Pakistan a Moderate Muslim Test Case

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf could not have been more clear: "We are in direct confrontation with the extremist forces - it is moderates versus extremists." Yet instead of being encouraged by Musharraf's newly launched war to reform Islam from within, Lee Hamilton, former 9/11 Commission and Iraq Study Group member, recommended that the U.S. strike at al Qaeda in its Pakistani mountain safe haven on the Afghanistan border without Musharraf's consent. Hamilton cited several good reasons for taking unilateral action, specifically the importance of keeping al Qaeda on the run and unable to replenish itself. Hamilton also expressed evident disdain for Musharraf's insistence that Pakistani military forces conduct all raids against radical Islamist groups operating in Pakistan, an arrangement that Hamilton described as unacceptable. Hamilton joined Fox News Military analyst Colonel David Hunt in the "Musharraf is not our friend" chorus, and if Americans continue to sing that tune long and loudly enough, we will soon find few friends among the moderate Muslim leaders of the world.

Hamilton and Col. Hunt want what we all want: to see al Qaeda hunted down ruthlessly in their mountain sanctuaries as a deterrent to the rest of the world's radical Islamic terrorists and their potential recruits. The problem is that both men are fixated on the American "right" to conduct military operations within Pakistan even though Pakistan's moderate Muslim president and military leader has declared war on the extremists in his own nation and has now promised to confront radical Islamists in every corner of Pakistan.

Of course we want to strike al Qaeda, but doing so unilaterally without the consent of the president of the world's only Muslim nuclear nation would send precisely the wrong message to Muslims everywhere. Americans complain that not enough moderate Muslims are working to reform Islam by confronting its extremists, yet when we find one who happens to be a powerful figure with control of a small nuclear arsenal, Hamilton and Col. Hunt question his friendship and urge our leaders to ignore Musharraf's promise to purge the terrorists internally. Either we want Islam to reform itself or we don't. Hamilton and Col. Hunt cannot have it both ways.

I wrote previously about Musharraf's need for sovereignty, further postulating that the United States would never allow a foreign military to conduct strikes within our borders, as we would, like Musharraf, exercise our sovereignty and insist that our military remove the enemy from within our borders. It is no small matter for a president to permit a foreign military to cross his nation's borders and attack members, albeit radical ones, of his national religion. Therein lays the danger inherent in circumventing Musharraf's authority. His decision to publicly distinguish between moderate and extreme Islam, and further vow to "fight against extremism and terrorism no matter what province," has worsened his already precarious political position because a long-term battle against terrorists in Pakistan will require Musharraf to not relinquish command of the Pakistani military, a power he has personally retained despite calls for separation of his political and military role as President-General. Musharraf's military command, if he continues on the moderate path, is of great benefit to global security, as he keeps nuclear weapons in moderate hands.

Meanwhile, radicals within Pakistan salivate at the prospect of electing a president who shares their views and might use that arsenal to intimidate or annihilate their enemies. America finds itself in the position of having a moderate Muslim president-military dictator as perhaps its most valuable and vulnerable ally in the War on Terror.

Musharraf has successfully remained in power because of his strong hold on Pakistan's military establishment, though he faces danger in that realm from radical infiltration. If the United States were to ignore Musharraf's sovereign authority and send our military to conduct operations within Pakistan, it would directly challenge the one core strength he possesses: electorates rarely choose to change leaders in war time or when military confrontation is imminent. A U.S. strike, rather than a sustained Pakistani operation, would convince Pakistanis that Musharraf did not wield any international influence and could be replaced, since the U.S. would have shown little regard for whomever was Pakistan's president by handling the matter unilaterally. Musharraf is receiving criticism from every political party in Pakistan, some opposing his combative stance against radical Islam, and others decrying his determination to run for re-election without relinquishing control of the military.

Impatience is our sorest affliction in Iraq, as the House and Senate worked feverishly and at least for one night, sleeplessly, to withdraw from Iraq long before the full results of the surge strategy can be evaluated. That same impatience must not dictate precipitous U.S. action in Pakistan before allowing Musharraf's confrontation strategy to yield tangible results. Arguably the most militarily and politically powerful moderate Muslim in the world, Musharraf embodies the great question the non-Muslim world wants answered: Is Islam truly a moderate religion of peace, or does radical Islam hold sway in the hearts and minds of the majority?

If Musharraf's declared war against extremism within Islam succeeds in Pakistan, it would set a precedent to be followed in Muslim nations worldwide. If it is also true that moderate Muslims live in fear of the radicals in their midst, then we, and they, should sing Musharraf's praises for pitting himself squarely against the terrorists, rather than forming choruses that shriek about his perceived limitations.

