German Cop Sacrificed to Government Gods

It is a cardinal rule of law enforcement that if something unplanned occurs that is detrimental to an ongoing investigation or surveillance, the lowliest agent or officer will be the sacrificial lamb. His career is slaughtered to appease the angry gods of government, who demand a sacrifice when embarrassments or liabilities arise from an operation gone bad.

In America, when terrorism investigations are compromised, federal agencies move swiftly to blame the state and local agencies they have been partnered with for leaking information or lacking sufficient experience to investigate suspects effectively. The finger of blame is never pointed inward. Likewise, when state-level criminal investigations are conducted jointly with city police departments or county sheriffs' offices and an informant is burned or the target of a surveillance is lost, it is always the "localest yokel" who is blamed for the operation's failure. The good news is that America is not alone in fostering this phenomenon among the ranks of federal and local law enforcement; unfortunately, that is also the bad news, as one of our key allies in the War on Terror demonstrated recently.

Media coverage of the arrests of three Islamic terrorists plotting to hit American targets, including Ramstein Air Base and Frankfurt Airport in Germany last week has achieved global saturation levels. What drew my attention for further scrutiny was Monday's revelation of a possible "blunder" by a German traffic police officer, who, according to reports, allegedly tipped off the three terror suspects prior to their eventual arrests that they were on a German government watch list. Of course, if the story were that simple, the traffic cop could rightly be castigated for an incident of incompetence that might have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Americans at the hands of these potential terrorist bombers. However, there is more to this story than alleged negligent bungling by an excited traffic officer.

Let's look first at CNN's description of what occurred prior to the arrests of the three terror suspects in Germany last week:

The three terror suspects arrested last week in Germany may have sped up their bombing plot after a loud-talking police officer inadvertently alerted them that they were on a federal watch list, an unnamed source with knowledge of the investigation told CNN.

The men were stopped by a traffic officer in the weeks prior to their arrest last Tuesday. The traffic stop was described by the head of Germany's Federal Criminal Investigation Office, Joerg Ziercke, as "a setback for the group."

But it may have also been a boon for the suspects, who had been under surveillance for over six months.

Federal investigators had bugged the vehicle carrying the suspects during the traffic stop and could hear one of the police officers loudly exclaim that the men were on a federal watch list, the source said.

Days later, the men were observed mixing a massive amount of explosive materials that German authorities said could have resulted in a stronger explosion than the terror attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005.

At that point, investigators moved in and arrested the men at a rental house in west-central Germany.

Even readers with law enforcement backgrounds likely cringed when reading this account of the "loudmouth" police officer notifying the suspects of their inclusion on the German watch list. Yet readers with experience planning and conducting complex surveillance operations should be asking themselves how a routine traffic stop ever occurred during a classified surveillance operation. The terror suspects were under surveillance by Germany's equivalent of the FBI, the Federal Criminal Investigation Office, which, according to CNN's report, had installed listening devices in the terrorists' vehicle because American intelligence had warned German authorities of their identities and plans.

Having planned and participated in many such surveillance operations, I found it unthinkable that Federal Criminal Investigation Office officials had not collaborated sufficiently with the local German police department to avoid even the possibility of the terror suspects having contact with any police entities throughout the duration of the surveillance. It is a routine practice to advise local police departments when state or federal agencies will be conducting surveillance within their jurisdictions for one simple reason: to avoid "blue on blue" incidents in which officers and agents are in real danger of mistakenly using lethal force on each other, neither recognizing each other as law enforcement until it is too late.

Surveillance planners are expected to ensure that local police officials are aware of an ongoing surveillance, even if the specific identities of the suspects remains unknown to them due to classification clearances. Local officials do not need to know who is under surveillance, but for officer safety they do need to know when it is occurring, what vehicles are involved, and what their instructions are in relation to the surveillance.

This is where the breakdown occurred in Germany, and although the unfortunate traffic officer is bearing the brunt of criticism for mentioning the watch list around the suspects, he is far less culpable than the Federal Criminal Investigation Office agents who clearly failed adequately brief the local traffic officers that under no circumstances should the suspects' vehicle be followed, approached, or stopped by any law enforcement vehicles.

This suspects had been under surveillance for six months, and apparently no German federal agent thought it necessary or wise to provide local traffic officers with instructions regarding the importance of avoiding the suspects, doing nothing to alarm them or make them suspect greater law enforcement presence, and above all to avoid direct confrontation with them unless requested otherwise by federal officials.

An effective surveillance is done without the suspects ever seeing a vehicle that even remotely resembles styles commonly used by law enforcement. To this end, law enforcement agencies purchase sports cars, SUVs, and other vehicles that fit into any neighborhood and bear no tell-tale signs of law enforcement presence, such as visible antennas, grill lights, visible radios in the cabin, and others. The surveillance team wants suspects to go about their daily business, visiting their associates, shopping for bomb-making supplies, going to their bomb-making facility if it is not in one of their homes, such as a storage rental unit or relatives' home.

It is the daily routine that allows the surveillance team to understand what is normal and what is not in their behavior, and this cannot be achieved if the suspects routinely encounter law enforcement vehicles. Such encounters, even if not traffic stop occurs, tend to spook the suspects and encourage them to alter their itineraries, change travel routes, and to be more aware of their surroundings, looking for possible surveillance.

While the "loudmouth" traffic officer in Germany certainly should not have mentioned the government watch list in such close proximity to the suspects, and his actions apparently did prompt them to hasten their production of bombs for the intended strike on American civilian and military targets, he was placed in position to blunder by a significantly graver goof.

The local traffic officer never would have stopped the suspects' vehicle if clear and unmistakable rules of engagement had been provided to the local police department by German federal officials running the surveillance. Unfortunately, this effort by Germany's federal agents to keep its local police in the dark has placed the traffic officer's slip-up under glaring media light. A mistake by one who should know better was a blunder. A mistake by those who should have known best of all was inexcusable.

Thankfully, these suspects merely sped up their bomb production and were still captured rather than disappearing to reemerge elsewhere and strike other, unsuspecting, targets. We should all hope that Germany's federal agents, and their international counterparts, learned a valuable lesson on proper surveillance planning and information sharing. More likely than not, when agencies hold their cards too close to the vest, they later learn they have dealt themselves a very bad hand.

Technorati Tags:
German Police, Federal Criminal Investigation Office, Bomb Plot, Islamic Terrorists, Surveillance, Terrorist Watch Lists, Counterterrorism, Ramstein Air Base

From "Freakonomics" to "Freakoterror"?

Has NY Times blogger and co-author of the best-seller Freakonomics, Steven Levitt, unintentionally spawned a new phenomenon that could be referred to as “Freakoterror?” Levitt’s post to the Times’ Freakonomics blog yesterday titled “If You Were a Terrorist, How Would You Attack?” has generated much controversy in the media, with seemingly equal numbers condemning Levitt as irresponsible for giving terrorists ideas or praising him for getting ideas out into the open so counterterrorism officials can consider them and plan accordingly. Could Levitt's foray into issues beyond his expertise result in waves of attacks by "Freakoterrorists," inspired by the attack ideas submitted by Levitt's readers?

I will admit that my career involvement in threat assessment and security planning caused me to react initially to Levitt’s post title with a slight cringe. This was not because I think he was doing terrorists any favors with his amateurish attempt to address a deadly serious issue, but because such hypothetical questions tend to blur the distinctions between what law enforcement and intelligence agencies can prepare for realistically and grandiose attack plans that would be a nightmare but are ultimately unpreventable.

