Bush's Wars Blamed for Police Ammo Crisis

If your local police officer or sheriff’s deputy shoots at a dangerous suspect and misses because he spent too little time practicing at the firearms range, you should blame President Bush. That was the message of a Washington Post report Monday titled “Police Feeling Wartime Pinch on Ammunition,” which placed at the feet of the president the responsibility for making ammunition for local law enforcement agencies difficult to obtain due to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Post report was an illustration of what occurs when a reporter obtains multiple explanations for an alarming trend but chooses to emphasize the only possible explanation that fits the reporter’s or perhaps the news organization’s political agenda. The report included several factors that contribute to existing shortages of law enforcement ammunition for training, but each of these was dismissed in favor of adding to the list of societal and international crises allegedly caused by President Bush: “Quagmire” in Iraq; Hurricane Katrina; global warming; “cooking” intelligence to start wars; and now creating a famine of ammunition needed for law enforcement training.

Clearly intended to alarm local residents of the DC metropolitan region, the Post report opened by painting a dire portrait of law enforcement agencies eventually running out of ammunition:

The U.S. military's soaring demand for small-arms ammunition, fueled by two wars abroad, has left domestic police agencies less able to quickly replenish their supplies, leading some to conserve rounds by cutting back on weapons training, police officials said.

To varying degrees, officials in Montgomery, Loudoun and Anne Arundel counties said, they have begun rationing or making other adjustments to accommodate delivery schedules that have changed markedly since the military campaigns began in Iraq and Afghanistan.

"Before the war, lag time from order to delivery was three to four months; now it's six months to a year," said James Gutshall, property supervisor for the Loudoun Sheriff's Office. "I purchased as much as I could this year because I was worried it would be a problem."

Montgomery police began limiting the amount of ammunition available to officers on the practice range a little more than year ago, said Lucille Baur, a county police spokeswoman. The number of cases a group of officers can use in a training session has been cut from 10 to three.

But some expressed concern that a prolonged shortage could eventually affect officers' competence as marksmen. Practice with live ammunition is a crucial part of any police training regime, experts say. A lack of practice can translate into diminished ability in the field, where accuracy and speed can mean the difference between life and death, they say.

So is the War on Terror really draining our local law enforcement agencies of the ammunition they need to train and remain prepared to serve and protect us? The answer is actually provided in the Post article, but the reporter failed to put the pieces of the puzzle together and view the big picture behind the ammunition shortages.

First, my experience with a federal agency that required stringent marksmanship training and monthly firearms re-qualification also included my observing shortages of live ammunition for training that pre-dated 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. After successfully qualifying at the firearms range, we were not allowed to repeat the range exercises because ammunition needed to be preserved for those who had not yet re-qualified. Again, this was before 9/11 or the current War on Terror. The reason for those shortages, which continue to this day, was budget priorities. There was plenty of ammunition available from a variety of vendors, but insufficient funds to purchase it. That is not to say that law enforcement agencies intentionally place a low priority on training days at the range. Nothing could be further from the truth. Nearly all law enforcement professionals I have worked with would be willing to dedicate far more time to situational exercises and marksmanship training than is made available to them by their agencies. However, these agencies are given strict budgets of taxpayer money and must distribute funds in priority order.

Officer or agent salaries and benefits must come first, followed by facilities, utilities, and equipment including duty weapons, vehicles, ballistic vests, and a host of other necessities for public safety and national security. Contract vendors of such equipment understand the necessity of their products and charge exorbitant prices that quickly erode ever-shrinking budgets. When you throw in the costs of running temporary jails at sheriffs’ stations, budget needs rapidly become a challenge for administrators to meet. Do you cut back on 911 dispatchers and ballistic vests or ammunition set aside for training? Both are important, but choices must be made. If agencies are facing shortages of ammunition for training, it is far more likely that the shortage is the result of a conscious priority decision rather than the availability of ammunition due to the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Second, for those few and far between agencies that are funded at comfortable levels, experiencing ammunition shortages occur due to poor planning. If vendor delays become a problem, there are competitors available to provide the needed products. Agencies can also order their ammunition further in advance to avoid reordering only when supplies are already becoming dangerously low. The Post report quotes various law enforcement officials tasked with maintaining ammunition supply levels, and in each case the officials describe how it now takes six months to a year to get shipments of ammunition that formerly arrived in three or four months. Is this because so much ammunition is flowing to Iraq and Afghanistan? More likely, it is caused by a fact mentioned only in passing by the Post reporter: law enforcement agencies at all levels of government since 9/11 have focused on obtaining better equipment, more training, and more ammunition for their officers, deputies, and agents to better prepare them to defend their communities from terrorist attacks.

The Post report repeatedly asserted that the bulk of ammunition produced by manufacturers was flowing to Iraq and Afghanistan but offered no statistics to illustrate the difference between how much ammunition was shipped to military units fighting the War on Terror and the quantity shipped to law enforcement agencies throughout the United States. Likewise, the Post made no effort to research whether military shipments from the same supplier were also delayed because of the increased demand from law enforcement agencies. The report did mention that one major supplier of ammunition had experienced an increase of forty percent in orders from law enforcement agencies in 2006 and business was booming so nicely that the company was expanding its production levels and its profit margin to accommodate the growing demand. Two critical factors explaining the shortage of ammunition for law enforcement agencies were thus set forth in the article but only in the context that the rounds requested by law enforcement were of the same caliber as those used by standard-issue military weapons.

The ammunition supplier cited in the article did not indicate that their products were being shipped to the military in higher priority than to law enforcement, but the Post report implied that this was the case, blaming the two war fronts for depriving law enforcement of precious ammunition when the cause was actually underproduction to meet demand. That situation is being corrected through capitalism: the manufacturer is opening new plants and expanding old ones to meet the needs of its customers. If one major supplier cannot keep up with demand, others will.

If you know you will run low of a critical item in your household, such as milk or in my case cereal, you naturally buy a new supply well in advance so you do not find yourself with a bare cupboard. Likewise, law enforcement agencies need to set aside sufficient funds in each year’s budget for the following year’s needs so that equipment can be ordered early enough to overcome supplier delays. Many departments and agencies are beginning to do this, as they are learning from their previous re-supply miscalculations.

Other than competition for ammunition between the military and law enforcement, the shortages currently experienced appear unrelated to President Bush or the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. There were many explanations for the shortages but the most controversial approach was to blame them on the current administration. While the president and two unpopular wars may have been the most convenient scapegoats for a common supply and demand problem, the most likely explanations were downplayed or used in a limited context designed to fit a pre-determined conclusion. The ammunition shortage is a serious issue that merited more serious attention to its underlying causes.

