Truman Best Expressed Bush's Iraq Vision

Critics of the Bush administration in both parties argue that the president has done a poor job of explaining to the American people what we are trying to accomplish in Iraq, why it is necessary, and how much sacrifice might be required to achieve victory and preserve Iraqi democracy. The president and his cabinet members have certainly made plenty of speeches in which these questions are superficially addressed, but it is clear that either through selective media coverage or a national epidemic of Attention Deficit Disorder, Americans, particularly the anti-war Democrats, continually fail to grasp what is at stake in Iraq. President Bush is a plain-speaking man, but his speech writers have done him an enormous disservice by shunning Truman-like bluntness for nuanced platitudes that lost their effectiveness immediately after the president’s initial war address to the nation in 2003. This practice has only worsened as the president has sought to explain why America must continue in Iraq and why setting timetables for withdrawal is a dangerous idea. Phrases such as “embolden our enemies” and “fight them over there so we won’t have to fight them here” are true, but one can only use them so many times before repetition renders them rote and predictable.

It’s not as if the White House speech writers were lacking available material from which to draw inspiration or to be used as templates. Unfortunately, they overlooked a speech delivered by the plainest of plain-speaking presidents, Harry Truman to a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947. President Truman had received urgent pleading requests from Greece and Turkey for military and economic assistance in the face of Soviet aggression and internal chaos and terrorism. The free governments of both nations faced overthrow by radicals (communists), and Britain, ravaged by World War II, simply lacked sufficient resources to support either nation. Truman came to the realization that if democratically elected governments in Greece and Turkey were to survive, and the peoples of those nations to remain free, America had to come to their rescue, with or without UN assistance. The similarities to the situations in Greece and Turkey and the status of Iraq are remarkably clear. President Bush’s speechwriters should have read Truman’s address to Congress in which he established what became the Truman Doctrine and substituted “Greece” or “Turkey” with “Iraq.” Had they done so, they would have discovered that the best explanation for why we must win in Iraq was offered in 1947 in far more bluntly eloquent language than any set forth by President Bush.

The Truman Doctrine address to Congress requested $400 million in military and economic assistance for Greece and Turkey. I invite readers to substitute “Greece,” “Greek,” or “Turkey” with “Iraq” or “Iraqi.” If readers will do this, they will be armed with the most effectively communicated verbal defense of America’s continued engagement in Iraq. Of particular note, you will observe that both Greece and Turkey faced internal terrorism and concerted efforts to discredit and destroy their elected governments. Iraq faces those same perils and has pleaded for our continued support, but no one in 1947 claimed that Greece and Turkey were embroiled in “civil wars” and neither is Iraq today a civil war despite Democratic claims to the contrary. I want to draw out one sentence in case readers do not take the time to read the address; “It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." That policy fits precisely what is occurring in Iraq.

And now, by substituting "Iraq" for "Greece" or "Turkey," travel back in time to 1947, when Truman explained, appropriately for this Memorial Day weekend, why we fight:

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress of the United States:

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.

One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey. The United States has received from the Greek government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American economic mission now in Greece and reports from the American ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.

I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek government.

Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940, this industrious and peace-loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation, and bitter internal strife.

When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five percent of the children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry and draft animals had almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings.

As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible.

Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances the people of Greece cannot make progress in solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to restore internal order and security, so essential for economic and political recovery.

The Greek government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American administrators, economists and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public administration.

The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A commission appointed by the United Nations Security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece and alleged border violations along the frontier between Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other.

Meanwhile, the Greek government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the government throughout Greek territory. Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy.
The United States must supply that assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid, but these are inadequate.

There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn.

No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government.

The British government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece.

We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action, and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.

It is important to note that the Greek government has asked for our aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we may give to Greece, and in improving its public administration. It is of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece; in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece self-supporting, and will help to build an economy in which a healthy democracy can flourish.

No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected. The government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it represents 85 percent of the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people.