Much of the criticism directed at Levitt for his choice of topic centered on the notion that by soliciting readers to submit their ideas for effective terrorist attacks in the United States, Levitt was somehow providing terrorists with potential plans they may not have thought of previously. That logic is flawed on several levels: First, it is a misguided assumption that radical Islamic terrorists read the Freakonomics blog. For argument’s sake, even if terrorist planners read Levitt’s blog, they would not have gained any knowledge they did not already possess; second, Levitt would not have been accused of helping terrorists if he had merely posed the question a different way. For example, if Levitt had asked his readers to submit their best ideas for an action movie involving a terrorist attack in America, as former CIA officer Bruce Schneier did last year, his readers would have proposed the same ideas, using their imaginations to attempt to concoct “realistic” terrorist attacks that would make for riveting film entertainment.

Some authors or screenplay writers have proven prescient, such as Tom Clancy’s novel Debt of Honor, in which a large jet was flown into the U.S. Capitol building during a State of the Union speech, wiping out most high-ranking government leaders. Did al Qaeda come up with the 9/11 plot after gathering around a campfire in Afghanistan and listening to Clancy’s book on tape? Of course not. Drawings of aircraft ramming American buildings were found in Ramsey Yousef’s dwelling during the investigation of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, two years before Clancy’s novel was published. It should surprise no one that terrorists are perfectly capable of hatching effective and original plots without the help of creative geniuses in American literature or Hollywood.

It is a testament to our arrogance that so many condemned Levitt based on the belief that terrorists lack the intelligence to come up with thousands of hypothetical plans on their own, without help from New York Times readers. Such thinking misses the mark. While western counterterrorism officials go home each day to eat, sleep, and interact with their families as much as their demanding schedules permit, radical terrorist planners go “home” by moving from one part of daily training camp to another, caves or tents, eating while discussing potential methods of attack, and relaxing around the campfire at night by tossing out hypothetical attack plans for debate. That is their life and the sole purpose to which they have dedicated themselves.

Levitt’s hypothetical plan, imagined shortly after the DC Sniper rampage, involved a score of armed terrorists driving around in cities of various sizes randomly shooting citizens. That was his suggestion for a terror attack that would meet his proposed criteria for fear inducement and low potential for the attackers to be captured or killed. Levitt is a professor of economics, not a counterterrorism analyst, thus it was not surprising that his proposal was not particularly imaginative.

Reader submissions, on the other hand, offered a variety of plot ideas that ranged from beautiful female Lara Croft versions of al Qaeda to Molotov cocktails constructed only with items purchased in airport terminal Duty Free shops, including gift cigarette lighters that are now allowed on flights after the TSA ban was lifted. Liberal readers argued that the terrorist threat is greatly exaggerated by the Bush administration to keep Americans in fear and Republicans in office. One reader suggested that it would be simple for terrorists to acquire automatic weapons, cross the U.S.-Mexico border, and shoot up movie theaters in south Texas, further alleging that the reason that has not happened under Bush’s watch is that such threats are concocted by the government to enslave fearful citizens.

It is obvious that the author of that comment underestimates, or more likely avoids discussions of one important reason why we have not seen attacks of that nature on American theaters, restaurants, or shopping malls, and especially such establishments in Texas: the 2nd Amendment. Yes, it would be relatively easy for a determined terrorist to acquire a weapon and go on a rampage at a mall. Non-terrorists have done that, as recently as February at Trolley Square Mall in Salt Lake City. That gunman killed several people, but was cornered and shot by an off duty police officer who had been dining at a mall restaurant. That is the key obstacle for organized plots for terror attacks at public places in America: the terrorists cannot predict how many average citizens among the potential victims is carrying a firearm and could thwart the plot before it achieves its goal of mass casualties.

This, among other reasons, is why gunmen plotting mass casualties like the Columbine killers or the Virginia Tech shooter focus on schools. Students are not allowed to carry guns on campus, thus the possibility of resistance is greatly reduced. Some commenters clearly missed another Clancy novel, The Teeth Of The Tiger, in which Islamic terrorists attempt a firearms rampage in a Northern Virginia shopping mall and are killed by off-duty counterterrorism operatives who resided in the area.

Such an attack might work in Britain or other “enlightened” European nations that have banned gun ownership by citizens, but Americans present a well-armed and action-oriented populace that would not easily be cowed into submission. American malls, theaters, and restaurants are filled each night with men and women who carry firearms and are willing to use them to preserve the lives of their families and fellow citizens. I can assure Levitt’s commenters that terrorists would not do much damage in a Texas (or Northern Virginia) theater or mall before being brought to justice by an armed movie-goer. Those clothing bulges aren’t concealing food smuggled into the movies to avoid high concession stand prices!

While Americans love to conjure up imaginative conspiracy theories, movie plots, or methods terrorists could use to attack us, ultimately the exercise is futile. Counterterrorism officials, limited as they are by budget constraints, must pick and choose which forms of attack are most probable, and dedicate resources and assets accordingly. Americans rightfully do not want to live in a police state or pay the terribly burdensome taxes that would be required to fund efforts to secure the country against all possible attacks. The alternative to a police state is what we see currently: government doing what it can with available resources, combining forces with an armed and vigilantly observant populace, knowing that we will be attacked but hoping to thwart as many attempts as possible.

In the end, it is good that we have Tom Clancy’s and others with active imaginations among us to help citizens think tactically and be more aware of their surroundings and potential targets in their communities. In a war against a radical ideology that devalues innocent life, preparation is not paranoia.

Technorati Tags:
Steven Levitt, Freakonomics, Freakoterror, Terrorist Attack Plans, 2nd Amendment, Counterterrorism, Tom Clancy, Mall Shootings, Bruce Schneier, Deterrence, War on Terror

Former Congressman Fuels "Big Brother" Fears

Americans are being scared into compromising their own safety, and Bob Barr is doing the scaring. As Barr has discovered, nothing is more effective at whipping alleged privacy fears into anti-government frenzy than inflammatory warnings that “Big Brother is watching.” Barr, a former Georgia Republican congressman and U.S. Attorney contributed an OpEd piece to today’s Washington Times that contained a torrent of fear-inducing comparisons between Tony Blair’s and Michael Bloomberg’s efforts to install thousands of surveillance cameras throughout London and New York with George Orwell’s “1984 ” and philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon society. According to Barr, Americans have much to fear from governments at all levels that place great emphasis on the need for surveillance cameras as a solution for ensuring safety.

According to Barr’s dire warnings, we must not allow America to become a land where, as in Bentham’s Panopticon, “control was exercised not by being surveilled continuously but by each person knowing they might be under surveillance at any time, or all the time.” Barr was a U.S. Attorney, and as such one would assume that at some point he attended law school. Apparently Barr missed the course where privacy in public places was discussed, because his OpEd piece, “Big Brother in the Big Apple,” was long on exaggeration and incongruous conspiratorial comparisons to Orwell but short on facts or for that matter, the truth about London’s and New York’s surveillance systems.

No surveillance system is perfect, and despite conspiracy-fueling television or movie depictions they are not installed in every hallway or room in any city. It is important to separate the fear mongering from fact: in London and New York there are no cameras in private areas, such as restrooms or dressing rooms where by law one is granted a reasonable expectation of privacy. Private establishments such as a business or doctor’s waiting room are mandated to post signs indicating the presence of closed circuit TV cameras. Those who do not wish to be on camera in such areas are not required to stay. The cameras that Barr and privacy rights activists condemn are located in public places, such as malls, city streets, tourist attractions, and other areas where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. Ironically, Barr, a former congressman, is more afraid of government cameras monitoring public areas than he is of terrorist cells in the planning phase monitoring those same public areas for vulnerabilities.