Technorati Tags: Law Enforcement Ammunition Shortage War on Terror Bush Administration Iraq War Afghanistan Washington Post Live Fire Training

US Al Qaeda Reality Hits Dems on NSA Bill

Is there anyone in the American intelligence community who does not think there are al Qaeda and other terrorist cells organizing and operating in the United States? Since 9/11, hasn't this been the single greatest suspicion among Americans? The fear of such cells lurking in America's shadows was sufficient to prompt a Time magazine cover dedicated to it in August 2004. In my career, especially since 9/11, my employer has wisely worked under the assumption that there are active terror cells in America, and we have worked closely with other government agencies to develop counterterrorism programs and security planning reflecting that belief. Perhaps because of this long held position in my workplace, it amazes me that news headlines like “Al Qaeda Cell May Be Loose in U.S.” are met with shock, fear, or even surprise by readers. That headline, from today’s New York Sun, frankly tells Americans nothing that should cause surprise, particularly to anyone who even remotely follows trends and developments in the War on Terror.

I do not mean to single out the New York Sun or the author of the above-mentioned article, Eli Lake, for criticism. The Sun and Lake in particular, have been referred to and frequently praised by Capital Cloak for fine coverage of the War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Lake in this article was merely reporting what one of his reliable Washington sources told him about new evidence that al Qaeda had been in contact electronically with sympathizers or potential operatives inside the United States. Lake reported, in part, as follows:

E-mail addresses for American individuals were found on the same password-protected e-mail chains used by the United Kingdom plotters to communicate with Qaeda handlers in Europe, a counterterrorism official told The New York Sun yesterday. The American and German intelligence community now believe the secure e-mail chains used in the United Kingdom plot have provided a window into an operational Qaeda network in several countries.

"Because of the London and Glasgow plot, we now know communications have been made from Al Qaeda to operatives in the United States," the counterterrorism official said on condition of anonymity. "This plot helps to connect a lot of stuff. We have seen money moving a lot through hawala networks and other illicit finance as well." But this source was careful to say that at this point no specific information, such as names, targets or a timeline, was known about any particular plot on American soil. The e-mail addresses that are linked to Americans were pseudonyms.

Lake’s report is important not for the fact that it appears to confirm the presence of al Qaeda cells in America, something that virtually everyone in the intelligence community has assumed for years. What makes Lake’s information important is its timing. Over the weekend, as the most significant final pre-recess action taken by Congress, the House and Senate approved a bill strengthening and expanding government authorization to monitor international telephone and electronic communications without a warrant between Americans and foreign suspects.

These are the same Democrat-controlled House and Senate bodies that have relentlessly and obviously disingenuously accused the White House of abusing the NSA’s warrantless domestic surveillance program. There have been hearings, misrepresentations of the Bush administration’s motives, and cries of violations of civil liberties from the left since the program was leaked to and eagerly exposed by the New York Times. Now it appears that the intelligence gleaned from the thwarted London and Glasgow plots in July was sufficient to convince the virulent leaders of the anti-Bush Congress, Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid, that all those warnings about potential terrorist cells in America were not merely presidential bluster.

Neither House nor Senate Democrats were personally pleased to pass this expanded surveillance powers legislation, and they continue to grumble about it in the media. After all, it was Pelosi who stated in January 2006 that, “I would not want any president — Democrat or Republican — to have the expanded power the administration is claiming in this case.” Yet now, when faced with the reality of actual email evidence of al Qaeda cells receiving communications from the bomb plotters in London, even the liberal left wing in Congress realized the surveillance was distasteful to them but ultimately necessary for survival.

As a safety net for the Democrats, the powers authorized in the bill were extended only for a six month period, in which we can expect rancorous debate over domestic surveillance, further accusations that the president is abusing civil liberties, and likely revisions of certain aspects of the bill. That six month period also indicates, however, that Congress felt the threat to the homeland was sufficiently grave in the next six months to merit special preventive measures. That fact, in and of itself, is telling.

The following is an excerpt from the New York Times’ description of the new legislation approved Saturday night by Congress and signed into law yesterday by President Bush:

Congressional aides and others familiar with the details of the law said that its impact went far beyond the small fixes that administration officials had said were needed to gather information about foreign terrorists. They said seemingly subtle changes in legislative language would sharply alter the legal limits on the government’s ability to monitor millions of phone calls and e-mail messages going in and out of the United States.

They also said that the new law for the first time provided a legal framework for much of the surveillance without warrants that was being conducted in secret by the National Security Agency and outside the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the 1978 law that is supposed to regulate the way the government can listen to the private communications of American citizens.

“This more or less legalizes the N.S.A. program,” said Kate Martin, director of the Center for National Security Studies in Washington, who has studied the new legislation.

Previously, the government needed search warrants approved by a special intelligence court to eavesdrop on telephone conversations, e-mail messages and other electronic communications between individuals inside the United States and people overseas, if the government conducted the surveillance inside the United States.

Today, most international telephone conversations to and from the United States are conducted over fiber-optic cables, and the most efficient way for the government to eavesdrop on them is to latch on to giant telecommunications switches located in the United States.

By changing the legal definition of what is considered “electronic surveillance,” the new law allows the government to eavesdrop on those conversations without warrants — latching on to those giant switches — as long as the target of the government’s surveillance is “reasonably believed” to be overseas.

This change was necessary because much of the infrastructure of the world’s largest telecommunications companies is housed in the United States, particularly the switch and server backbone that powers the Internet globally. The vast majority of the world’s email, even point to point between foreign countries, passes through servers located in America. In all respects, the bill was a necessary and prudent expansion of government surveillance powers to monitor international communications, and regardless of their motives or their half-hearted passage of the measures, Congressional Democrats should be applauded for doing the right thing to protect Americans by coming to terms with President Bush on this issue, even if it is only a temporary fix.

While no one in the intelligence community was surprised at the report of email communications between European al Qaeda and American operatives, it provided a wake up call to Congress that the War on Terror and the threat of attacks in the United States, are not merely “bumper sticker” slogans of the Bush administration. There were active al Qaeda cells in America more than one year prior to 9/11, and it is logical to conclude that there were others at that time and now who merely await activation and instructions from leadership. The activation and instructions will likely come in some form of long distance communication; email, telephone, instant messenger, or similar. Thanks to the president’s vigilant insistence on the power to monitor such communication and Congress’s reluctant cooperation, our chances of intercepting key messages have increased, and that makes America safer than it was just last week prior to this legislation.

It should be remembered that these expanded surveillance powers will not necessarily prevent any plans that have already reached the execution phase with a predetermined date or time, but they will prove crucial to detecting developing plots and in identifying suspected cell members.

It was not surprising to read of communications between al Qaeda and its operatives in America. The real surprise was that Congressional Democrats took so long to realize the importance of the government surveillance program in protecting America from attack. When the president’s critics do the right thing, even grudgingly, for national security, we all benefit.