The Greek government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek government has done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the right or the left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now.

Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention.

The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war, the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid.

Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.

Since the war Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity.

That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.

The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.

As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.

I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.

To ensure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression.
The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East.

We must take immediate and resolute action.

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400 million for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350 million which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.

Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized.

If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the executive and legislative branches of the government must work together.

This is a serious course upon which we embark.

I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious. The United States contributed $341 billion toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace.

The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than 1 tenth of 1 percent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world -- and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.

I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

The Republican Congress in 1947 united with Democrat Truman and approved the strategy and its accompanying funding, and the course of history for Greece and Turkey remained one of freedom and self-determination. Our current Congress has the same responsibility and opportunity with Iraq. Will they rise to the occasion? Their behavior since the November 2006 elections inspires little confidence.

Is the "Mess" in Iraq Fact or Fiction? Newt Gingrich, Winston Churchill, and Robert Kaplan Make Their Cases

I was recently asked, “Is Iraq really a mess, or does the media just portray it as a mess?” The knee-jerk reply to such a question would be to blame the media, since liberal media bias against President Bush and the military has been so well-documented in alternative media including Spy The News! However, the recent criticisms by Senator John McCain of the management of this war, which echoed similar criticisms he leveled in 2004, remind supporters of the war effort that criticizing war management does not equate to being anti-war or in favor of our withdrawal from Iraq.

Is the situation in Iraq a mess? Liberals and conservatives agree that it is. The difference lies in what one does with that realization. Liberals interpret the mess as confirmation that we cannot win the war and should withdraw our troops as quickly as possible regardless of the long term consequences for Iraqis and anxious neighboring nations. Conservative critics, except for cut and run advocates like Chuck Hagel, understand that the current situation is a mess, but favor learning from our mistakes and adapting strategy to achieve the original, noble purpose of the war. Both sides have engaged in useless political posturing, with Democrats and some weak-kneed Republicans passing non-binding resolutions assigning blame to someone else despite their own votes for the war in 2003. Republicans too, like McCain, have attacked former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for what they consider mismanagement of the war strategy.

Assigning blame will not make Iraq any less of a mess than it is now, and merely creates personal animosity when the more important matter, fixing the current situation in Iraq, receives secondary attention. To improve the current situation, it is essential to recognize what mistakes were made (not who made them) and correct the mistakes.

Critics seem to be in agreement that the biggest mistake was our failure to incorporate the then-existing Iraqi army and local tribal sheiks in our efforts to win the hearts of the Iraqi people and offer them security. In a book frequently recommended by radio and blog personality Hugh Hewitt, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military, from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, journalist Robert Kaplan, who was embedded with Army and Marine units in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, observed the following about our failure to utilize tribal leaders and the Iraqi army:

In fact, repression had not been the only tool used by Saddam Hussein. He had also bribed the paramount sheiks of the Sunni Triangle with cash, fancy cars, tracts of land, and other tangible gifts. But the American-led invasion dismantled that entire system. And what had the Americans brought in return to assuage such notables, who for millennia had affected the thinking of their extended clans? The promise of elections? What was that? An abstraction that meant little to many here. In a part of the world where blood was thicker than ideas, it was a difficult step for one Muslim to dime out another Muslim, especially for something as intangible as elections.

Thus the Sheiks and others, driven by narrow self-interest-as if that should have surprised anyone-made it known that they were open to deals with Syrians and assorted other jihadists. . . . It didn’t help matters that the very militarization of the state facilitated by Saddam had turned Iraq into one huge ammunition storehouse for the supply of rockets and mortars to the jihadists, and the making of IEDs. . . . And with the Iraqi army disbanded, there was now a pool of people with knowledge of ordnance and explosives, and the incentive to use it against the Americans.