Major tourist attractions such as Disney World have utilized closed circuit TV surveillance for many years, with great success. Signs are posted at the entrances to such theme parks advising that visitors will be surveilled. Bags are checked, certain items are banned, all in the name of security. Would Barr prefer to visit Disney World in today’s age of terrorism without these security measures in place? Reasonable people are glad that steps are taken to protect them while they visit attractive terrorist targets, and like it or not, the streets of our major cities are lined by such targets, whether they are historical sites, government buildings, or financial nerve centers of the global economy.

The key to such security measures is simple: if you are not a criminal or a terrorist, you should not be bothered by the fact that when in public you may be on camera. If you wanted to do something that you wouldn’t want anyone else to see, wouldn’t you find somewhere private to do it off camera?

Barr avoids this entire issue by focusing his OpEd on a baseless argument that “government at all levels convinces a fearful populace that a surveilled society is a safe society.” Having worked in the private sector and the federal government I can assure Barr that no promises are given by government that any security measures are guaranteed to produce “a safe society.” There are thousands of government attorneys at all levels whose duty is to make certain that government never guarantees anything, because it if fails to deliver on its promises, it would be ripe for lawsuits. Government certainly extols the virtues of camera surveillance systems, particularly for their role in identifying pre-operational surveillance conducted by criminals and terrorist groups or providing investigative leads after attacks that lead to identifying and arresting the suspects, like the London Tube bombers in 2005. Yet at no time has government stated that installing cameras will make us completely safe.

Terrorists never strike at random, and cell operatives must physically visit and evaluate potential targets, usually taking many photos and lingering in the area engaged in seemingly innocent behaviors. It is only through careful monitoring by law enforcement and intelligence specialists and reviews of surveillance footage that pre-operational planning and descriptions of the suspects are gleaned and plots thwarted or pieced together after the fact.

The point of video surveillance in public areas is not to guarantee safety but to deter criminals and more specifically terrorists from choosing those areas for attack. Like criminals, terrorists often seek out targets that offer the least resistance. A home with an ADT or Brinks security sign posted in the yard is far less likely to be burglarized than a home where no such system is visible. That same principle applies to counterterrorism and anti-crime security measures in the public areas of our major cities.

Barr would like to live in a world where only specific political buildings, such as government symbols in Washington, DC were targets. The reality of our age, however, is that every American city is home to scores of potentially attractive terrorist targets ranging from financial centers, defense industry companies, and natural resource facilities, to local malls, swanky restaurants, and as the thwarted London bomb plot in July should have made clear, even unsuspecting nightclubs. All of these targets share one important commonality: all are surrounded by public areas, streets, parking lots, and parks where there is no expectation of privacy. Installing cameras in those areas would make terrorist pre-operational planning and target surveillance much more difficult and increase the risk of detection. The only “right” violated by such cameras is the terrorist’s “right” to conduct his pre-attack target surveillance without the fear of being caught.

Barr exposed his own Orwellian conspiracy fears throughout his OpEd piece, but nowhere more clearly than in these lines:

Of course, the notion that surveillance is key to control was not new with Bentham; centuries before, the Greek philosopher Plato had mused about the power of the government to control through surveillance, when he raised the still-relevant question, "Who watches the watchers?"

More recently, of course, George Orwell gave voice to the innate fear that resides deep in many of our psyches against government surveillance, in his nightmare, "Big Brother is Watching You" world of the novel "1984."

…Mayor Bloomberg and former Prime Minister Blair epitomize the almost mindless, unquestioning embrace of surveillance as the solution to problems — real, manufactured or exaggerated — that pervades government post-September 11, 2001. Fear of terrorism as much as fear of crime is the currency by which government at all levels convinces a fearful populace that a surveilled society is a safe society.

Barr’s reference to “the innate fear that resides deep in many of our psyches against government surveillance,” was telling. He raised a fear all too commonly cited by opponents of government video surveillance systems, Plato’s “who is watching the watchers?” This question is a conundrum because if taken to its logical conclusion, no one anywhere at any level could be trusted. For if there are watchers watching the watchers, who watches the watchers’ watchers? Where does it end? With Barr, fear of so-called privacy violation is the currency by which privacy rights activists convince a fearful minority of the populace that government at all levels, rather than terrorists, is our enemy.

I understand suspicion of government. Clearly government has grown to exert influence in aspects of our businesses and lives into which it was never meant to encroach. That is our fault as citizens, as government excesses are the result of voter apathy and could be reigned in by a more informed and involved populace. However, this alleged concern over who is watching the watchers when it comes to government video surveillance in public areas is misguided. The watchers observe only public behavior that they could witness if they were seated on a park bench watching crowds pass by them. The fact that they sit in a control room instead of a park bench should make no difference. They are not watching citizens engaged in any private behaviors or in intimate settings, thus it is difficult to pinpoint precisely what Barr fears he will be observed doing by these “Big Brother” public surveillance systems. Like most privacy advocates, Barr cannot offer one example of how his privacy would be violated by a surveillance system in a public area or explain what liberties or freedoms he would lose while on camera.

Americans have been filmed burning the flag, making obscene finger gestures at the president, and similar behaviors and these have been protected as “free speech.” Cameras do not curb political protest or freedom of expression. Barr should speak with any political action group and ask whether they prefer to demonstrate in front of cameras or in useless anonymity off camera. Obviously they seek out cameras and attention, and have no fear of voicing their opinions in public. What freedoms would Barr lose with the presence of public surveillance cameras? He left the answer to that question out of his OpEd piece because the answer would have rendered his fear mongering unnecessary.

Barr may have couched his argument in anti-government rhetoric about privacy, but it seemed that his real concern may have been that New York will one day follow London’s example and use cameras to identify traffic violators and issue fines or tickets. I reiterate my previous point that government excesses are the fault of voter apathy. Americans have expressed overwhelming support for London and New York-style surveillance camera systems in public areas to help protect us from terrorists, and if we do not want those systems to be used for other purposes like traffic fines then we must exercise control over government and restrict its reach.

In the meantime, I will continue to visit historic sites, tourist attractions, government buildings, and financial centers knowing that I am on camera and not bothered at all by that fact. After all, in public it is always a wise personal safety tactic to assume you are being watched. I am glad that our cities are making terrorists more conscious of that fact. If I am being watched in public, so are the planners of a potential attack. I am confident that “the watchers” will differentiate between us. Unless Barr plans to engage in criminal or terrorist pre-operational surveillance in a public area, the only thing he needs to fear with cameras is his fear itself.

Technorati Tags:
Bob Barr, Big Brother, Michael Bloomberg, Surveillance Cameras, CCTV, Privacy Rights, Terrorist Surveillance, New York, London

Did FBI Call ABC but not Border Patrol?

The ABC News Blotter reported yesterday that Iraqis are being smuggled from Mexico across the Rio Grande River into New Mexico by a human smuggling ring, and this ring has been in operation for more than a year, according to an FBI intelligence report issued last week. This ABC story received significant attention in Internet news forums, but reader commentary at The Blotter web site and one of my favorites, Lucianne.com, was focused almost exclusively on our porous borders and the Bush administration's crusade for amnesty at the expense of national security through secure borders. These criticisms were, of course, perfectly valid, but when I read Brian Ross' Blotter piece, I observed something different and troubling that unless rectified, will almost certainly lead to continued vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Here is the portion of Ross' report that caught my attention:

An FBI intelligence report distributed by the Washington, D.C. Joint Terrorism Task Force, obtained by the Blotter on ABCNews.com, says the illegal ring has been bringing Iraqis across the border illegally for more than a year.