Technorati Tags:
Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in America, FISA, NSA, Wiretap, Electronic Surveillance, Terrorist Cells, Bush Administration, Email monitoring

Times Surge of Truth Refreshing

Stop the presses! The New York Times, far and away the most virulent anti-Bush, anti-war news organization in America, today published an Op/Ed piece that actually debunked that paper’s own daily headlines of doom and gloom news from Iraq.

In a contribution co-authored by Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack, Brookings Institution fellows and no fans of the Bush administration, the pair presented a region by region analysis of the results so far of General Petraeus’ surge strategy, which finally reached full operational strength in June. Congressional Democrats and defecting (perhaps defective?) Republicans call for troop withdrawals and insist that defeat is inevitable, but O’Hanlon and Pollack, who spent eight days meeting with troops, military leaders, and Iraqi leaders, came to a far different conclusion about progress in Iraq than Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, and presidential candidate Barack Obama.

I recommend reading the Op/Ed piece in its entirety, as it contains descriptions of progress that never garner any attention from major media outlets bent on reporting only suicide bombings or IED incidents that add to the death toll. The cynical nature of Iraq War news reporting offered by the traditional networks belies the truth of what is actually occurring in Iraq’s cities and villages: The country is becoming more secure, and the U.S. military has been infused with high morale. The following analysis of conditions in Iraq will surprise the “impeach Bush” crowd, much as it did the authors themselves:

Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. As two analysts who have harshly criticized the Bush administration’s miserable handling of Iraq, we were surprised by the gains we saw and the potential to produce not necessarily “victory” but a sustainable stability that both we and the Iraqis could live with.

After the furnace-like heat, the first thing you notice when you land in Baghdad is the morale of our troops. In previous trips to Iraq we often found American troops angry and frustrated — many sensed they had the wrong strategy, were using the wrong tactics and were risking their lives in pursuit of an approach that could not work.

Today, morale is high. The soldiers and marines told us they feel that they now have a superb commander in Gen. David Petraeus; they are confident in his strategy, they see real results, and they feel now they have the numbers needed to make a real difference.

Everywhere, Army and Marine units were focused on securing the Iraqi population, working with Iraqi security units, creating new political and economic arrangements at the local level and providing basic services — electricity, fuel, clean water and sanitation — to the people. Yet in each place, operations had been appropriately tailored to the specific needs of the community. As a result, civilian fatality rates are down roughly a third since the surge began — though they remain very high, underscoring how much more still needs to be done.

We traveled to the northern cities of Tal Afar and Mosul…. American troop levels in both cities now number only in the hundreds because the Iraqis have stepped up to the plate. Reliable police officers man the checkpoints in the cities, while Iraqi Army troops cover the countryside.

The authors rightfully conclude from their observations in Iraq that while Iraq’s government must achieve solidarity and work with more urgency for its own survival, the undeniable fact is that General Petraeus’ surge strategy is working, and working impressively. They further credit Petraeus for ending the “whack-a-mole” security situation in many parts of Iraq that existed previously. The “Whack-a-mole” issue has been a complaint of U.S. soldiers through much of the war, because regions were formerly only temporarily secured by minimum force levels, and once American troops moved on to other more intense fighting, insurgents and al-Qaeda recruits would pop up again in the previously secure areas. This usually meant that our troops would be forced to return and re-secure those areas. Under Petraeus’ leadership, regions are held until they are actually secure before troops move on to clear other regions of insurgents and terrorists.

Bush administration critics should consider that the results observed by these two Brookings fellows have occurred in a relatively short period, and are increasing in momentum now that the surge force has reached full staffing levels. War opponents were looking with eager anticipation for Petraeus’ surge report due in September. They were certain there would be ample evidence in the report to justify their advocacy of troop withdrawals by April 2008, however this early report of surge success, coming as it did from two consistent critics of President Bush’s handling of the Iraq War, should throw some much needed water on the “impeach Bush” bonfire.

The Times deserves praise for providing its readers with O’Hanlon’s and Pollack’s Op/Ed report of the successes of the surge thus far. Although the pair included a mild disclaimer that “victory” may not be possible, they clearly saw potential for a “sustainable stability.” Such an achievement of stability would indeed constitute victory, as stability would permit the Iraqis to solidify their democratically elected government and develop the resources needed to defend themselves from foreign influences with ulterior motives for Iraq’s future. A “sustained stability” would further alleviate the need for full U.S. troop deployment in Iraq, as our soldiers could eventually assume an advisory/training role rather than performing actual regional security sweeps.

Surge critics will find it increasingly difficult to justify their opposition to Petraeus and the Bush administration when similar reports of success become available in the media. Americans are confident of our armed forces and know that good news is always just around the corner when our soldiers are committed to action. The surge strategy appears to have helped the Iraqis turn some important corners, and they are now more actively engaged in their own security and counterterrorism operations than ever before. That is good news for America, Iraq, and the free world. Hopefully the Times will continue to search for and publish the successes of the surge strategy with fervor equal to its reports of perceived Bush administration failures.

Technorati Tags:
David Petraeus, Surge Strategy, Iraq War, Brookings Institution, Anbar Province, Surge Progress

Beware Iran's Left Hand if Shaking Right

No government engages in more doublespeak than the current Iranian regime. While shaking America’s right hand and agreeing to participate in a Regional Security Subcommittee with the U.S. and Iraq, Ahmadinejad’s administration holds a lethal weapon in its other hand. It is impossible to assign any credibility to Iran’s stated desire to help stabilize the security situation in Iraq while it simultaneously floods Iraq with weapons, IEDs, and terrorists using them to kill American troops and Iraqis. It is likewise impossible to place trust for cooperation in Iraq in a regime that flatly refuses to comply with UN resolutions and sanctions designed to halt its uranium enrichment efforts.

Iran’s offer to help broker security in Iraq is nothing more than a clever political feint clearly designed to soften international perceptions of Iran’s intentions in the region. If Iran can convince world leaders through its participation on a security subcommittee that it seeks peace and stability in the region, then its claims to a peaceful nuclear program developed only for power generation will appear less transparent. Our European allies are easily pacified by small gestures of cooperation, no matter how insincere those gestures may be, from Middle Eastern leaders. Saddam Hussein proved that conclusively by co-opting high ranking government officials in Germany, France, and Britain through cash and oil bribes. In exchange, these leaders softened their countries’ stances on enforcement of UN resolutions against Iraq’s pursuit of WMD.

Consider whether these words from a senior Iranian official, reported by the Guardian (UK) indicate any commitment to a peaceful and lawful end to Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons:

Tehran has made clear that it will not suspend enrichment as the UN security council has demanded, despite two earlier rounds of financial, travel and arms sanctions. A decision on a third round has been put off until September. "If there is another resolution, we will react with whatever we have," the senior official told western journalists. "So far we have answered legally, limiting [UN] inspections, and reducing cooperation with the IAEA within the legal framework.

"But if there is no legal option left, it is obvious we will be tempted to do illegal things. What is very important to us is our dignity, and we are prepared to act."

