Is the "Mess" in Iraq Fact or Fiction? Newt Gingrich, Winston Churchill, and Robert Kaplan Make Their Cases

I was recently asked, “Is Iraq really a mess, or does the media just portray it as a mess?” The knee-jerk reply to such a question would be to blame the media, since liberal media bias against President Bush and the military has been so well-documented in alternative media including Spy The News! However, the recent criticisms by Senator John McCain of the management of this war, which echoed similar criticisms he leveled in 2004, remind supporters of the war effort that criticizing war management does not equate to being anti-war or in favor of our withdrawal from Iraq.

Is the situation in Iraq a mess? Liberals and conservatives agree that it is. The difference lies in what one does with that realization. Liberals interpret the mess as confirmation that we cannot win the war and should withdraw our troops as quickly as possible regardless of the long term consequences for Iraqis and anxious neighboring nations. Conservative critics, except for cut and run advocates like Chuck Hagel, understand that the current situation is a mess, but favor learning from our mistakes and adapting strategy to achieve the original, noble purpose of the war. Both sides have engaged in useless political posturing, with Democrats and some weak-kneed Republicans passing non-binding resolutions assigning blame to someone else despite their own votes for the war in 2003. Republicans too, like McCain, have attacked former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld for what they consider mismanagement of the war strategy.

Assigning blame will not make Iraq any less of a mess than it is now, and merely creates personal animosity when the more important matter, fixing the current situation in Iraq, receives secondary attention. To improve the current situation, it is essential to recognize what mistakes were made (not who made them) and correct the mistakes.

Critics seem to be in agreement that the biggest mistake was our failure to incorporate the then-existing Iraqi army and local tribal sheiks in our efforts to win the hearts of the Iraqi people and offer them security. In a book frequently recommended by radio and blog personality Hugh Hewitt, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military, from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, journalist Robert Kaplan, who was embedded with Army and Marine units in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, observed the following about our failure to utilize tribal leaders and the Iraqi army:

In fact, repression had not been the only tool used by Saddam Hussein. He had also bribed the paramount sheiks of the Sunni Triangle with cash, fancy cars, tracts of land, and other tangible gifts. But the American-led invasion dismantled that entire system. And what had the Americans brought in return to assuage such notables, who for millennia had affected the thinking of their extended clans? The promise of elections? What was that? An abstraction that meant little to many here. In a part of the world where blood was thicker than ideas, it was a difficult step for one Muslim to dime out another Muslim, especially for something as intangible as elections.

Thus the Sheiks and others, driven by narrow self-interest-as if that should have surprised anyone-made it known that they were open to deals with Syrians and assorted other jihadists. . . . It didn’t help matters that the very militarization of the state facilitated by Saddam had turned Iraq into one huge ammunition storehouse for the supply of rockets and mortars to the jihadists, and the making of IEDs. . . . And with the Iraqi army disbanded, there was now a pool of people with knowledge of ordnance and explosives, and the incentive to use it against the Americans.

In Kaplan’s writings, it is clear he is no fan of the Bush administration, yet his book provides one of the best firsthand accounts of what our Army Special Forces and Marines have faced. The failure to respect and utilize local tribal sheiks to suppress radical insurgents was perhaps the most shortsighted error made in Iraq. After decades of oppression and firm control by Saddam’s regime, Iraqis lived in fear but knew who was in charge in their local areas. After disbanding the Iraqi army, we left no force other than the American military to suppress insurgents, something the Iraqi army had been successfully doing prior to our arrival.

Lest one think that the observation of one embedded journalist is unreliable, consider this excerpt from Newt Gingrich’s book Winning the Future: A 21st Century Contract with America:

The decision to have an American administration in Baghdad was a mistake. We seemed to be doing relatively well in Iraq until late May 2003 when the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) transitioned into power.

Instead of the CPA, we should have created an interim Iraqi government in June 2003 as we had in Afghanistan. It took only three weeks to identify Hamid Kharzai in Afghanistan. The people actually involved in Iraq’s interim government in June 2004 were all known and available in 2003.

The decision of the CPA to disband the Iraqi military, putting hundreds of thousands of armed young men out of work, was a disaster that our military warned against. Had the Iraqi army been kept intact-as General Tommy Franks and General Michael DeLong recommended-it is possible that most of the subsequent violence would have been averted.