Border Patrol officials in the area said they were unaware of the specifics of the FBI's report, and federal prosecutors in New Mexico told ABCNews.com they had no current cases involving the illegal smuggling of Iraqis.

The FBI report, issued last week, says the smuggling organization "used to smuggle Mexicans, but decided to smuggle Iraqi or other Middle Eastern individuals because it was more lucrative....

If Ross' source is accurate, the FBI distributed this Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) report last week to agencies that are participating members of the Washington DC JTTF. That list would include most federal agencies with counterterrorism and law enforcement functions, including Department of Homeland Security components such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP), as well as many local and state law enforcement agencies. Yet when contacted for information about the Iraqi smuggling ring and the FBI's information about its existence, Border Patrol officials "were unaware" of the FBI report. Is this another example of the FBI keeping its terrorism investigation details close to the vest? It should concern all Americans that Brian Ross can obtain a copy of a restricted document about the smuggling of Middle Easterners into New Mexico, but the Border Patrol in New Mexico cannot.

What was the lesson from 9/11 if not the importance of information sharing among government agencies? I have decried the lack of openness in the intelligence and law enforcement communities in previous posts and there is ample blame to go around, but here we find ourselves nearly six years after 9/11 and the lead agency charged with investigating terrorism learns of a ring smuggling Middle Eastern individuals into America and no one bothers to tell the Border Patrol? The media should not be tasked with notifying law enforcement agencies about illegal activities that likely have a terrorist nexus. Brian Ross is not an FBI agent or counterterrorism specialist, yet when he contacted the Border Patrol in New Mexico, they received first notice of the FBI report from a journalist.

To make matters worse, the new National Intelligence Estimate issued yesterday made it quite clear that al Qaeda in Iraq has expressed significant interest in possibly attacking the U.S. homeland with Iraqi operatives to be placed in America. I'm sure it is just coincidence that the smuggling of Iraqis from Mexico into New Mexico has been occurring for over a year. Are they really "refugees fleeing the violence in Iraq" as Brian Ross claims, or are some of them the proverbial wolf in sheep's clothing?

Do you feel safer knowing that those sworn to protect you work harder to avoid communicating with each other than they do to warn each other of newly obtained intelligence? This is a problem that must be stopped before an attack that could have been detected early is brought to terrible fruition.

Technorati Tags:
Border Patrol, Border Security, Human Smuggling, Iraqis, New Mexico, FBI, Information Sharing, National Intelligence Estimate, Al Qaeda in Iraq, Brian Ross

Fox Analyst Flays "Friend" Musharraf

It is a rare occurrence when I must side with the usually left-leaning State Department on any issue that directly involves national security. However, when it comes to calls from certain quarters for the Bush administration to aggressively pressure Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to wage all out war on Islamic radicals hiding in the mountainous Afghanistan/Pakistan border, I found myself siding with Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs rather than Fox News military analyst Colonel David Hunt. Ordinarily I appreciate Col. Hunt’s blunt assessments and aggressive posture towards engaging the enemy with full purpose and force rather than limited rules of engagement, but Col. Hunt’s recommendations for conducting the War on Terror within Pakistan are fraught with dangers that he either minimizes or ignores in his online columns and cable news interviews.

A summary of a new threat assessment leaked to the Associated Press this week highlighted the reality that the Taliban and al Qaeda have regrouped and regained strength nearly on par with pre-9/11 levels, thriving in their mountain hideouts in the tribal regions of Pakistan’s northwestern border with Afghanistan. What to do about that reality is, next to Iraq, the most hotly debated issue in Washington. Counterterrorism and intelligence officials believe Musharraf has not done enough to root out the terrorists while accepting $100 million from the U.S. each month ostensibly to develop the local economy in the tribal areas where many find the money alternatively offered by terror groups and border smugglers irresistible. Musharraf has insisted that Pakistani forces execute all counterterrorism raids and operations within Pakistan, and the amount of success he has achieved forms the crux of the debate between the State Department’s approach toward Pakistan and the approach favored by Col. Hunt and others.

In his latest column at FoxNews.com, Col. Hunt wrote the following:

This week, we learned that in 2005, great guys from Seal Team 6, Special Forces, and other terrific Special Operations Organizations were sitting on a runway in Afghanistan, all geared up, ready to go and capture and or kill much of al Qaeda's top leadership. You remember al Qaeda; they’re the ones who killed us on September 11, 2001. Our supremely brave, conditioned and trained men were fully rehearsed, totally committed and ready to kick some serious al Qaeda [expletive].

They call him Rummy … or at least I do. He's the former and totally incompetent Secretary of Defense, who less than two years after 9/11 — two years after the president says “we will hunt them down” — decides that this mission was to be canceled. He makes this bone-headed decision because it might be “dangerous” and it might piss off the president of Pakistan. ARE YOU KIDDING ME? Hey, Mr. “Ask and Answer Your Own Questions,” everything about war is dangerous and General Musharraf is not our friend.

I do not fault Col. Hunt for his dislike of former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld or for his desire for Special Forces operations like the one he described to act swiftly and lethally to eliminate Bin Laden or other terrorist leaders. From a counterterrorism and military perspective, the idea that a Special Forces team had a specific location to hit within Pakistan and was prepared to strike but was denied the opportunity for political reasons is incredibly frustrating. It is easy for those of us who work in intelligence or related fields to conclude that though such an operation might anger Musharraf, the ends would justify the means, especially if Bin Laden were captured or killed. Yet that is precisely where Col. Hunt’s assessment of the missed opportunity and the risk to Musharraf drifts from understandable disappointment to dangerous miscalculation.

Col. Hunt’s assessment that “General Musharraf is not our friend” is shared by many within the intelligence and counterterrorism community, but it is based on unrealistic expectations for “friendship” in the War on Terror, as well as a dangerous underestimation of the Muslim power vacuum that would occur in nuclear-armed Pakistan should Musharraf lose control or be assassinated. Although Musharraf may not be the “friend” that Col. Hunt understandably hopes for, considering the seething cauldron of Islamic radicalism that surrounds him within his own population it is remarkable that he has survived to assist the U.S. as long as he has. Assistant Sec. of State Boucher defended Musharraf’s contributions to the War on Terror during a House committee hearing yesterday, as excerpted from the Washington Post:

At the hearing, Boucher said that Pakistan has "captured more al-Qaeda than any country in the world, and lost more people doing that." He added that Pakistani authorities had killed or captured three of the top 10 Taliban commanders in the border area over the past six to nine months -- and caught several more in the past week.

Boucher said that Pakistan has about 85,000 troops stationed in the border area, with Washington reimbursing Islamabad for its $100 million monthly expenses. Musharraf has promised the tribal leaders $100 million annually for 10 years, and the United States has pledged another $150 million annually for five years, in an effort to promote economic development as an alternative to smuggling and terrorism.

"These were all joint efforts with Pakistan that led to the elimination of some of the top Taliban leaders who had been operating from Pakistan to support the insurgency in Afghanistan," Boucher said.

He said that there are signs "every now and then that there's not a wholehearted effort at all levels in all institutions in Pakistan" -- a reference to news accounts of Pakistani intelligence officials supporting terrorists.

"We've raised those when we need to," Boucher said. When asked about Musharraf's role, he said, "I think if Pakistan was not fighting terrorism, there'd be no way we could succeed in Afghanistan or in terms of the security of our homeland."