There will never be a stable Iraq as long as there is a radical, nuclear weapons-seeking regime on its border, pouring arms and terrorist expertise into the country. The danger from Iran is increased by the fact, as stated by this senior official, that Iran's dignity is at stake. To a regime that thrives on projecting an image of strength, defending dignity will likely require irrational actions. The major difference between the mullahs’ quest for nuclear weapons and Saddam Hussein’s similar effort to acquire WMD is religion. Saddam was a secular leader who sought ultimate weapons for the sheer exercise of power politics. The mullahs seek them for self-proclaimed apocalyptic use on Israel and the United States.

In our determination to stabilize Iraq and assure that its government is capable of providing defending itself, we must not lose sight of the greater danger posed by Iran. Though it would be an unpleasant situation, technically the U.S. could fight al Qaeda indefinitely in Iraq on a small scale, but if Iran’s uranium enrichment is not halted and its production facilities are not rendered inoperable, we will be fighting the same war for years to come but under the danger of nuclear attack from Iraq’s neighbor. Thus our war to provide Iraq with freedom and self-determination will have been for naught.

The Bush administration is right to argue that a stable Iraq is important to our national security, particularly in the long run, because it would establish a Muslim democracy and maintain America's image of strength in an area of the world that preys on perceived weakness. However, stabilizing Iraq should be a secondary priority to eliminating Iran’s supply stream of IEDs and arms into Iraq as well as its uranium enrichment recalcitrance. Since Iraq’s stability is codependent on Iran’s, our focus should be on stabilizing the one that is months away from possessing sufficient enriched uranium to produce its first nuclear weapon. Once that genie is out of the bottle, there will be no further opportunity to recapture it. Israeli intelligence clearly shares this assessment and may be forced to act unilaterally by the end of this year. It should not be forced to act alone. The UN Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should be enforced aggressively by all who signed it.

Before the U.S. places any trust in Iran, Iran must be required to demonstrate responsibility on the world stage by immediately halting its uranium reduction efforts. Ahmadinejad is no fool. His new willingness to engage the U.S. in diplomacy over Iraq’s security is a calculated tactical move that provides him with the two most valuable things he needs to move his uranium enrichment to the point of no return: an international image of cooperation; and time.

As long as Iran appears cooperative on the issue of Iraq, it will be difficult for President Bush to make the case to the world that decisive action must be taken to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program. The world will always call for new talks, further negotiations, and diplomatic solutions. At some point in coming months, while holding talks and negotiations, Iran will pass the point of no return in its uranium enrichment and the opportunity for action will have passed. Iran is counting on its Iraq cooperation smokescreen to obscure from view its true intentions, both in Iraq and in its nuclear facilities.

An Iranian gesture of “goodwill” in Iraq on the one hand must not be allowed to conceal or excuse the nuclear dagger it holds in the other. America should make no mistake as to where that dagger points.

Technorati Tags:
Iraq War, Iran, Regional Security Subcommittee, Ahmadinejad, Bush Administration, Uranium Enrichment, Diplomacy

31 Victims Wish Gitmo Had Kept Mehsud

The moral of the story is that releasing terrorist enemy combatants from Guantanamo kills people. What is the story that leads to that moral? The tale of Abdullah Mehsud, a one-legged terrorist leader once housed at Guantanamo.

Liberal critics of the Bush administration’s detainment of terrorist enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay are full of sympathy and understanding for these so-called “freedom fighters” or “insurgents.” Those same critics have taken the administration to court in order to extend rights and legal representation to these terrorists caught in battle, arguing that they deserve criminal trials and should be released rather than held indefinitely. In the liberal mind these captured enemy combatants were never as dangerous or involved in high level terrorist activity as the military or the Bush administration claimed. As usual, however, liberal criticism of such military detentions has been proved unwarranted. As it turns out, even the detainees who are eventually released for various reasons immediately resume their jihad as soon as they return to Afghanistan, Iraq, or in one case symptomatic of the problem, Pakistan.

The story of Taliban leader Abdullah Mehsud illustrates quite clearly why it is not a good idea to release these enemy combatants while we are fighting a global war against Islamic terrorists. From today’s Washington Post:

A top Taliban commander who had became one of Pakistan's most wanted men since being released from U.S. custody in 2004 died Tuesday as security forces raided his hide-out, officials here said.

Abdullah Mehsud had earned a fearsome reputation by orchestrating brazen attacks and kidnappings, and was regarded as one of the masterminds of an insurgency that has spread from Afghanistan into Pakistan and grown more intense in recent weeks.

Pakistani officials said Mehsud blew himself up with a grenade early Tuesday morning rather than surrender as security forces closed in on his hideout....

...Mehsud, who was believed to be 31, was captured by U.S. troops in Afghanistan in late 2001, after the United States launched an invasion to topple the Taliban regime. The prisoner spent 25 months in the American detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. But he apparently concealed his identity from his captors, and was released in March 2004. Mehsud later bragged that he had convinced Americans at Guantanamo that he was Afghan, not Pakistani.

Almost as soon as he was freed, the one-legged fighter -- he lost his other leg to a landmine -- resumed waging war, Pakistani officials say. The government of Pakistan placed an $84,000 bounty on his head after his followers kidnapped two Chinese engineers in October 2004. One of the engineers survived, while the other died during the rescue operation.

Mehsud, who operated both in Afghanistan and in the tribal areas of Pakistan, was believed to have ties to al Qaeda. It was not known if he had a role in the recent spate of attacks, though he was suspected in connection with a car bombing last week that targeted a convoy of Chinese engineers in Baluchistan. The engineers survived, but 30 Pakistanis were killed.

In this case, the government released Mehsud because he reportedly convinced Guantanamo officials that he was not a Taliban terrorist in Pakistan. The veracity of Mehsud’s bragging is questionable, but his release and subsequent behavior validate the Bush administration’s policy of indefinite detainment at facilities like Guantanamo. Even if the two attacks described above were the only ones orchestrated by Mehsud since his release from Guantanamo, which is highly unlikely, his release alone directly led to the deaths of 31 victims.

He returned to Pakistan and immediately resumed his role as an inspirational terrorist leader, yet the president’s critics incessantly pine for legal protections and releases for more than three hundred of Mehsud’s fellow terrorists. I am sure the families of Mehsud’s 31 most recent victims could offer convincing testimony regarding the wisdom of indefinite detentions for enemy combatants at Guantanamo. Unfortunately, liberals seeking to condemn President Bush listen more closely to the ACLU’s defense of “rights” for detainees than they do to reports of what happens when murderous terrorists are set free.

Mehsud further demonstrated that he preferred an explosive suicidal death to being captured and facing any form of legal prosecution or Pakistani military detainment. By continuing his policy of taking the fight to the enemy in its own lands, President Bush is allowing all who share Mehsud’s desire for ultimate justice their opportunity for self-execution. In the end, Mehsud did not want a lawyer, he wanted a grenade. He did not want a trial, he wanted martyrdom.