History, in fact, provided ample tactical and cultural information about Afghanistan and Iraq that was apparently ignored in the design of “Shock and Awe” and other chest-thumping strategies. As quoted by Kaplan, in 1897 young Winston Churchill (in his Story of the Malakand Field Force) observed the following about Afghanistan, where the British Empire was attempting to hold sway against indigenous forces:

A roadless, broken and underdeveloped country; an absence of any strategic points; a well-armed enemy with great mobility and modern rifles, who adopts guerilla tactics. The results . . .are the troops can march anywhere, and do anything, except catch the enemy. . . .

“The unpractical,” Churchill replied, “may wonder why we, a people who fill some considerable place in the world, should mix in the petty intrigues of these border chieftains.” Some, whom Churchill calls “bad and nervous sailors,” would simply cut and run, even though that would be impossible in the circumstances, whereas others call for “full steam ahead,” that is, a dramatic increase in military and other resources until the frontier valleys “ are as safe and civilized as Hyde Park.” But, as Churchill intimates, there are usually neither the troops nor the money nor the will to do any such thing. Therefore, he concludes, the “inevitable alternative” is a system of “gradual advance, of political intrigue among the tribes, of subsidies and small expeditions."

Did we enter Iraq with small expeditions and forward operating bases (FOBs) spread throughout the country to assess and adapt to local tribal leaders and situations? No, we drove impressively to Baghdad in a glorified televised event, captured Saddam, disbanded the Iraqi army, failed to “grease the skids” with the local sheiks who employed small military forces of their own, and then Washington seemed surprised that an insurgency arose. Of course, bribing tribal sheiks sounds corrupt and even antithetical to the effort of establishing a democracy, but in reality a democracy can only succeed when each local tribe feels safe to go to the polls and feels adequately represented in the national government.

The tribes trusted their sheiks, but the U.S. CPA was loathe to deal with them and chose its own representatives for the tribes. We lacked adequate cultural intelligence to make appropriate decisions, and the sheiks and their armed followers were understandably offended. It would have been far wiser to “shock and awe” the tribal leaders with our monetary generosity. Gifts and yes, even bribes, would have made them forget the past payments expected of Saddam and secured their cooperation in securing local villages and cities against insurgents who could disturb this comfortable arrangement.

Was there military intelligence or training material that could have predicted this eventuality? Kaplan quoted the following from the U.S. Marine Corps Small Wars Manual(initially published in 1940):

Hostile forces will withdraw into the more remote parts of the country, or will be dispersed into numerous small groups which continue to oppose the occupation. Even though the recognized leaders may capitulate, subordinate commanders often refuse to abide by the terms of the capitulation. Escaping to the hinterland, they assemble heterogeneous armed groups of patriotic soldiers, malcontents, notorious outlaws. . .and by means of guerilla warfare, continue to harass and oppose the intervening force in its attempt to restore peace and good order throughout the country as a whole.

It seems clear that the Marines in 1940 were already providing keys to success in the War on Terror 61 years before 9/11, Afghanistan, and eventually Iraq. Kaplan and Gingrich also identified other mistakes that we have made that can still be corrected. Kaplan was embedded with a Marine unit in Al-Fallujah and witnessed what he described as progress in the battle against the insurgents there. Just as our military seemed poised to score what could have been a decisive victory, the Bush administration called for a cease-fire for, as journalist Kaplan writes in Imperial Grunts, media and public opinion reasons:

The focus of the media. . .on Al-Fallujah. . .was central to the decision-made at the highest levels of the U.S. government-to call a cease-fire that would end the Marine assault. This happened just as the Marines, strengthened by the arrival of a whole new battalion, may have been about to overrun the insurgents.

To be sure, the decision to invest Al-Fallujah and then pull out just as victory was within reach demonstrated both the fecklessness and incoherence of the Bush administration. While a case can be made for either launching a full-scale marine assault or continuing the previous policy of individual surgical strikes, a case cannot be made for launching a full-scale assault only to reverse it because of political pressures that were foreseeable in the first place.

The tendency of our political leaders to be swayed by media coverage and subsequent public opinion polls, led to decisions that rendered the tasks of the on the scene military commanders impossible. Those commanders are not being allowed to wage brutal war against a brutal enemy. Had we decisively defeated the insurgents in Al-Fallujah, one of the most violent areas of Iraq, the course of the war might have been vastly different than what we have experienced. Newt Gingrich went into more detail about our mistakes in the public opinion war, specifically that we have not waged one:

We also underestimated the effect of the Arab media’s propaganda campaign against us. We had no information program in the Arab world or in Europe capable of effectively communicating what we were trying to do. CPA media efforts were wrongly focused on American public opinion, not Iraqi public opinion. That made it much harder for us to mobilize Iraqis to our side.

In the global struggles against fascism and communism, the United States waged a military, economic, and propaganda war. Yet we have done nothing similarly organized and coherent in the war against Islamists and the rogue states.