The State Department and intelligence community are nearly always at odds over strategy and alliance issues, and nowhere is that more evident than in the debate over how much pressure the U.S. should apply to Musharraf to wage war against Islamic radicals within his own country. In addition to the contributions Musharraf has made as outlined in part by Asst. Secretary Boucher, Musharraf recently showed courage in raiding a radical mosque and killing a barricaded Islamic radical cleric, actions that were wildly unpopular In Islamabad and caused riots. He has reportedly survived fourteen assassination attempts, and yet continues to mount Pakistani military operations against Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in the tribal regions. In this precarious position reality dictates that losing Musharraf, regardless of his perceived level of “friendship” with the U.S., would be far more dangerous to world stability and our national security than his continued allegedly half-hearted engagement in the War on Terror.

Col. Hunt was quick to criticize Musharraf and to call for American military strikes within Pakistan regardless of the potential ramifications for Musharraf’s continued control over Pakistan’s nuclear weaponry and resources. Such rash action might satisfy our desire for revenge on Bin Laden and it might very well weaken al Qaeda greatly for many years. However, as recent plots in Britain, Indonesia, the Philippines, and other nations have demonstrated, al Qaeda’s leadership may be holed up in Pakistan’s mountains, but its ideology and followers have formed a global movement. By striking within Pakistan without the consent of President Musharraf, America would undermine his authority and control over his country and embolden radical Islamists to gain control of Pakistan’s military and nuclear weapons through a coup or other violent action. Would America be safer with a Pakistani leader who, though far from being a perfect “friend”, at least keeps nuclear weapons and material out of the hands of Islamic terrorists, or with the alternative; a radical Islamist Pakistani leader who opens Pakistan’s nuclear resources to the highest bidding terrorist organization?

If a U.S. War on Terror, waged by the U.S. inside Pakistan, would create no other repercussions than making Musharraf angry, as Col. Hunt simplistically assumed, then it would be well worth doing, and doing immediately. Unfortunately, war carries multiple dangers, and angering Musharraf is not the reason we have forestalled sending our Special Forces into Pakistan. The simple truth is that Musharraf’s stability in Pakistan has earned him the right to demand that Pakistan’s military conduct all operations within its border. One wonders how Col. Hunt might respond if he were President of the United States and a terrorist group, later discovered to be holed up in the Rocky Mountains near Denver, flew planes into government buildings in Islamabad, killing 3,000 Pakistanis. Would “President Hunt,” when contacted by an angry Musharraf, agree to allow Pakistani forces to operate inside the U.S. and attack the terrorists hiding in the Rocky Mountains? It is not likely. “President Hunt” would rightfully expect to be respected and would likewise rightfully assure Musharraf that the U.S. military would handle any such operation within our borders. Why would Col. Hunt expect Musharraf to act any differently when given the same type of request?

For a military man steeped in the culture of respect for authority, it is surprising that Col. Hunt would demonstrate so much contempt for the authority of a foreign president of a nuclear power with a population of 165 million who has, lest it be forgotten, taken high profile terrorists like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed into custody and turned them over to American intelligence operatives. The information gleaned from those prisoners has been the most significant contribution to our knowledge of the enemy in the War on Terror, and Musharraf’s military operations against al Qaeda in Pakistan made that possible. While Musharraf holds onto his fragile control over Pakistan, America should patiently assist this “friend” rather than cast stones at him. Who among world leaders is a perfect “friend?” Let him cast the first stone. Secretary Rumsfeld, also a far from perfect Defense Secretary, clearly had more significant reasons for not sending Special Ops into Pakistan than making Musharraf angry, reasons that continue to shape current American restraint in order to preserve a known and stable leadership in Pakistan.

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Musharraf, Pakistan, al Qaeda, War on Terror, Bush Administration, Colonel David Hunt, State Department, Richard Boucher, Taliban, Counterterrorism

Gut Check: Chertoff v. Threat Assessment

A U.S. counterterrorism official leaked portions of a new classified report to the media this morning warning that al Qaeda has regrouped to near pre-9/11 strength and may be poised for significant attacks. No, wait, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff insisted to the media this morning that the threat posed by al Qaeda has NOT returned to pre-9/11 levels. What is wrong with this picture? The anonymous counterterrorism official “familiar with” the contents of a classified report titled “Al-Qaida Better Positioned to Strike the West” stated that the report would be included in a meeting today at the White House to discuss a pending National Intelligence Estimate. This raises a crucial question; had Secretary Chertoff already read the summary report about al Qaeda’s renewed strength before he claimed to have a “gut feeling” that America may be attacked this summer and before he later assured Americans via ABC and NBC appearances that al Qaeda does not pose as great a threat today as it did in the summer of 2001?

The contradictions between the AP’s counterterrorism source and Secretary Chertoff are curious. If Secretary Chertoff’s widely ridiculed comment Tuesday about his “gut feeling” that America faces a heightened risk of attack this summer came after he had reviewed the summary report leaked by the AP’s anonymous source, then what did Chertoff really mean with his “gut feeling” remark? One could interpret Chertoff’s remarks as a call to vigilance, as he later characterized them, and not as indicating knowledge of specific threats or plots. On the surface that could pass as a somewhat logical explanation. However, if Chertoff had already reviewed the classified report later leaked to the Post, then that report constituted the basis for his “gut feeling” about our increased risk of a summer attack. The logical conclusion here is that Chertoff would only state that his “gut” told him al Qaeda was likely to attempt an attack in America this summer if he had read classified reports describing al Qaeda’s strength and activity now as approaching the level of summer 2001.

He later explained away his “gut feeling” remarks as merely a general call for Americans to be vigilant and observant, but if that is true, then why downplay the current risk from al Qaeda? Americans are traditionally entertained by things that revolve, such as doors, merry-go-rounds, or carousels, but do not expect government terror warnings to revolve by being issued, contradicted, retracted, and reissued like a carnival ride.

When intelligence community and counterterrorism officials contradict statements by the Homeland Security secretary, we should all sit up and take notice. The reality is that a classified document reportedly confirms that al Qaeda is nearly as strong as it was prior to 9/11 and may be prepared to strike us with operations rivaling 9/11 in scope and ambition, but our Homeland Security secretary assures us that al Qaeda is actually not that strong while simultaneously warning that his “gut” tells him we may be attacked this summer. Chertoff’s Potomac two-step on this assessment of al Qaeda would be a humorous example of political double-speak if it merely involved politics, but since it involves national security there is nothing funny about the mixed messages coming out of Washington in advance of today’s intelligence meeting at the White House.

Americans do not mind requests to be vigilant. Such warnings appeal to our individualism and desire to add a small personal contribution to winning the War on Terror. However, Americans become justifiably cynical of all such warnings and grow to distrust the government officials who issue them when warnings are given in a disingenuous manner. Chertoff’s comment that he just had a “gut feeling” when it appears now that it was actually a now-leaked classified report that stirred his gut was both disingenuous and unnecessary. Instead of hinting at classified reports or using a smokescreen “gut feeling” comment that he should have known would bring him only ridicule, Chertoff could have stated something like the following:

“While we have been fortunate to have avoided another attack in America since 9/11, we do not underestimate the capabilities and determination of al Qaeda. Tourist attractions and vacation sites are crowded and popular during the summer months and may present attractive targets for terrorists wishing to inflict mass casualties. I urge Americans to be vigilant and observant as they vacation and travel this summer, and to report anything suspicious. Together, we can all work to keep each other safe.”