Ironically, he was never safer from his own suicidal ideology than he was while detained at Guantanamo. Setting such men free is potentially lethal, to innocents and to the terrorists themselves. We can increase global security for everyone by keeping these captured terrorists in pocket as long as we are at war with them.

Technorati Tags:
Abdullah Mehsud, Guantanamo, Enemy Combatants, al Qaeda, Bush Administration, Suicide, Islamic Terrorists

Fox Analyst Flays "Friend" Musharraf

It is a rare occurrence when I must side with the usually left-leaning State Department on any issue that directly involves national security. However, when it comes to calls from certain quarters for the Bush administration to aggressively pressure Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to wage all out war on Islamic radicals hiding in the mountainous Afghanistan/Pakistan border, I found myself siding with Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs rather than Fox News military analyst Colonel David Hunt. Ordinarily I appreciate Col. Hunt’s blunt assessments and aggressive posture towards engaging the enemy with full purpose and force rather than limited rules of engagement, but Col. Hunt’s recommendations for conducting the War on Terror within Pakistan are fraught with dangers that he either minimizes or ignores in his online columns and cable news interviews.

A summary of a new threat assessment leaked to the Associated Press this week highlighted the reality that the Taliban and al Qaeda have regrouped and regained strength nearly on par with pre-9/11 levels, thriving in their mountain hideouts in the tribal regions of Pakistan’s northwestern border with Afghanistan. What to do about that reality is, next to Iraq, the most hotly debated issue in Washington. Counterterrorism and intelligence officials believe Musharraf has not done enough to root out the terrorists while accepting $100 million from the U.S. each month ostensibly to develop the local economy in the tribal areas where many find the money alternatively offered by terror groups and border smugglers irresistible. Musharraf has insisted that Pakistani forces execute all counterterrorism raids and operations within Pakistan, and the amount of success he has achieved forms the crux of the debate between the State Department’s approach toward Pakistan and the approach favored by Col. Hunt and others.

In his latest column at FoxNews.com, Col. Hunt wrote the following:

This week, we learned that in 2005, great guys from Seal Team 6, Special Forces, and other terrific Special Operations Organizations were sitting on a runway in Afghanistan, all geared up, ready to go and capture and or kill much of al Qaeda's top leadership. You remember al Qaeda; they’re the ones who killed us on September 11, 2001. Our supremely brave, conditioned and trained men were fully rehearsed, totally committed and ready to kick some serious al Qaeda [expletive].

They call him Rummy … or at least I do. He's the former and totally incompetent Secretary of Defense, who less than two years after 9/11 — two years after the president says “we will hunt them down” — decides that this mission was to be canceled. He makes this bone-headed decision because it might be “dangerous” and it might piss off the president of Pakistan. ARE YOU KIDDING ME? Hey, Mr. “Ask and Answer Your Own Questions,” everything about war is dangerous and General Musharraf is not our friend.

I do not fault Col. Hunt for his dislike of former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld or for his desire for Special Forces operations like the one he described to act swiftly and lethally to eliminate Bin Laden or other terrorist leaders. From a counterterrorism and military perspective, the idea that a Special Forces team had a specific location to hit within Pakistan and was prepared to strike but was denied the opportunity for political reasons is incredibly frustrating. It is easy for those of us who work in intelligence or related fields to conclude that though such an operation might anger Musharraf, the ends would justify the means, especially if Bin Laden were captured or killed. Yet that is precisely where Col. Hunt’s assessment of the missed opportunity and the risk to Musharraf drifts from understandable disappointment to dangerous miscalculation.

Col. Hunt’s assessment that “General Musharraf is not our friend” is shared by many within the intelligence and counterterrorism community, but it is based on unrealistic expectations for “friendship” in the War on Terror, as well as a dangerous underestimation of the Muslim power vacuum that would occur in nuclear-armed Pakistan should Musharraf lose control or be assassinated. Although Musharraf may not be the “friend” that Col. Hunt understandably hopes for, considering the seething cauldron of Islamic radicalism that surrounds him within his own population it is remarkable that he has survived to assist the U.S. as long as he has. Assistant Sec. of State Boucher defended Musharraf’s contributions to the War on Terror during a House committee hearing yesterday, as excerpted from the Washington Post:

At the hearing, Boucher said that Pakistan has "captured more al-Qaeda than any country in the world, and lost more people doing that." He added that Pakistani authorities had killed or captured three of the top 10 Taliban commanders in the border area over the past six to nine months -- and caught several more in the past week.

Boucher said that Pakistan has about 85,000 troops stationed in the border area, with Washington reimbursing Islamabad for its $100 million monthly expenses. Musharraf has promised the tribal leaders $100 million annually for 10 years, and the United States has pledged another $150 million annually for five years, in an effort to promote economic development as an alternative to smuggling and terrorism.

"These were all joint efforts with Pakistan that led to the elimination of some of the top Taliban leaders who had been operating from Pakistan to support the insurgency in Afghanistan," Boucher said.

He said that there are signs "every now and then that there's not a wholehearted effort at all levels in all institutions in Pakistan" -- a reference to news accounts of Pakistani intelligence officials supporting terrorists.

"We've raised those when we need to," Boucher said. When asked about Musharraf's role, he said, "I think if Pakistan was not fighting terrorism, there'd be no way we could succeed in Afghanistan or in terms of the security of our homeland."

The State Department and intelligence community are nearly always at odds over strategy and alliance issues, and nowhere is that more evident than in the debate over how much pressure the U.S. should apply to Musharraf to wage war against Islamic radicals within his own country. In addition to the contributions Musharraf has made as outlined in part by Asst. Secretary Boucher, Musharraf recently showed courage in raiding a radical mosque and killing a barricaded Islamic radical cleric, actions that were wildly unpopular In Islamabad and caused riots. He has reportedly survived fourteen assassination attempts, and yet continues to mount Pakistani military operations against Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in the tribal regions. In this precarious position reality dictates that losing Musharraf, regardless of his perceived level of “friendship” with the U.S., would be far more dangerous to world stability and our national security than his continued allegedly half-hearted engagement in the War on Terror.

Col. Hunt was quick to criticize Musharraf and to call for American military strikes within Pakistan regardless of the potential ramifications for Musharraf’s continued control over Pakistan’s nuclear weaponry and resources. Such rash action might satisfy our desire for revenge on Bin Laden and it might very well weaken al Qaeda greatly for many years. However, as recent plots in Britain, Indonesia, the Philippines, and other nations have demonstrated, al Qaeda’s leadership may be holed up in Pakistan’s mountains, but its ideology and followers have formed a global movement. By striking within Pakistan without the consent of President Musharraf, America would undermine his authority and control over his country and embolden radical Islamists to gain control of Pakistan’s military and nuclear weapons through a coup or other violent action. Would America be safer with a Pakistani leader who, though far from being a perfect “friend”, at least keeps nuclear weapons and material out of the hands of Islamic terrorists, or with the alternative; a radical Islamist Pakistani leader who opens Pakistan’s nuclear resources to the highest bidding terrorist organization?

