Get out your Ouija boards, Tarot cards, Magic 8-Balls, and tea leaves, because with these you could predict with as much accuracy as any “expert” how long it will take for Iran to produce a functional nuclear weapon. The dynamics of the debate over Iran’s capabilities change from week to week. The divergent opinions of nuclear “experts” and intelligence agencies signal a frightening admission that when it comes to estimating when Iran will master the uranium enrichment and warhead production processes, the only certain thing is uncertainty.
In January I warned that America’s intelligence analysts were underestimating Iran’s determination and aggressive overtures to accomplice nations such as Russia, and North Korea. At that time, the consensus among intelligence analysts was that Iran could not construct a nuclear weapon earlier than 2015. On April 3rd I alerted readers that Iran’s unprecedented speed in building 3,000 centrifuges forced intelligence experts to revise earlier estimates and point to 2009 rather than 2015 as the year by which Iran would weaponize uranium. On April 10th I wrote about the revised revisions of WMD specialists alarmed by reports and video footage from within the Natanz nuclear facility south of Tehran. At that time “experts” warned that Iran, if all factors fell into place and centrifuge construction continued at a torrid pace, might produce sufficient enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon by the end of this year. Following this pattern, it would seem logical to predict that the next revised estimate might warn of Iran weaponizing uranium before Alex Rodriguez hits his 20th home run of this young season (he has hit 14 in 18 games in April thus far).
So much for patterns or analysts’ credibility! An esteemed British theoretical physics professor and Israel’s intelligence service, Mossad, now agree that Iran is actually three or four years away from producing deployable weapons grade uranium. After interviewing Professor Norman Dombey, the UK Telegraph reported:
But the smallest particle of dust - even a fingerprint - can disrupt enrichment. Iran will have to spin all the centrifuges inside a vacuum without any interruption for a period of about one year.
If any machine breaks down - or if dust enters the system or if the power supply is lost - the process must halt and start again.
Prof Dombey estimates that Iran will need about two years simply to master the process of running centrifuges. Then, making allowances for interruptions caused by breakdowns, it could take another two years to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb.
The Telegraph article also asserted that even if Iran eventually masters the enrichment process, it will still be faced with the task of building a warhead and fitting it to a missile delivery system. I do not separate this task from the more complex enrichment problem. Iran’s role as provider of 20% of the world’s crude oil places it in a strong position to purchase warhead delivery missile technology from a number of willing nations already doing business in Iran. Iran need not “figure out” how to build the missiles. It can simply buy them and clear that hurdle while the centrifuges are spinning straw into gold, as it were.
Intelligence analysts have now changed their estimates to read quite differently than just two years ago. Then, the consensus was that Iran would not be capable of producing sufficient uranium for 10 years. Now, analysts no longer speculate about capability to produce. That has become, apparently, an accepted fact. Estimates now focus only on whether Iran will encounter technological glitches that will hamper production. The UN and the U.S. missed the opportunity to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions decisively before they moved from construction to production. Now our intelligence “experts” are counting on Iran’s centrifuges to break down or work less efficiently than planned to buy time for negotiations and sanctions. What these “experts” will not predict is how soon Iran will have sufficient enriched uranium if all the centrifuges operate perfectly, because they apparently refuse to believe in that possibility. According to Gary Samore, Vice President of the Council on Foreign Relations, "The belief in Western intelligence circles is that a large portion of these machines are likely to break if Iran attempts to operate them at high speeds necessary for enrichment."
Counting on machinery to malfunction is not a strategy that will keep nuclear arms out of the mullahs’ hands. Analysts are uncertain how well the centrifuges were constructed. They are uncertain whether the machinery will withstand the rigors of high enrichment. They are uncertain how many centrifuges have been or are currently being constructed in facilities other than Natanz. They are uncertain what technological and material assistance has been provided by nations with valuable investments in Iran, such as China and Russia. They are uncertain how many years (or is it months?) it will take for Iran to enrich weaponized uranium.
The only factor of which analysts are certain is that the mullahs will do and say anything to buy time for their ultimate goal: Annihilating Israel and wielding nuclear weapons over cowering Middle East and Europe populations. Perhaps our policies toward Iran should operate on that premise rather than on psychics, palm readers, or nuclear intelligence “experts”, all of whom seem to be equally reliable sources when making important strategic decisions.
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