The above statement would have delivered the message Chertoff intended to convey, namely to be vigilant for a possible summer attack, without hinting at any specific intelligence or creating the impression that he was withholding information. Unfortunately, instead he chose to mention his “gut feeling” and then promptly backtracked on his position when assessments of the capabilities of al Qaeda were leaked to the media. These are not actions that secure the trust and united vigilance of Americans that Chertoff and other government officials rightly desire.

The assessments of al Qaeda’s current strength and operational abilities as leaked to the AP, if they were cited correctly by the anonymous source, paint a different portrait of al Qaeda’s current capabilities than Chertoff offered in his Good Morning America statement that the threat is not as great as it was pre-9/11. According to the AP source:

A new threat assessment from U.S. counterterrorism analysts says that al-Qaida has used its safe haven along the Afghan-Pakistan border to restore its operating capabilities to a level unseen since the months before Sept. 11, 2001.

...Al-Qaida is "considerably operationally stronger than a year ago" and has "regrouped to an extent not seen since 2001," the counterterrorism official said, paraphrasing the report's conclusions. "They are showing greater and greater ability to plan attacks in Europe and the United States."

The group also has created "the most robust training program since 2001, with an interest in using European operatives," the official quoted the report as saying.
…The threat assessment says that al-Qaida stepped up efforts to "improve its core operational capability" in late 2004 but did not succeed until December of 2006 after the Pakistani government signed a peace agreement with tribal leaders that effectively removed government military presence from the northwest frontier with Afghanistan.

The agreement allows Taliban and al-Qaida operatives to move across the border with impunity and establish and run training centers, the report says, according to the official.

It also says that al-Qaida is particularly interested in building up the numbers in its middle ranks, or operational positions, so there is not as great a lag in attacks when such people are killed.

If the AP source quoted the report accurately, it appears that al Qaeda is not only rapidly approaching pre 9/11 strength but is becoming more formidable and less detectable as it recruits more European followers willing to carry out attacks. A buildup of its middle ranks also signifies a shift in strategy away from occasional spectacular attacks like 9/11 to frequent mid or small-scale attacks on softer targets, such as nightclubs, shopping malls, or other public gathering places. The middle ranks of a terrorist cell would not be entrusted with planning major attacks, but with sufficient training they could operate as independent cells with discretion on choice of small-attack venues. The doctors involved in the recent attempted bombings in London and Glasgow are examples of al Qaeda’s middle ranks. They operated locally, unsuspected by the community, and had it not been for a wireless phone issue the bombings would have been successful.

If al Qaeda is working to flood its organization with “middle ranks” then the strategy has shifted to a sustained campaign of attrition much like it is conducting in Iraq. That effort has already produced a growing American desire to withdraw from Iraq. Imagine the chaos and finger-pointing that will ensure in America when a seemingly endless wave of smaller bombings and other forms of terror attacks begins in earnest in this country.

While Chertoff was correct in stating that al Qaeda is not precisely as strong as it was prior to 9/11, that fact should in no way comfort America and its allies. Often when a bone is broken, it heals and becomes stronger in the area of the break than it was before because of the addition of new and vital tissues. Al Qaeda appears to be healing its broken bones and becoming potentially stronger than it was before the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, with the addition of new European, and one would logically assume American, operatives. That prospect should cause all of us to experience a “gut feeling” that we will be increasingly at risk.

Technorati Tags:
al Qaeda, War on Terror, National Intelligence Estimates, Michael Chertoff, Homeland Security, Gut Feeling, Pakistan, Counterterrorism

Former Army Sec Faults DHS Terror Plans

The War on Terror is not, as Democratic presidential candidate John Edwards claims, merely a bumper sticker slogan, but it is rapidly regressing into perhaps the highest-stakes blame game in our nation’s history. When attacks or attempted attacks occur, the outrage expressed usually focuses on whom within America or among our allies failed to predict and prevent the attacks, but very little ire is directed towards those who perpetrated the cowardly acts. Americans are obsessed with assigning blame within our own government, desperate to identify an internal flaw that makes such attacks inevitable because Americans like to be liked and have difficulty fathoming the fact that much of the world detests America and all that it represents, for good or evil. We spent far more energy and resources on study groups, commissions, and media reports to determine who within the U.S. government was to blame for the 9/11 attacks, even while the remains of victims were being unearthed at Ground Zero.

Meanwhile on 9/11, there was dancing, rejoicing, and celebratory gunfire in cities and towns across the Middle East, images of which appeared on “fair and balanced” news networks, but were deemed too inflammatory for broadcasts on traditional left-leaning channels. In Oliver Stone’s otherwise even-handed and excellent film World Trade Center, he portrayed the populations of the Middle East as shocked and deeply sorrowed by the television images of the Twin Towers collapsing, ignoring completely the reality of their celebrations. To have truthfully portrayed Middle Eastern Muslims as happy and gleeful on 9/11 would have implied that millions of people in the world find pleasure in watching America suffer, and thus are to blame for supporting, indirectly or directly, terrorism directed against America and her allies. Americans, ever in denial that anyone could hate something as wonderful as America or its tolerance, prefer instead to seek scapegoats from within, turning on our own in order to vent the anger and thirst for revenge that is considered politically incorrect to direct at those who are actually to blame: Islamic terrorists.

In a Washington Times editorial yesterday, Mike Walker, former acting Secretary of the Army and former Deputy Director of FEMA, waxed eloquent about the need for Americans to maintain vigilance and not to underestimate the threat radical Islam poses to our way of life. Walker, writing of the preferred tactics of al Qaeda, warned “They seek to spread fear, hoping to turn us inward and against each other.” Yet, a mere two paragraphs later, Walker turns inward against American government agencies, blaming the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for neglecting its responsibility to prepare for and prevent terrorist attacks. Walker wrote:

The Department of Homeland Security seems more concerned with passing immigration legislation and not repeating the response to Hurricane Katrina. While this occurs, the terrorist threat, the reason the department was established in the first place, continues to build. Almost six years have passed since the 9/11 attacks, we still have no national terrorism prevention doctrine. Programs continue to be episodic and not based on a plan for prevention. State and local government homeland-security budgets continue to be cut, while daily priorities take precedence.

Capital Cloak has criticized DHS on occasion when warranted and recognizes many flaws within that department, but Walker’s portrayal of DHS as failing in its counterterrorism duties was factually in error and undeservedly singled out one department as a scapegoat. Walker was absolutely correct in his assessment that DHS is greatly concerned with immigration issues and avoiding another Hurricane Katrina fiasco. He was also correct that DHS was created post-9/11 as a response to Islamic terrorism and that after nearly six years there is no “national terrorism prevention doctrine.” However, Walker ignored several important truths about DHS that, had he included them, would have negated much of his criticism.

I have written previously that DHS, despite public perception, is not a counterterrorism agency. Although it was the love-child of the post-9/11 political frenzy to pass legislation reassuring the American people that something was being done about terrorism, DHS was never meant to become the nation’s lead agency in the War on Terror. That distinction has been and continues to be shared between the “terrorism quartet” of the CIA, FBI, DIA, and NSA, with the FBI front and center domestically. DHS has no intelligence operatives or informants, no satellites, no electronic monitoring capabilities; in short, it has no counterterrorism tools whatsoever. None of the agencies who possess these assets are DHS components. They operate either independently or under the direction of other departments, such as Defense or Justice. While these agencies have employees assigned to work with DHS as intelligence liaisons, the level of information sharing between them and DHS is not under DHS’ control. Efforts have been made to improve intelligence sharing procedures and expectations, but the current reality is that DHS relies 100% on other departments and agencies to provide it with intelligence on terrorist activity.