If a U.S. War on Terror, waged by the U.S. inside Pakistan, would create no other repercussions than making Musharraf angry, as Col. Hunt simplistically assumed, then it would be well worth doing, and doing immediately. Unfortunately, war carries multiple dangers, and angering Musharraf is not the reason we have forestalled sending our Special Forces into Pakistan. The simple truth is that Musharraf’s stability in Pakistan has earned him the right to demand that Pakistan’s military conduct all operations within its border. One wonders how Col. Hunt might respond if he were President of the United States and a terrorist group, later discovered to be holed up in the Rocky Mountains near Denver, flew planes into government buildings in Islamabad, killing 3,000 Pakistanis. Would “President Hunt,” when contacted by an angry Musharraf, agree to allow Pakistani forces to operate inside the U.S. and attack the terrorists hiding in the Rocky Mountains? It is not likely. “President Hunt” would rightfully expect to be respected and would likewise rightfully assure Musharraf that the U.S. military would handle any such operation within our borders. Why would Col. Hunt expect Musharraf to act any differently when given the same type of request?

For a military man steeped in the culture of respect for authority, it is surprising that Col. Hunt would demonstrate so much contempt for the authority of a foreign president of a nuclear power with a population of 165 million who has, lest it be forgotten, taken high profile terrorists like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed into custody and turned them over to American intelligence operatives. The information gleaned from those prisoners has been the most significant contribution to our knowledge of the enemy in the War on Terror, and Musharraf’s military operations against al Qaeda in Pakistan made that possible. While Musharraf holds onto his fragile control over Pakistan, America should patiently assist this “friend” rather than cast stones at him. Who among world leaders is a perfect “friend?” Let him cast the first stone. Secretary Rumsfeld, also a far from perfect Defense Secretary, clearly had more significant reasons for not sending Special Ops into Pakistan than making Musharraf angry, reasons that continue to shape current American restraint in order to preserve a known and stable leadership in Pakistan.

Technorati Tags:
Musharraf, Pakistan, al Qaeda, War on Terror, Bush Administration, Colonel David Hunt, State Department, Richard Boucher, Taliban, Counterterrorism

Former Army Sec Faults DHS Terror Plans

The War on Terror is not, as Democratic presidential candidate John Edwards claims, merely a bumper sticker slogan, but it is rapidly regressing into perhaps the highest-stakes blame game in our nation’s history. When attacks or attempted attacks occur, the outrage expressed usually focuses on whom within America or among our allies failed to predict and prevent the attacks, but very little ire is directed towards those who perpetrated the cowardly acts. Americans are obsessed with assigning blame within our own government, desperate to identify an internal flaw that makes such attacks inevitable because Americans like to be liked and have difficulty fathoming the fact that much of the world detests America and all that it represents, for good or evil. We spent far more energy and resources on study groups, commissions, and media reports to determine who within the U.S. government was to blame for the 9/11 attacks, even while the remains of victims were being unearthed at Ground Zero.

Meanwhile on 9/11, there was dancing, rejoicing, and celebratory gunfire in cities and towns across the Middle East, images of which appeared on “fair and balanced” news networks, but were deemed too inflammatory for broadcasts on traditional left-leaning channels. In Oliver Stone’s otherwise even-handed and excellent film World Trade Center, he portrayed the populations of the Middle East as shocked and deeply sorrowed by the television images of the Twin Towers collapsing, ignoring completely the reality of their celebrations. To have truthfully portrayed Middle Eastern Muslims as happy and gleeful on 9/11 would have implied that millions of people in the world find pleasure in watching America suffer, and thus are to blame for supporting, indirectly or directly, terrorism directed against America and her allies. Americans, ever in denial that anyone could hate something as wonderful as America or its tolerance, prefer instead to seek scapegoats from within, turning on our own in order to vent the anger and thirst for revenge that is considered politically incorrect to direct at those who are actually to blame: Islamic terrorists.

In a Washington Times editorial yesterday, Mike Walker, former acting Secretary of the Army and former Deputy Director of FEMA, waxed eloquent about the need for Americans to maintain vigilance and not to underestimate the threat radical Islam poses to our way of life. Walker, writing of the preferred tactics of al Qaeda, warned “They seek to spread fear, hoping to turn us inward and against each other.” Yet, a mere two paragraphs later, Walker turns inward against American government agencies, blaming the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for neglecting its responsibility to prepare for and prevent terrorist attacks. Walker wrote:

The Department of Homeland Security seems more concerned with passing immigration legislation and not repeating the response to Hurricane Katrina. While this occurs, the terrorist threat, the reason the department was established in the first place, continues to build. Almost six years have passed since the 9/11 attacks, we still have no national terrorism prevention doctrine. Programs continue to be episodic and not based on a plan for prevention. State and local government homeland-security budgets continue to be cut, while daily priorities take precedence.

Capital Cloak has criticized DHS on occasion when warranted and recognizes many flaws within that department, but Walker’s portrayal of DHS as failing in its counterterrorism duties was factually in error and undeservedly singled out one department as a scapegoat. Walker was absolutely correct in his assessment that DHS is greatly concerned with immigration issues and avoiding another Hurricane Katrina fiasco. He was also correct that DHS was created post-9/11 as a response to Islamic terrorism and that after nearly six years there is no “national terrorism prevention doctrine.” However, Walker ignored several important truths about DHS that, had he included them, would have negated much of his criticism.

I have written previously that DHS, despite public perception, is not a counterterrorism agency. Although it was the love-child of the post-9/11 political frenzy to pass legislation reassuring the American people that something was being done about terrorism, DHS was never meant to become the nation’s lead agency in the War on Terror. That distinction has been and continues to be shared between the “terrorism quartet” of the CIA, FBI, DIA, and NSA, with the FBI front and center domestically. DHS has no intelligence operatives or informants, no satellites, no electronic monitoring capabilities; in short, it has no counterterrorism tools whatsoever. None of the agencies who possess these assets are DHS components. They operate either independently or under the direction of other departments, such as Defense or Justice. While these agencies have employees assigned to work with DHS as intelligence liaisons, the level of information sharing between them and DHS is not under DHS’ control. Efforts have been made to improve intelligence sharing procedures and expectations, but the current reality is that DHS relies 100% on other departments and agencies to provide it with intelligence on terrorist activity.