Musharraf left no doubt about his commitment to victory in Pakistan's new war on extremism, reassuring his countrymen, "We will finish it off in every corner of the country." What greater victory could there be in a war against extremist terrorism than for a Muslim nation to clean its own house of terrorists? Let us not allow our national epidemic of impatience to cripple in Pakistan what may be the ultimate death knell for radical Islam: internal reform, by ideology if possible, but by the sword if necessary.

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Musharraf, Lee Hamilton, Colonel David Hunt, Pakistan, Al Qaeda, War on Terror, Moderate Muslims, Radical Islam

Musharraf: I Will Not Allow Extreme Islam

I had no sooner published my previous post about Colonel David Hunt’s assessment that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf “is not our friend,” titled “Fox Analyst Flays ‘Friend’ Musharraf,” when I came across today’s UK Telegraph article “Musharraf Declares War on Muslim Extremists.” After reading my earlier post and the following excerpts from the Telegraph story, it should be clear which side Musharraf is on in the War on Terror. While he may not be the perfect “friend” Col. Hunt apparently expects, his efforts to battle terrorists within Pakistan are exactly what we need from the leaders of all Muslim nations if Islamic extremism is ever to be defeated. In that light, Musharraf is our imperfect but certainly welcome friend despite Col. Hunt’s low opinion of him. Readers should decide whether these words published in the Telegraph are those of a friend or of an enemy, as Col. Hunt implied, in the War on Terror (Reuters photo courtesy of UK Telegraph):

…In a televised address to the nation, Gen Musharraf said that those inside the mosque and its adjacent madrassa, or Muslim college, were "terrorists" who directly threatened Pakistan's security. They had also tarnished Islam's reputation as a tolerant and peaceful religion.

"What do we as a nation want?" he asked. "What kind of Islam do these people represent? In the garb of Islamic teaching they have been training for terrorism. They prepared the madrassa as a fortress for war and housed other terrorists in there."

Gen Musharraf praised the army for wresting the mosque and its madrassa "from the hands of terrorists" and said: "I will not allow any madrassa to be used for extremism."

Isn’t this precisely what we have longed to hear from every Muslim leader in the world, a call to Muslims from Muslims to reject extremism and fight against those who tarnish Islam’s reputation? Other than allowing direct U.S. military action in Pakistan, which I discussed in more detail in my post earlier today, what more could Col. Hunt and other Musharraf critics hope for out of an embattled but courageous leader of the world’s only Muslim nuclear nation? For critics like Col. Hunt, what’s not to like about a moderate Muslim leader who raids radical mosques, kills barricaded extremist clerics firing upon government forces, and tells a nationwide audience that extremism is not consistent with true Islam and must be destroyed?

Musharraf’s televised address contained the strongest and most specific condemnation of extremism yet heard from a Muslim political figure, but perhaps more important than the condemnation was the call for Pakistani’s to ask themselves what kind of Pakistan and brand of Islam they want to represent, to themselves and the rest of the world.

Pakistan is rapidly careening towards a crossroads in its place in world history. It is a complicated combination of technological scientific achievement on the one hand and radical anti-modernization and religious oppression on the other. Musharraf’s statements and actions, placing his personal safety at continuous risk, clearly establish that he wants to help Pakistan develop into a modern and moderate Islamic nation. America and her allies should help Musharraf in every way possible to help Pakistan purge itself of the scourge of radical Islam rather than criticize him for not doing as much as we think he should within his own nation. If he invites U.S. military support in raiding the northern tribal areas infested with al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, then we should do so with relish. If, however, he continues to request that only Pakistani forces conduct these operations in Pakistan, then we should respect his authority and assist in every other way available.

It may well be crucial for Pakistan’s internal stability in the future that the nation purges its own Islamic extremist elements rather than allowing the U.S. to do so. Such a purge, conducted by Muslims against other Muslims by their own forces would be a clear statement of national purpose and unity in the name of preserving moderate Islam.

President Musharraf is a brave man who needs stalwart and patient friends to stand by him while he attempts to lead Pakistan through a period of nationwide religious introspection on the future direction of Islam in Pakistan. His address to his people, consistent with his continued contributions to the War on Terror, will hopefully silence Col. Hunt’s and other critics’ complaints that Musharraf is not “friend” enough for their liking.