If DHS is concerned with immigration issues, it is because immigration agencies are a significant part of the department, comprising the majority of DHS personnel. Immigration issues are also controversial and politically charged. DHS comes under fire for not “securing the border,” yet the executive branch, which is responsible (through the Justice Dept.) for establishing federal law enforcement priorities, has chosen not to pursue strict enforcement of immigration laws, including deportation, except in campaign years. As I have written previously, law enforcement is restricted in what laws it will enforce by the Justice Department’s willingness to prosecute violations of those laws. If American presidents and their attorney generals do not want to see illegal immigration laws enforced properly, law enforcement must focus its priorities on other laws that attorney generals do want to see enforced. It is not the way it should be, but that is the reality. DHS actively pursues violations according to direction from a Cabinet member and the president. If Walker is looking to lay blame for DHS’ interest in immigration issues, he should lay it at the feet of those who dictate priorities to DHS. Once Congress and the executive branch realize that illegal immigration and border enforcement are national security issues rather than the potential means to legalize a treasure trove of potential voters for political gain, perhaps DHS will be given the proper tools and mandate to halt illegal immigration and locate those already here.

As a former Deputy Director of FEMA, surely Walker must realize that FEMA has nothing to do with “homeland security” and never should have been included in the formation of DHS. The fallout from its handling of Hurricane Katrina, some deserved, some unfairly heaped on FEMA instead of local leaders, has assured that DHS must give an inordinate amount of attention and resources to predicting the only thing more unpredictable than terrorism: the weather. Nothing whips DHS leadership into frenzy quite like a tropical storm that may or may not become a hurricane. There are email alerts, pages, conference calls, and several daily briefings all to warn that a storm somewhere in the Atlantic or the Gulf of Mexico may one day develop into a hurricane. What is the terrorism nexus with hurricanes? Is al Qaeda sending these storms to batter America? Of course not, but you wouldn’t know it by the near panic that engulfs DHS with the mere mention of the dreaded phrase “Hurricane Katrina.” That DHS has this focus on the weather and determination never again to take a media beating after a major storm is not DHS’ fault. If Walker is looking to turn inward and lay blame, he should lay it at the feet of those who crafted the Homeland Security legislation to include FEMA in a department that was allegedly supposed to tackle weightier issues like terrorism.

Walker wondered why DHS has not created a “terrorism prevention doctrine” nearly six years after 9/11. The answer is quite simple and to a Washington insider like Walker should have been obvious: DHS does not have the resources, departmental mission, or terrorism expertise to oversee the creation of such a doctrine. For such a doctrine to be formulated, debated, edited, and approved, the process currently requires separate participation from a host of departments and agencies, each with its own budgetary and political agendas. DHS is perhaps the world’s largest middleman, receiving intelligence from other agencies, sanitizing it, and then sharing it with state or local officials. For DHS to gain counterterrorism capabilities, some of the agencies listed above who actually do perform counterterrorism functions would have to be moved into the department. Reliance on other agencies to share intelligence did not work very well or often prior to 9/11, and now that the stinging memory of 9/11 has become distant for some in Congress and the executive branch, that inter-agency dependence will inevitably devolve to previous levels of non-cooperation.

When a department or agency is the product of a flawed creation process, should the blame for its shortcomings be heaped upon those within it who merely perform the duties the department has been given? Certainly there have been and will always be human errors that occur in the performance of routine duties in any department, and those errors should be recognized and remedied appropriately. However, when it comes to public and media perception that DHS should be the government’s counterterrorism authority, a dose of reality would be refreshing. DHS’ creation without inclusion of the FBI, the primary agency empowered to investigate terrorism, was akin to building a fire station but choosing not to equip it with fire trucks or staff it with a crew. In the absence of counterterrorism capabilities, DHS naturally turns its attention to immigration and hurricanes as Walker argued, but not because terrorism is a low priority within the department. Effective counterterrorism is simply beyond DHS’ current organizational structure.

Whether DHS should be the lead agency in counterterrorism and be given more capabilities is a matter for debate, but criticizing DHS for failing to be something it was not designed to be contributes little to improving public trust at a time when our confidence and faith in each other as Americans is the one thing al Qaeda cannot destroy with its car bombs and plane hijackings. DHS is not the enemy. President Bush is not the enemy. Congress is not the enemy. Our enemies are radical Islamic terrorists, and they delight in our penchant for self-loathing and our obsession with assigning blame to each other for their actions.

Like a battered wife, we cover up our injuries and blame ourselves for the beatings we receive, searching ourselves for faults or flaws that make us deserve attack, while the bullying perpetrator who relies on violence to intimidate escapes blame or punishment. We, like our British counterparts, are asked not to mention that terrorists are Islamic and the use of the phrase “War on Terror” has been deemed too harsh or belittled as a “bumper sticker.” Sadly, many battered wives blame themselves until the terrible day that the cowardly abuser strikes a fatal blow. Only then is it clear that blame mattered not at all. The priority should have been removal from the threat or better still, removal of the threat.

Walker was right to warn Americans not to turn on one another. He should have set the example by heeding his own warning.

Technorati Tags:
Mike Walker, Homeland Security, DHS, FEMA, FBI, Counterterrorism, Intelligence, National Security, 9/11, Terrorism, Islamic Terrorists, Federal Government, Blame

Miniter: US Muslims, Vigilance, Top Brits

Multiple attempted vehicle bombings conducted by radical Islamic terrorists in London and Glasgow on Friday and Saturday raise the all-important question for Americans: why have such attacks been attempted in Britain, but not in the U.S.? This was the topic of a “Fox and Friends” interview with Richard Miniter of the Hudson Institute this morning, and Miniter offered some interesting possible answers to the question.

According to Miniter, there are three primary reasons that al Qaeda is actively targeting Britain but has thus far not struck within the U.S. with car bombs or suicide bombers:

1. U.S. military action in Afghanistan and Iraq has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of al Qaeda leaders and high level operatives, and this has caused a scarcity of resources, including knowledgeable, trained leaders to plan and carry out attacks. Miniter opined that the failed weekend bombings had the appearance of an operation that lacked the professionalism and technical expertise commonly associated with al Qaeda IEDs and VBIEDs. The failure of three bombs to detonate properly indicated to Miniter that the cell did not include a master bomb manufacturer.

2. U.S. officials are more vigilant than their British counterparts. According to Miniter, communication and intelligence flow between federal, state, and local law enforcement in the United States is superior to information sharing and investigative cooperation in Britain.

3. American Muslims are more assimilated into American culture than British Muslims are to British society, and thus American Muslims provide more tips and investigative assistance to U.S. law enforcement than British Muslims. Miniter commented that the increased likelihood of tip-offs from American Muslims to law enforcement made it more difficult for radicals to operate anonymously or without drawing attention to themselves.

While all of these are interesting hypotheses for why the U.S. has not yet been victimized by subway bombings, VBIEDs, or suicide bombers (individual, of the type seen in Israel, Iraq, and Afghanistan), in many ways they miss the mark. While I tend to agree with Miniter’s first point about our military weakening al Qaeda’s infrastructure and leadership, his second and third points deserve critical scrutiny.