While there is much to criticize about the management of the Iraq War, and plenty of blame to go around, the enduring lesson is that in the course of difficulty it is preferable to recognize and mend mistakes than to withdraw in defeat before the stated goal of the mission is accomplished. The stakes are high for our own security, our international credibility, and most importantly, the future of 50+ million Iraqis. The Boy Scouts are taught to always leave a place better than they found it. Regardless of how Iraq became a mess for us or who contributed to the mess, we are now obligated to leave Iraq better than we found it. Removing Saddam was the right thing to do, but we will not be leaving Iraq better than we found it if we abandon it to a Sunni-Shiite conflict that will quickly escalate and embroil neighboring nations eager to expand their borders and resources.

The only asset in short supply for Americans is patience. The media, possibly influenced by the initial “shock and awe” bluster, focus only on body counts, rarely reporting the rebuilding of infrastructure and other humanitarian work occurring in Iraq. But in fairness, the civilian affairs groups that typically provide humanitarian efforts have been largely unable to operate in Iraq because we have not yet secured the country from insurgents. As a result, as Kaplan describes effectively, our military is forced to fight insurgents while also rebuilding villages, schools, and utilities. The dissatisfaction among the troops in Iraq stems mainly from not being allowed to focus on the duty they are best trained for: engaging and killing the enemy.

Why are they not allowed to engage the enemy fully? Because casualty rates kill campaigns, and we are now in another election cycle. It is time for Republicans and Democrats who are serious about national security and winning the War on Terror to stop making war decisions based on small random sampling polls that purport to represent national opinion. Engaging the enemy more fully despite casualty risk, along with our propaganda efforts and outreach to local tribal leaders, can be corrected and proven effective, but only if we avoid a rash rush to retreat.

Society's Standards, Not Military's, in Decline

It wasn’t enough for John Kerry to insult the intellectual capacity of the soldiers in Iraq. Congressman Marty Meehan, D-MA, who serves on the House Armed Services Committee, has now added “criminals” to the list of derogatory terms used by Democrats to describe our troops. That is what passes as support for the armed services in the new Congress. Rather than praise the military for giving some who have made mistakes the chance to improve their skills and future employment prospects, Congressman Meehan puts a negative spin to recently published Pentagon recruiting statistics and warns that the military is filled with criminals.

Are military recruiting standards being lowered due to the strain of 5 years of the War on Terror and “mounting casualties”? That is the question raised in an AP story reported by Fox News today titled “US Military Letting in More Recruits With Criminal Records.” According to Defense Department statistics, the number of Army and Marine recruits with criminal records requiring waivers for military service nearly doubled between 2003 and 2006, the AP reports. Congressman Meehan argues that the rise in the number of recruits with criminal records demonstrates a lowering of standards by the armed services that is the direct result of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Congressman Meehan stated:

The data is crystal clear. Our armed forces are under incredible strain and the only way that they can fill their recruiting quotas is by lowering their standards. By lowering standards, we are endangering the rest of our armed forces and sending the wrong message to potential recruits across the country.

Do the statistics actually reflect what the Congressman alleges? According to Pentagon statistics, the armed services provided “moral waivers” by service branch as follows:

Army – 12.7% needed waivers in 2003, 20% needed waivers in 2006.
Marines – Slightly less than 50% needed waivers in 2003, slightly more than 50% needed waivers in 2006.
Navy – Less than 18% needed waivers in 2003, 18% needed waivers in 2006.
Air Force – More than 8% needed waivers in 2003, 8% needed waivers in 2006, trending downward.
Overall Average – 20% needed waivers in 2003, 25% needed waivers in 2006.

The Pentagon report divides moral waivers into the following categories: felonies, serious and minor non-traffic offenses, serious and minor traffic offenses and drug offenses. These categories are intentionally broad because many states differ in what constitutes felonies or misdemeanors.

Congressman Meehan’s “crystal clear” data actually only show a 5% rise in waivers throughout the armed services between 2003 and 2006. 5% does not reflect an incredible strain or a mad rush to throw recruiting standards out in order to meet recruiting quotas. On the contrary, the high percentage for the Marine Corps is not an alarming result of lowering standards; it is caused by the strict Marines' standard drug use policy that requires waivers even for single experience marijuana use.

In defense of the waiver program, the Pentagon issued the following statement:

The waiver process recognizes that some young people have made mistakes, have overcome their past behavior, and have clearly demonstrated the potential for being productive, law-abiding citizens and members of the military.