If DHS is concerned with immigration issues, it is because immigration agencies are a significant part of the department, comprising the majority of DHS personnel. Immigration issues are also controversial and politically charged. DHS comes under fire for not “securing the border,” yet the executive branch, which is responsible (through the Justice Dept.) for establishing federal law enforcement priorities, has chosen not to pursue strict enforcement of immigration laws, including deportation, except in campaign years. As I have written previously, law enforcement is restricted in what laws it will enforce by the Justice Department’s willingness to prosecute violations of those laws. If American presidents and their attorney generals do not want to see illegal immigration laws enforced properly, law enforcement must focus its priorities on other laws that attorney generals do want to see enforced. It is not the way it should be, but that is the reality. DHS actively pursues violations according to direction from a Cabinet member and the president. If Walker is looking to lay blame for DHS’ interest in immigration issues, he should lay it at the feet of those who dictate priorities to DHS. Once Congress and the executive branch realize that illegal immigration and border enforcement are national security issues rather than the potential means to legalize a treasure trove of potential voters for political gain, perhaps DHS will be given the proper tools and mandate to halt illegal immigration and locate those already here.

As a former Deputy Director of FEMA, surely Walker must realize that FEMA has nothing to do with “homeland security” and never should have been included in the formation of DHS. The fallout from its handling of Hurricane Katrina, some deserved, some unfairly heaped on FEMA instead of local leaders, has assured that DHS must give an inordinate amount of attention and resources to predicting the only thing more unpredictable than terrorism: the weather. Nothing whips DHS leadership into frenzy quite like a tropical storm that may or may not become a hurricane. There are email alerts, pages, conference calls, and several daily briefings all to warn that a storm somewhere in the Atlantic or the Gulf of Mexico may one day develop into a hurricane. What is the terrorism nexus with hurricanes? Is al Qaeda sending these storms to batter America? Of course not, but you wouldn’t know it by the near panic that engulfs DHS with the mere mention of the dreaded phrase “Hurricane Katrina.” That DHS has this focus on the weather and determination never again to take a media beating after a major storm is not DHS’ fault. If Walker is looking to turn inward and lay blame, he should lay it at the feet of those who crafted the Homeland Security legislation to include FEMA in a department that was allegedly supposed to tackle weightier issues like terrorism.

Walker wondered why DHS has not created a “terrorism prevention doctrine” nearly six years after 9/11. The answer is quite simple and to a Washington insider like Walker should have been obvious: DHS does not have the resources, departmental mission, or terrorism expertise to oversee the creation of such a doctrine. For such a doctrine to be formulated, debated, edited, and approved, the process currently requires separate participation from a host of departments and agencies, each with its own budgetary and political agendas. DHS is perhaps the world’s largest middleman, receiving intelligence from other agencies, sanitizing it, and then sharing it with state or local officials. For DHS to gain counterterrorism capabilities, some of the agencies listed above who actually do perform counterterrorism functions would have to be moved into the department. Reliance on other agencies to share intelligence did not work very well or often prior to 9/11, and now that the stinging memory of 9/11 has become distant for some in Congress and the executive branch, that inter-agency dependence will inevitably devolve to previous levels of non-cooperation.

When a department or agency is the product of a flawed creation process, should the blame for its shortcomings be heaped upon those within it who merely perform the duties the department has been given? Certainly there have been and will always be human errors that occur in the performance of routine duties in any department, and those errors should be recognized and remedied appropriately. However, when it comes to public and media perception that DHS should be the government’s counterterrorism authority, a dose of reality would be refreshing. DHS’ creation without inclusion of the FBI, the primary agency empowered to investigate terrorism, was akin to building a fire station but choosing not to equip it with fire trucks or staff it with a crew. In the absence of counterterrorism capabilities, DHS naturally turns its attention to immigration and hurricanes as Walker argued, but not because terrorism is a low priority within the department. Effective counterterrorism is simply beyond DHS’ current organizational structure.

Whether DHS should be the lead agency in counterterrorism and be given more capabilities is a matter for debate, but criticizing DHS for failing to be something it was not designed to be contributes little to improving public trust at a time when our confidence and faith in each other as Americans is the one thing al Qaeda cannot destroy with its car bombs and plane hijackings. DHS is not the enemy. President Bush is not the enemy. Congress is not the enemy. Our enemies are radical Islamic terrorists, and they delight in our penchant for self-loathing and our obsession with assigning blame to each other for their actions.

Like a battered wife, we cover up our injuries and blame ourselves for the beatings we receive, searching ourselves for faults or flaws that make us deserve attack, while the bullying perpetrator who relies on violence to intimidate escapes blame or punishment. We, like our British counterparts, are asked not to mention that terrorists are Islamic and the use of the phrase “War on Terror” has been deemed too harsh or belittled as a “bumper sticker.” Sadly, many battered wives blame themselves until the terrible day that the cowardly abuser strikes a fatal blow. Only then is it clear that blame mattered not at all. The priority should have been removal from the threat or better still, removal of the threat.

Walker was right to warn Americans not to turn on one another. He should have set the example by heeding his own warning.

Technorati Tags:
Mike Walker, Homeland Security, DHS, FEMA, FBI, Counterterrorism, Intelligence, National Security, 9/11, Terrorism, Islamic Terrorists, Federal Government, Blame

Colin Powell's Oscar-Worthy UN Iraq Act

Colin Powell, once the military name most respected by everyday Americans, is becoming increasingly synonymous with Hillary Clinton's well earned moniker of “America’s Greatest Iraq Monday Morning Quarterback.” Hillary, who joined her husband in condemning Saddam Hussein and claiming that nothing short of military action would remove the threat he posed to the world, voted to authorize President Bush’s decision to act militarily to disarm and remove Hussein from power. Now that she is running for the Democratic nomination in a party largely controlled by MoveOn.org and other radical anti-war groups, however, Hillary made the outrageously disingenuous claim that “if she knew then what she knows now,” as president in 2003 she never would have authorized a war in Iraq. The accounts of Hillary’s pre-war and pre-2006 press conferences and Senate speeches are legion, and they all contain a shared theme: Saddam possessed WMD, was unstable, and the security of the United States and the Middle East demanded that action be taken against him due to his continued violation of UN resolutions. The Monday morning quarterbacking Hillary now employs in her harangues against the Bush administration’s Iraq War policies is hypocritical but not surprising from the presidential candidate looking to establish ideological roots wherever fertile political soil is found, but Monday morning quarterbacking about the invasion of Iraq now made public by Colin Powell was less expected and in some ways more bereft of character than Hillary’s hypocrisies.

Hillary is a power-coveting politician, and as such her approach to support or opposition to the Iraq War vacillates depending on which way the political wind blows each day. This is not to suggest that her Gumby-like stretching into publicly desired positions is right, but rather it is expected. Colin Powell, on the other hand, as former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and an integral figure in the previous Gulf War to contain Saddam’s aggressions, was considered by many to be a man of honor, integrity, and military expertise. However, his Monday morning quarterbacking of the president’s Iraq War decision as reported in yesterday’s UK Sunday Times revealed a level of hypocrisy previously unknown to the American public. From the UK Times story:

THE former American secretary of state Colin Powell has revealed that he spent 2½ hours vainly trying to persuade President George W Bush not to invade Iraq and believes today’s conflict cannot be resolved by US forces.

