In America, when terrorism investigations are compromised, federal agencies move swiftly to blame the state and local agencies they have been partnered with for leaking information or lacking sufficient experience to investigate suspects effectively. The finger of blame is never pointed inward. Likewise, when state-level criminal investigations are conducted jointly with city police departments or county sheriffs' offices and an informant is burned or the target of a surveillance is lost, it is always the "localest yokel" who is blamed for the operation's failure. The good news is that America is not alone in fostering this phenomenon among the ranks of federal and local law enforcement; unfortunately, that is also the bad news, as one of our key allies in the War on Terror demonstrated recently.
Media coverage of the arrests of three Islamic terrorists plotting to hit American targets,
including Ramstein Air Base and Frankfurt Airport in Germany last week has achieved global saturation levels. What drew my attention for further scrutiny was Monday's revelation of a possible "blunder" by a German traffic police officer, who, according to reports, allegedly tipped off the three terror suspects prior to their eventual arrests that they were on a German government watch list. Of course, if the story were that simple, the traffic cop could rightly be castigated for an incident of incompetence that might have resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Americans at the hands of these potential terrorist bombers. However, there is more to this story than alleged negligent bungling by an excited traffic officer.Let's look first at CNN's description of what occurred prior to the arrests of the three terror suspects in Germany last week:
The three terror suspects arrested last week in Germany may have sped up their bombing plot after a loud-talking police officer inadvertently alerted them that they were on a federal watch list, an unnamed source with knowledge of the investigation told CNN.
The men were stopped by a traffic officer in the weeks prior to their arrest last Tuesday. The traffic stop was described by the head of Germany's Federal Criminal Investigation Office, Joerg Ziercke, as "a setback for the group."
But it may have also been a boon for the suspects, who had been under surveillance for over six months.
Federal investigators had bugged the vehicle carrying the suspects during the traffic stop and could hear one of the police officers loudly exclaim that the men were on a federal watch list, the source said.
Days later, the men were observed mixing a massive amount of explosive materials that German authorities said could have resulted in a stronger explosion than the terror attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005.
At that point, investigators moved in and arrested the men at a rental house in west-central Germany.
Even readers with law enforcement backgrounds likely cringed when reading this account of the "loudmouth" police officer notifying the suspects of their inclusion on the German watch list. Yet readers with experience planning and conducting complex surveillance operations should be asking themselves how a routine traffic stop ever occurred during a classified surveillance operation. The terror suspects were under surveillance by Germany's equivalent of the FBI, the Federal Criminal Investigation Office, which, according to CNN's report, had installed listening devices in the terrorists' vehicle because American intelligence had warned German authorities of their identities and plans.
Having planned and participated in many such surveillance operations, I found it unthinkable that Federal Criminal Investigation Office officials had not collaborated sufficiently with the local German police department to avoid even the possibility of the terror suspects having contact with any police entities throughout the duration of the surveillance. It is a routine practice to advise local police departments when state or federal agencies will be conducting surveillance within their jurisdictions for one simple reason: to avoid "blue on blue" incidents in which officers and agents are in real danger of mistakenly using lethal force on each other, neither recognizing each other as law enforcement until it is too late.
Surveillance planners are expected to ensure that local police officials are aware of an ongoing surveillance, even if the specific identities of the suspects remains unknown to them due to classification clearances. Local officials do not need to know who is under surveillance, but for officer safety they do need to know when it is occurring, what vehicles are involved, and what their instructions are in relation to the surveillance.
This is where the breakdown occurred in Germany, and although the unfortunate traffic officer is bearing the brunt of criticism for mentioning the watch list around the suspects, he is far less culpable than the Federal Criminal Investigation Office agents who clearly failed adequately brief the local traffic officers that under no circumstances should the suspects' vehicle be followed, approached, or stopped by any law enforcement vehicles.
This suspects had been under surveillance for six months, and apparently no German federal agent thought it necessary or wise to provide local traffic officers with instructions regarding the importance of avoiding the suspects, doing nothing to alarm them or make them suspect greater law enforcement presence, and above all to avoid direct confrontation with them unless requested otherwise by federal officials.
An effective surveillance is done without the suspects ever seeing a vehicle that even remotely resembles styles commonly used by law enforcement. To this end, law enforcement agencies purchase sports cars, SUVs, and other vehicles that fit into any neighborhood and bear no tell-tale signs of law enforcement presence, such as visible antennas, grill lights, visible radios in the cabin, and others. The surveillance team wants suspects to go about their daily business, visiting their associates, shopping for bomb-making supplies, going to their bomb-making facility if it is not in one of their homes, such as a storage rental unit or relatives' home.
It is the daily routine that allows the surveillance team to understand what is normal and what is not in their behavior, and this cannot be achieved if the suspects routinely encounter law enforcement vehicles. Such encounters, even if not traffic stop occurs, tend to spook the suspects and encourage them to alter their itineraries, change travel routes, and to be more aware of their surroundings, looking for possible surveillance.
While the "loudmouth" traffic officer in Germany certainly should not have mentioned the government watch list in such close proximity to the suspects, and his actions apparently did prompt them to hasten their production of bombs for the intended strike on American civilian and military targets, he was placed in position to blunder by a significantly graver goof.
The local traffic officer never would have stopped the suspects' vehicle if clear and unmistakable rules of engagement had been provided to the local police department by German federal officials running the surveillance. Unfortunately, this effort by Germany's federal agents to keep its local police in the dark has placed the traffic officer's slip-up under glaring media light. A mistake by one who should know better was a blunder. A mistake by those who should have known best of all was inexcusable.
Thankfully, these suspects merely sped up their bomb production and were still captured rather than disappearing to reemerge elsewhere and strike other, unsuspecting, targets. We should all hope that Germany's federal agents, and their international counterparts, learned a valuable lesson on proper surveillance planning and information sharing. More likely than not, when agencies hold their cards too close to the vest, they later learn they have dealt themselves a very bad hand.
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German Police, Federal Criminal Investigation Office, Bomb Plot, Islamic Terrorists, Surveillance, Terrorist Watch Lists, Counterterrorism, Ramstein Air Base
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