apparently refuse to believe in that possibility. According to Gary Samore, Vice President of the Council on Foreign Relations, "The belief in Western intelligence circles is that a large portion of these machines are likely to break if Iran attempts to operate them at high speeds necessary for enrichment."

Counting on machinery to malfunction is not a strategy that will keep nuclear arms out of the mullahs’ hands. Analysts are uncertain how well the centrifuges were constructed. They are uncertain whether the machinery will withstand the rigors of high enrichment. They are uncertain how many centrifuges have been or are currently being constructed in facilities other than Natanz. They are uncertain what technological and material assistance has been provided by nations with valuable investments in Iran, such as China and Russia. They are uncertain how many years (or is it months?) it will take for Iran to enrich weaponized uranium.

The only factor of which analysts are certain is that the mullahs will do and say anything to buy time for their ultimate goal: Annihilating Israel and wielding nuclear weapons over cowering Middle East and Europe populations. Perhaps our policies toward Iran should operate on that premise rather than on psychics, palm readers, or nuclear intelligence “experts”, all of whom seem to be equally reliable sources when making important strategic decisions.

Tuesday, April 10, 2007

Will Iran Have Bomb in Months?

My, how things change in a week! One week ago, I wrote about reports that U.S. intelligence analysts had revised their estimates for the earliest date by which Iran could develop a nuclear bomb from the year 2015 to 2009. Now, a scant 7 days later, World Net Daily is reporting that after yesterday’s “nuclear day” announcement by Iranian President Ahmadinejad, intelligence analysts have again revised their estimates of Iran’s capabilities and warn that Iran could potentially produce sufficient weapons-grade Uranium in a matter of months. This would change the estimated target date from sometime in 2009 to late 2007-mid 2008. Maybe moving up the dates of all those big state primaries was a good idea after all, as the candidates may be forced to directly state what they would do about Iran even as Iran’s WMD program reaches critical mass.

According to WND, analysts were taken by surprise by yesterday’s announcement that Iran had successfully constructed and placed in operation 3,000 centrifuges, ten times the number of centrifuges previously known, at the underground Natanz facility. The Chief of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization stated after yesterday’s announcement that within the next 20 days, Iran will announce the number of centrifuges injected with uranium at Natanz.

Because Iran has prevented IAEA inspectors access to the Natanz facility and other less publicized sites, it is currently unknown how many centrifuges are operational throughout Iran or what improvements have been made on the original centrifuge technology Iran acquired from Pakistani scientist Abdul Kahn.

In one week, intelligence analysts shaved 7-8 years off of their estimates of Iran’s nuclear weapons program capabilities. The only surprise involved in Iran’s announcement yesterday is that analysts were taken by surprise. On January 24, I wrote the following paragraphs in a post here at Spy The News!, which in light of yesterday’s announcement and analysts’ reactions, seems prescient:
One wonders, given this incredible underestimation of China, a nation we know much more about and can monitor more closely than Iran, how accurate are analysts’ assessments that Iran will not have nuclear weapon capabilities until 2015? That estimate was made after a “major US intelligence review” in 2005, and analysts concluded that Iran was 10 years away from possessing the capability to produce a nuclear bomb.

These analysts were wrong about North Korea, wrong about China’s space weaponry, and it is prudent for current and future administrations to assume that the 10 year prediction for Iran is another dangerous underestimation. Ahmadinejad refuses to allow IAEA inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities, and he openly challenges America, the only obstacle to the goal of Iranian nuclear weaponry, to try to stop him. With the technological assistance of North Korea and the UN Security Council vetoes of China and Russia confidently in pocket, Iran will surely produce a deployable nuclear weapon much sooner than analysts predict.

Revising a WMD estimate from years to months is a significant act in the intelligence community. At least we know one thing for certain: Ahmadinejad does not yet have a nuclear bomb. We know this because no mushroom clouds have appeared over Israel yet. Hopefully our intelligence on Iran will improve so that that will not be our first official notification of Iran’s capabilities. While it is true that leaders such as Ahamdinejad often employ bluster as a propaganda tool, it has become clear that there is significant technology and determination operating behind the bombast. Iran is perilously close to bringing online sufficient enrichment capabilities to produce weapons grade uranium and is daring the UN and particularly the U.S. to intervene.