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Musharraf, Pakistan, Red Mosque, Islamic Extremism, Televised Address, Madrassas, Terrorists, War on Extremists, War on Terror, Colonel David Hunt, Moderate Islam

Fox Analyst Flays "Friend" Musharraf

It is a rare occurrence when I must side with the usually left-leaning State Department on any issue that directly involves national security. However, when it comes to calls from certain quarters for the Bush administration to aggressively pressure Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to wage all out war on Islamic radicals hiding in the mountainous Afghanistan/Pakistan border, I found myself siding with Richard Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs rather than Fox News military analyst Colonel David Hunt. Ordinarily I appreciate Col. Hunt’s blunt assessments and aggressive posture towards engaging the enemy with full purpose and force rather than limited rules of engagement, but Col. Hunt’s recommendations for conducting the War on Terror within Pakistan are fraught with dangers that he either minimizes or ignores in his online columns and cable news interviews.

A summary of a new threat assessment leaked to the Associated Press this week highlighted the reality that the Taliban and al Qaeda have regrouped and regained strength nearly on par with pre-9/11 levels, thriving in their mountain hideouts in the tribal regions of Pakistan’s northwestern border with Afghanistan. What to do about that reality is, next to Iraq, the most hotly debated issue in Washington. Counterterrorism and intelligence officials believe Musharraf has not done enough to root out the terrorists while accepting $100 million from the U.S. each month ostensibly to develop the local economy in the tribal areas where many find the money alternatively offered by terror groups and border smugglers irresistible. Musharraf has insisted that Pakistani forces execute all counterterrorism raids and operations within Pakistan, and the amount of success he has achieved forms the crux of the debate between the State Department’s approach toward Pakistan and the approach favored by Col. Hunt and others.

In his latest column at FoxNews.com, Col. Hunt wrote the following:

This week, we learned that in 2005, great guys from Seal Team 6, Special Forces, and other terrific Special Operations Organizations were sitting on a runway in Afghanistan, all geared up, ready to go and capture and or kill much of al Qaeda's top leadership. You remember al Qaeda; they’re the ones who killed us on September 11, 2001. Our supremely brave, conditioned and trained men were fully rehearsed, totally committed and ready to kick some serious al Qaeda [expletive].

They call him Rummy … or at least I do. He's the former and totally incompetent Secretary of Defense, who less than two years after 9/11 — two years after the president says “we will hunt them down” — decides that this mission was to be canceled. He makes this bone-headed decision because it might be “dangerous” and it might piss off the president of Pakistan. ARE YOU KIDDING ME? Hey, Mr. “Ask and Answer Your Own Questions,” everything about war is dangerous and General Musharraf is not our friend.

I do not fault Col. Hunt for his dislike of former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld or for his desire for Special Forces operations like the one he described to act swiftly and lethally to eliminate Bin Laden or other terrorist leaders. From a counterterrorism and military perspective, the idea that a Special Forces team had a specific location to hit within Pakistan and was prepared to strike but was denied the opportunity for political reasons is incredibly frustrating. It is easy for those of us who work in intelligence or related fields to conclude that though such an operation might anger Musharraf, the ends would justify the means, especially if Bin Laden were captured or killed. Yet that is precisely where Col. Hunt’s assessment of the missed opportunity and the risk to Musharraf drifts from understandable disappointment to dangerous miscalculation.

Col. Hunt’s assessment that “General Musharraf is not our friend” is shared by many within the intelligence and counterterrorism community, but it is based on unrealistic expectations for “friendship” in the War on Terror, as well as a dangerous underestimation of the Muslim power vacuum that would occur in nuclear-armed Pakistan should Musharraf lose control or be assassinated. Although Musharraf may not be the “friend” that Col. Hunt understandably hopes for, considering the seething cauldron of Islamic radicalism that surrounds him within his own population it is remarkable that he has survived to assist the U.S. as long as he has. Assistant Sec. of State Boucher defended Musharraf’s contributions to the War on Terror during a House committee hearing yesterday, as excerpted from the Washington Post:

At the hearing, Boucher said that Pakistan has "captured more al-Qaeda than any country in the world, and lost more people doing that." He added that Pakistani authorities had killed or captured three of the top 10 Taliban commanders in the border area over the past six to nine months -- and caught several more in the past week.

Boucher said that Pakistan has about 85,000 troops stationed in the border area, with Washington reimbursing Islamabad for its $100 million monthly expenses. Musharraf has promised the tribal leaders $100 million annually for 10 years, and the United States has pledged another $150 million annually for five years, in an effort to promote economic development as an alternative to smuggling and terrorism.