In Kaplan’s writings, it is clear he is no fan of the Bush administration, yet his book provides one of the best firsthand accounts of what our Army Special Forces and Marines have faced. The failure to respect and utilize local tribal sheiks to suppress radical insurgents was perhaps the most shortsighted error made in Iraq. After decades of oppression and firm control by Saddam’s regime, Iraqis lived in fear but knew who was in charge in their local areas. After disbanding the Iraqi army, we left no force other than the American military to suppress insurgents, something the Iraqi army had been successfully doing prior to our arrival.

Lest one think that the observation of one embedded journalist is unreliable, consider this excerpt from Newt Gingrich’s book Winning the Future: A 21st Century Contract with America:

The decision to have an American administration in Baghdad was a mistake. We seemed to be doing relatively well in Iraq until late May 2003 when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) transitioned into power.

Instead of the CPA, we should have created an interim Iraqi government in June 2003 as we had in Afghanistan. It took only three weeks to identify Hamid Kharzai in Afghanistan. The people actually involved in Iraq’s interim government in June 2004 were all known and available in 2003.

The decision of the CPA to disband the Iraqi military, putting hundreds of thousands of armed young men out of work, was a disaster that our military warned against. Had the Iraqi army been kept intact-as General Tommy Franks and General Michael DeLong recommended-it is possible that most of the subsequent violence would have been averted.

History, in fact, provided ample tactical and cultural information about Afghanistan and Iraq that was apparently ignored in the design of “Shock and Awe” and other chest-thumping strategies. As quoted by Kaplan, in 1897 young Winston Churchill (in his Story of the Malakand Field Force) observed the following about Afghanistan, where the British Empire was attempting to hold sway against indigenous forces:

A roadless, broken and underdeveloped country; an absence of any strategic points; a well-armed enemy with great mobility and modern rifles, who adopts guerilla tactics. The results . . .are the troops can march anywhere, and do anything, except catch the enemy. . . .

“The unpractical,” Churchill replied, “may wonder why we, a people who fill some considerable place in the world, should mix in the petty intrigues of these border chieftains.” Some, whom Churchill calls “bad and nervous sailors,” would simply cut and run, even though that would be impossible in the circumstances, whereas others call for “full steam ahead,” that is, a dramatic increase in military and other resources until the frontier valleys “ are as safe and civilized as Hyde Park.” But, as Churchill intimates, there are usually neither the troops nor the money nor the will to do any such thing. Therefore, he concludes, the “inevitable alternative” is a system of “gradual advance, of political intrigue among the tribes, of subsidies and small expeditions."

Did we enter Iraq with small expeditions and forward operating bases (FOBs) spread throughout the country to assess and adapt to local tribal leaders and situations? No, we drove impressively to Baghdad in a glorified televised event, captured Saddam, disbanded the Iraqi army, failed to “grease the skids” with the local sheiks who employed small military forces of their own, and then Washington seemed surprised that an insurgency arose. Of course, bribing tribal sheiks sounds corrupt and even antithetical to the effort of establishing a democracy, but in reality a democracy can only succeed when each local tribe feels safe to go to the polls and feels adequately represented in the national government.

The tribes trusted their sheiks, but the U.S. CPA was loathe to deal with them and chose its own representatives for the tribes. We lacked adequate cultural intelligence to make appropriate decisions, and the sheiks and their armed followers were understandably offended. It would have been far wiser to “shock and awe” the tribal leaders with our monetary generosity. Gifts and yes, even bribes, would have made them forget the past payments expected of Saddam and secured their cooperation in securing local villages and cities against insurgents who could disturb this comfortable arrangement.

Was there military intelligence or training material that could have predicted this eventuality? Kaplan quoted the following from the U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual(initially published in 1940):

Hostile forces will withdraw into the more remote parts of the country, or will be dispersed into numerous small groups which continue to oppose the occupation. Even though the recognized leaders may capitulate, subordinate commanders often refuse to abide by the terms of the capitulation. Escaping to the hinterland, they assemble heterogeneous armed groups of patriotic soldiers, malcontents, notorious outlaws. . .and by means of guerilla warfare, continue to harass and oppose the intervening force in its attempt to restore peace and good order throughout the country as a whole.