My experiences lead me to an opposite conclusion regarding Miniter’s second point that America is more vigilant and intelligence flow in the U.S. is superior to that found in Britain. The Patriot Act and other post-9/11 legislation may have removed many of the formal barriers between America’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies, but little has been done to address the informal barriers. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security, containing as it does a mixture of agencies with legitimate national security duties and others who have no role whatsoever in homeland security, was a mere political gesture. If the Bush administration and Congress truly had been seeking to establish a department capable of securing the homeland to the best of its ability in “the terrorists’ war on us,” as Rudy Giuliani calls it, the department would also contain the FBI, the federal agency designated to investigate potential terrorism on U.S. soil. Information sharing has certainly improved between the federal agencies and state/local departments, but information sharing between federal agencies remains a significant problem that may not be resolved until future terrorist strikes in America force more drastic cooperation requirements on the federal intelligence and law enforcement communities in the name of survival.

Our vigilance dwindles depending on what else catches our interest: far more media attention was given over the past month to Paris Hilton than Muslim unrest in Paris, France; we complain about airport passenger screening inconveniences; we spend millions to support Hollywood movies depicting our own government as the true enemy we should fear most; we narrowly pass Patriot Act legislation each time it comes up for renewal, and the margin decreases with each passing year without a terrorist attack on U.S. soil; our major newspapers and news networks leak information about secret government programs designed to identify terrorists and prevent future attacks in the planning stages; we openly declare that enforcement of our illegal-immigration laws is unrealistic, thus encouraging more illegal immigration which surely includes terrorists cloaked within groups of laborers; we pay sub-standard wages to airport screeners directly responsible for preventing bombs, firearms, chemicals, and other deadly items from making onto our passenger aircraft. To claim that America is more vigilant than Britain is surely Miniter’s sincere wish, but there is precious little evidence to support the assertion.

It is ironic that Miniter made the claim to superiority of American information sharing over that of Britain in the wake of a massive and rapidly successful anti-terror investigation related to the linked incidents in London and Glasgow. Some unconfirmed reports indicated that U.S. intelligence received warning of a future attack in Glasgow two weeks ago but never shared that information with British officials. By this morning, less than 48 hours after the Glasgow incident, seven individuals apparently affiliated in an al Qaeda influenced cell had been arrested in Britain. There did not seem to be any shortage of intelligence flow or information sharing between Britain’s foreign and domestic intelligence and law enforcement services, and local police were actively involved throughout the continued investigation. Rolling up seven members of a terrorist cell within 48 hours of an attack is efficient police work by any standard, providing an object lesson disproving Miniter’s apparently low expectations of Britain’s internal cooperation. By comparison, how long did it take for U.S. authorities to identify and arrest the DC snipers? How about Timothy McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber? The rapid execution of warrants and arrests in Britain has been impressive in all respects.

Britain’s investigative technologies exceed our own to a high enough degree that Senator Joe Lieberman stepped into his leadership role yesterday to trumpet the need for the U.S. to imitate Britain,” specifically in reference to the widespread use of security cameras throughout London and most major British cities. The ability British authorities have to isolate digital recordings of suspects’ faces, vehicles, license plates, and tactics is far beyond anything currently available to U.S. law enforcement, in large part due to “privacy issues.” British authorities seized upon a point that America’s liberal left refuses to concede: when in public, a person has no expectation of privacy. Thus, the installation of thousands of surveillance cameras on the streets and in the subways of British cities was considered a reasonable method for boosting security with no invasion of privacy for the public in public areas. Lieberman was right to call for similar measures in public areas in the U.S. Information sharing is much more effective when it includes photos of the suspect and his accomplices and transportation. Law enforcement cannot be everywhere at all times, but cameras can.

Miniter’s third point regarding American Muslims being more cooperative with law enforcement than British Muslims is, at a minimum, controversial. It would be helpful if Miniter could provide empirical evidence to support this claim, because such evidence would do much to diffuse the hostility and suspicion many Americans feel towards their Muslim neighbors. In a previous post I recounted my experience at a Muslim cultural sensitivity training course in 2004, hosted in part by CAIR for the law enforcement and intelligence communities. In a separate post regarding American Muslims and their involvement in the War on Terror, I included a marvelous quote from a notable American Muslim that expressed what all non-Muslim Americans wish they heard more of from their Islamic friends and neighbors:

In a similar but even more blunt assessment of what Arab-Americans should be doing to fight terrorism within their own religion, M. Zuhdi Jasser, founder of American Islamic Forum for Democracy, contributed a wonderful articleto National Review Online last week. Jasser defended the plot line of "24" and declared that Muslims need to unite and defeat the true enemy, which he explicitly identified as Islamism. Jasser, a former U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander, made the following call to arms to fellow American Muslims:

"It’s time for hundreds of thousands of Muslims to be not only private but public in their outrage — and to commit themselves to specific, verbal engagement of the militants and their Islamism. We, as American Muslims, should be training and encouraging our Muslim-community youth to become the future Jack Bauers of America. What better way to dispel stereotypes than to create hundreds of new, real images of Muslims who are publicly leading this war on the battlefield and in the domestic and foreign media against the militant Islamists. Condemnations by press release and vague fatwas are not enough. We need to create organizations — high-profile, well-funded national organizations and think tanks — which are not afraid to identify al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah by name, and by their mission as the enemies of America. If Muslim organizations and the American Muslim leadership were seen publicly as creating a national, generational plan to fight Islamism — rather than searching for reasons to claim victimhood — then the issues and complaints surrounding such TV shows would disappear. The way to fight the realities of 24 is to create a Muslim CTU, a deep Muslim counterterrorism ideology and a national action plan for our security."[emphasis added]

While American Muslims have cooperated in numerous terrorism investigations, more will be expected and required of them. They could erase most suspicion or bigotry by actively working toward the vision expressed above by Jasser.

The logic behind Miniter’s assessment that British Muslims are less loyal to Britain is questionable. How does one quantitatively determine levels of loyalty among the Muslim populations in two different nations? It is too simplistic to assume that because Britain is experiencing increasing incidents of homegrown Islamic terrorism and America is not, that American Muslims are thus more cooperative with investigations. I would be thrilled to believe that the freedoms and liberties of America had so inspired American Muslims that radical Islam will never find enough fertile ground in American mosques to ever spark domestic jihad here. However, I also know that the 9/11 operatives lived and moved freely among American Muslims for significant amounts of time, planning, plotting, and training for the hijackings, and apparently no one noticed these behaviors or considered them suspicious. Miniter seems to give American Muslims the benefit of a doubt for that but labels British Muslims as less cooperative because they failed to tip-off British authorities to the 7/7 London subway bombing or the failed car bombs this weekend. If Miniter has a comparative statistical analysis that validates his claim that American Muslims are more cooperative than their British counterparts, let him bring it forward for review.

The far more likely and simple answer to the original question posed to Miniter is that we have been lucky but our time will come. The VBIEDs utilized in the failed Glasgow and London bombings this weekend indicate a cell’s over-emphasis on constructing and executing attacks with little prior planning or on short notice. They were crudely designed, simple to construct, and made with readily available materials that would attract no suspicion at the point of purchase. These VBIEDs could be thrown together in a matter of hours in virtually any city in the world upon orders from a controlling leader or by independent target selection of the cell members. In a nation full of stores with shelves lined with propane tanks, gas cans, and limitless electronic gadgetry, rudimentary attacks like the ones in Britain over the weekend may be coming to a city near you, and if these attacks are any indication, there will be no prior warnings identified by our vigilant but over-restricted intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

Glasgow car bomb photo courtesy of UK Daily Mail.

Technorati Tags:
Glasgow Airport, London Car Bomb, Richard Miniter, Information Sharing, Intelligence Agencies, al Qaeda, Terrorist Cells, VBIED