"These were all joint efforts with Pakistan that led to the elimination of some of the top Taliban leaders who had been operating from Pakistan to support the insurgency in Afghanistan," Boucher said.

He said that there are signs "every now and then that there's not a wholehearted effort at all levels in all institutions in Pakistan" -- a reference to news accounts of Pakistani intelligence officials supporting terrorists.

"We've raised those when we need to," Boucher said. When asked about Musharraf's role, he said, "I think if Pakistan was not fighting terrorism, there'd be no way we could succeed in Afghanistan or in terms of the security of our homeland."

The State Department and intelligence community are nearly always at odds over strategy and alliance issues, and nowhere is that more evident than in the debate over how much pressure the U.S. should apply to Musharraf to wage war against Islamic radicals within his own country. In addition to the contributions Musharraf has made as outlined in part by Asst. Secretary Boucher, Musharraf recently showed courage in raiding a radical mosque and killing a barricaded Islamic radical cleric, actions that were wildly unpopular In Islamabad and caused riots. He has reportedly survived fourteen assassination attempts, and yet continues to mount Pakistani military operations against Taliban and al Qaeda leaders in the tribal regions. In this precarious position reality dictates that losing Musharraf, regardless of his perceived level of “friendship” with the U.S., would be far more dangerous to world stability and our national security than his continued allegedly half-hearted engagement in the War on Terror.

Col. Hunt was quick to criticize Musharraf and to call for American military strikes within Pakistan regardless of the potential ramifications for Musharraf’s continued control over Pakistan’s nuclear weaponry and resources. Such rash action might satisfy our desire for revenge on Bin Laden and it might very well weaken al Qaeda greatly for many years. However, as recent plots in Britain, Indonesia, the Philippines, and other nations have demonstrated, al Qaeda’s leadership may be holed up in Pakistan’s mountains, but its ideology and followers have formed a global movement. By striking within Pakistan without the consent of President Musharraf, America would undermine his authority and control over his country and embolden radical Islamists to gain control of Pakistan’s military and nuclear weapons through a coup or other violent action. Would America be safer with a Pakistani leader who, though far from being a perfect “friend”, at least keeps nuclear weapons and material out of the hands of Islamic terrorists, or with the alternative; a radical Islamist Pakistani leader who opens Pakistan’s nuclear resources to the highest bidding terrorist organization?

If a U.S. War on Terror, waged by the U.S. inside Pakistan, would create no other repercussions than making Musharraf angry, as Col. Hunt simplistically assumed, then it would be well worth doing, and doing immediately. Unfortunately, war carries multiple dangers, and angering Musharraf is not the reason we have forestalled sending our Special Forces into Pakistan. The simple truth is that Musharraf’s stability in Pakistan has earned him the right to demand that Pakistan’s military conduct all operations within its border. One wonders how Col. Hunt might respond if he were President of the United States and a terrorist group, later discovered to be holed up in the Rocky Mountains near Denver, flew planes into government buildings in Islamabad, killing 3,000 Pakistanis. Would “President Hunt,” when contacted by an angry Musharraf, agree to allow Pakistani forces to operate inside the U.S. and attack the terrorists hiding in the Rocky Mountains? It is not likely. “President Hunt” would rightfully expect to be respected and would likewise rightfully assure Musharraf that the U.S. military would handle any such operation within our borders. Why would Col. Hunt expect Musharraf to act any differently when given the same type of request?

For a military man steeped in the culture of respect for authority, it is surprising that Col. Hunt would demonstrate so much contempt for the authority of a foreign president of a nuclear power with a population of 165 million who has, lest it be forgotten, taken high profile terrorists like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed into custody and turned them over to American intelligence operatives. The information gleaned from those prisoners has been the most significant contribution to our knowledge of the enemy in the War on Terror, and Musharraf’s military operations against al Qaeda in Pakistan made that possible. While Musharraf holds onto his fragile control over Pakistan, America should patiently assist this “friend” rather than cast stones at him. Who among world leaders is a perfect “friend?” Let him cast the first stone. Secretary Rumsfeld, also a far from perfect Defense Secretary, clearly had more significant reasons for not sending Special Ops into Pakistan than making Musharraf angry, reasons that continue to shape current American restraint in order to preserve a known and stable leadership in Pakistan.

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Musharraf, Pakistan, al Qaeda, War on Terror, Bush Administration, Colonel David Hunt, State Department, Richard Boucher, Taliban, Counterterrorism