It seems clear that the Marines in 1940 were already providing keys to success in the War on Terror 61 years before 9/11, Afghanistan, and eventually Iraq. Kaplan and Gingrich also identified other mistakes that we have made that can still be corrected. Kaplan was embedded with a Marine unit in Al-Fallujah and witnessed what he described as progress in the battle against the insurgents there. Just as our military seemed poised to score what could have been a decisive victory, the Bush administration called for a cease-fire for, as journalist Kaplan writes in Imperial Grunts, media and public opinion reasons:

The focus of the media. . .on Al-Fallujah. . .was central to the decision-made at the highest levels of the U.S. government-to call a cease-fire that would end the Marine assault. This happened just as the Marines, strengthened by the arrival of a whole new battalion, may have been about to overrun the insurgents.

To be sure, the decision to invest Al-Fallujah and then pull out just as victory was within reach demonstrated both the fecklessness and incoherence of the Bush administration. While a case can be made for either launching a full-scale marine assault or continuing the previous policy of individual surgical strikes, a case cannot be made for launching a full-scale assault only to reverse it because of political pressures that were foreseeable in the first place.

The tendency of our political leaders to be swayed by media coverage and subsequent public opinion polls, led to decisions that rendered the tasks of the on the scene military commanders impossible. Those commanders are not being allowed to wage brutal war against a brutal enemy. Had we decisively defeated the insurgents in Al-Fallujah, one of the most violent areas of Iraq, the course of the war might have been vastly different than what we have experienced. Newt Gingrich went into more detail about our mistakes in the public opinion war, specifically that we have not waged one:

We also underestimated the effect of the Arab media’s propaganda campaign against us. We had no information program in the Arab world or in Europe capable of effectively communicating what we were trying to do. CPA media efforts were wrongly focused on American public opinion, not Iraqi public opinion. That made it much harder for us to mobilize Iraqis to our side.

In the global struggles against fascism and communism, the United States waged a military, economic, and propaganda war. Yet we have done nothing similarly organized and coherent in the war against Islamists and the rogue states.

While there is much to criticize about the management of the Iraq War, and plenty of blame to go around, the enduring lesson is that in the course of difficulty it is preferable to recognize and mend mistakes than to withdraw in defeat before the stated goal of the mission is accomplished. The stakes are high for our own security, our international credibility, and most importantly, the future of 50+ million Iraqis. The Boy Scouts are taught to always leave a place better than they found it. Regardless of how Iraq became a mess for us or who contributed to the mess, we are now obligated to leave Iraq better than we found it. Removing Saddam was the right thing to do, but we will not be leaving Iraq better than we found it if we abandon it to a Sunni-Shiite conflict that will quickly escalate and embroil neighboring nations eager to expand their borders and resources.

The only asset in short supply for Americans is patience. The media, possibly influenced by the initial “shock and awe” bluster, focus only on body counts, rarely reporting the rebuilding of infrastructure and other humanitarian work occurring in Iraq. But in fairness, the civilian affairs groups that typically provide humanitarian efforts have been largely unable to operate in Iraq because we have not yet secured the country from insurgents. As a result, as Kaplan describes effectively, our military is forced to fight insurgents while also rebuilding villages, schools, and utilities. The dissatisfaction among the troops in Iraq stems mainly from not being allowed to focus on the duty they are best trained for: engaging and killing the enemy.

Why are they not allowed to engage the enemy fully? Because casualty rates kill campaigns, and we are now in another election cycle. It is time for Republicans and Democrats who are serious about national security and winning the War on Terror to stop making war decisions based on small random sampling polls that purport to represent national opinion. Engaging the enemy more fully despite casualty risk, along with our propaganda efforts and outreach to local tribal leaders, can be corrected and proven effective, but only if we avoid a rash rush to retreat.