“I tried to avoid this war,” Powell said at the Aspen Ideas Festival in Colorado. “I took him through the consequences of going into an Arab country and becoming the occupiers.”

Powell has become increasingly outspoken about the level of violence in Iraq, which he believes is in a state of civil war. “The civil war will ultimately be resolved by a test of arms,” he said. “It’s not going to be pretty to watch, but I don’t know any way to avoid it. It is happening now.”

He added: “It is not a civil war that can be put down or solved by the armed forces of the United States.” All the military could do, Powell suggested, was put “a heavier lid on this pot of boiling sectarian stew”.

…According to Powell: “We have to face the reality of the situation that is on the ground and not what we would want it to be.” He believes that, even if the military surge has been a partial success in areas such as Anbar province, where Sunni tribes have turned on Al-Qaeda, it has not been accompanied by the vital political and economic “surge” and reconciliation process promised by the Iraqi government.

The assertion that Powell tried valiantly to avoid the war by talking President Bush out of an invasion is, to say the least, difficult to swallow. If Powell’s statement in Colorado was true, then perhaps Powell could explain what arm-twisting or blackmail was employed to force him into personally appearing before the UN Security Council in February 2003 as Secretary of State to present the administration’s case for war against Saddam Hussein. If Powell felt so strongly that invading Iraq was a mistake at the time, why is it that only now, after 4 years of a war he lent his personal credibility to in order to garner international support, does Powell mention that he was actually opposed to the war before it began? Who can forget the mountains of evidence Powell brought to bear in support of war against Saddam? Surveillance photos of WMD sites, recorded testimony of intelligence sources, financial transaction records revealing weapons funding in violation of UN resolutions while starving Iraqis received none of the food assistance the UN funds were supposed to purchase under the “Oil for Food” program. The list of documents brought to bear is staggering, and Powell eloquently explained the danger to the world that would result from allowing Saddam to ignore UN resolutions and continue his quest for WMD.

Powell’s case was so compelling that a coalition of allies voted to support the invasion and lent proportional military support. So credible was Powell’s UN testimony that Democrats and Republicans, reviewing the same intelligence data, voted overwhelmingly to authorize the invasion, with much bipartisan pontification about the potential threat to the world from Saddam’s WMD ambitions. Powell’s recent claim that he tried in vain to prevent the war lacks any corroborative evidence to support it. If Powell was as morally opposed to invasion as he now claims, then his performance at the UN Security Council was Oscar-worthy. A stronger case has never been made for war by someone who allegedly opposed it.

For the complete text of Powell’s testimony to the UN Security Council, click here. The following are brief selected excerpts from Powell’s command performance. Decide for yourselves if these were the words of a man who supposedly tried hard to talk the president out of war with Iraq:

The material I will present to you comes from a variety of sources. Some are U.S. sources. And some are those of other countries. Some of the sources are technical, such as intercepted telephone conversations and photos taken by satellites. Other sources are people who have risked their lives to let the world know what Saddam Hussein is really up to.

…I cannot tell you everything that we know. But what I can share with you, when combined with what all of us have learned over the years, is deeply troubling....

…Everything we have seen and heard indicates that, instead of cooperating actively with the inspectors to ensure the success of their mission, Saddam Hussein and his regime are busy doing all they possibly can to ensure that inspectors succeed in finding absolutely nothing.

My colleagues, every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence. I will cite some examples, and these are from human sources.

…Numerous human sources tell us that the Iraqis are moving, not just documents and hard drives, but weapons of mass destruction to keep them from being found by inspectors.

…Ladies and gentlemen, these are not assertions. These are facts, corroborated by many sources, some of them sources of the intelligence services of other countries.

…Iraq has now placed itself in danger of the serious consequences called for in U.N. Resolution 1441. And this body places itself in danger of irrelevance if it allows Iraq to continue to defy its will without responding effectively and immediately.

…We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction; he's determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not some day use these weapons at a time and the place and in the manner of his choosing at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond?

The United States will not and cannot run that risk to the American people. Leaving Saddam Hussein in possession of weapons of mass destruction for a few more months or years is not an option, not in a post-September 11th world.

It is equally curious that, if Powell’s new claim is to be believed, he was not convinced by the military and intelligence data he personally presented to the UN Security Council. One wonders what further evidence Powell wanted in order to quell his supposedly troubled conscience on the issue of invasion. How many UN resolution violations was Powell willing to tolerate? How many satellite images of WMD storage and production facilities did he need to convince him that action was needed? It is telling that Powell offered no explanation for why he allegedly opposed the invasion, limiting his condemnation of the Iraq War to the current results rather than the situation and available information at the time the decision to invade was reached. Perhaps it speaks volumes about Powell’s lack of qualifications for high office that allegedly he alone was unconvinced by overwhelming intelligence data from virtually every international agency. It is the ultimate Monday morning quarterbacking for Powell to look at today’s news reports from Iraq and claim that he foresaw the current situation and if only the president had listened to Powell, the violence and casualties could have been avoided.

There were many options available to Powell once he allegedly realized he could not change the president’s mind. He could have spoken to a reporter on condition of anonymity and leaked the story of his own opposition to the invasion and kept his job as Secretary of State. He could have resigned as Secretary of State in protest and made it clear to the press and public why he was resigning. Even later, when he resigned long after the invasion, he cited personal reasons like family time for his decision rather than publicly challenge a decision to invade a foreign nation. Instead, Powell mounted no principled opposition to a plan he claims to have argued against. Where is the integrity and honor in that?

The UK Times pointed out that Powell has consulted twice with the Barack Obama campaign, and that Obama’s position on an immediate withdrawal from Iraq has been revised to more closely dovetail with Hillary’s desired gradual troop force reductions. It is telling that Powell, who claims to have attempted to talk President Bush out of invading Iraq, is not counseling Obama to demand an immediate and complete removal of U.S. troops from Iraq. If the invasion was a mistake, as Powell allegedly asserted to the president already in 2002-2003, then why is Powell not recommending a complete reversal of the decision by “bringing the troops home” as quickly as possible? Certainly the anti-war wing of Obama’s party demands this, so why counsel the young, inexperienced Senator to call for gradual troop reductions or redeployment in the region?

While Powell uses clever language in describing the U.S. military effort in Iraq as putting “a heavier lid on this pot of boiling sectarian stew,” Americans should keep in mind that Powell agreed to lend his personal credibility to placing the stew on the stove and turning up the heat when he presented the government’s case for war in Iraq. He should apply his own words when it comes to his claim that he tried to prevent the war and put a lid on it.

Technorati Tags:
Colin Powell, Hillary Clinton, Iraq War, Monday Morning Quarterback, War Opposition, UN Security Council, Saddam Hussein, War Critics, Bush Administration