While statistically it may appear the military is lowering recruiting standards, the explanation for the increase in moral waivers is far more attributable to the decades-long decline in national morals than to any cause/effect stemming from the War on Terror. When I was recruited for government service, the entity that recruited me had a zero tolerance policy against drug use of any kind at any time. Those who lied about recreational use in their youth were weeded out in the polygraph stage. The standard behind that policy was: in sensitive government positions involving life and death decisions and actions, anyone who could prove unstable or succumb to physical addictions that involve violating laws should be excluded without exception.

In the intervening years, however, that standard has “evolved” as fewer applicants could state with confidence that they had never used illegal narcotics of any kind. The current standard allows exceptions for recreational use of marijuana, as long as that use was no more than a few years prior to application for employment with this specific government entity. Was the change a result of this entity’s manpower-intensive contribution to the War on Terror? No, it was the result of a shrinking pool of applicants who had never experimented with drugs in their youth.

I view the change in standards as a troubling but not at all surprising trend that is impacting all employers, not merely the US Government or military. Finding recruits who have ethical standards, can successfully pass intensive background investigations, polygraphs, and psychological fitness tests, is becoming more difficult. The parental permissiveness of baby-boomers has spawned more recreational drug experimentation, growing serious criminal behavior among youth, and a moral relativism that has taught young Americans that right and wrong depend entirely on the situation and how you feel about it, not that there are clear differences between right and wrong. All forms of sexual deviance are likewise embraced and displayed as popular entertainment, further obscuring the once accepted values of self-restraint and responsibility. Criminals, once societal pariahs, have become the heroes in our popular entertainment, while our government and military are nearly always portrayed as the true villains. Drug use is portrayed as adventurous, daring, and socially enlightened. Drug lords, smugglers, and dealers, are afforded respect and glory in today’s Hollywood productions. Hollywood attaches no stigma to indulgent or illegal behavior.

One wonders how much effort Congressman Meehan has expended in fighting Hollywood’s culturally suicidal assault on American morals, or how concerned he is that Americans are subjected daily to Hollywood’s disdain and mockery of government and military personnel. If the Congressman worries about sending the wrong message to potential recruits, why not start with the anti-military messages spewing from Hollywood and his own party?

Congressman Meehan’s policy statement on Iraq includes terms he believes show support for our troops: Quagmire; Torture Accountability; Haliburton; Rifts in International Relationships; Failure; and Damaged Credibility. He is far less dedicated to improving military recruiting than he is to casting the military in a poor light in order to discredit the Bush Administration and the Iraq War.

Because generations of Americans have willingly embraced Hollywood’s values and definitions of right and wrong (i.e. there is no difference), fewer Americans are living the lives the government and military once demanded from recruits in preparation for service. The private sector is likewise facing a shortage of applicants with high standards, but unless an employer is a government contractor providing sensitive government support, background checks are shallow and polygraphs are non-existent. Thus the decline in moral standards throughout society would naturally be most visible in government and military, where security clearances and access to weaponry and intelligence reports require far more character than is expected in the private sector.

The military, to its credit and despite the AP report on Pentagon recruiting statistics, gives far more scrutiny to its recruits than the private sector, including the news media, gives to its employee applicants. To attribute the rise in moral waivers for military recruits to the strains of the War on Terror misses the larger cultural context in which recruiting occurs. The military should be applauded for working to recruit the best available representation of American culture, and not criticized because America’s culture is in decline.

Hollywood's Favorite Villains: Government, Law Enforcement, and the Military

As part of my previous post, I discussed the growing cynicism and outright suspicion many Americans harbor toward the US Government, and the media’s contribution to that destructive trend. From memory and with a few mouse clicks to refresh it, I have compiled below a sampling of movie plots in which the military or government agencies are the villains. The list is by no means all-inclusive, as I realized when researching that this trend began in earnest in the 1960s and has produced a disturbingly large number of movies that could appear in this list. When films depicting corrupt local police departments (NYPD and LAPD are witheringly vilified) are included, the number of movies in which government or law enforcement are the enemy is far exceeded by the list of films in which criminals are the heroes. Audiences are influenced by these portrayals, and mistrust of police and government agencies is a direct result of Hollywood’s choice of villains.

Here is a small sampling of such films, with a brief synopsis of each plot. Please note that the inclusion of any film on this list is not an endorsement of it. Many of these movies have aired on network or cable television minus their abundant gratuitous violence, sex, and language. Unfortunately their anti-government themes were not also scrapped:

Mercury Rising – The NSA tests an unbreakable super code by putting it in a puzzle magazine. An autistic 9 year old deciphers the code in the puzzle. The NSA sends hit squads to kill the boy. He hides in his home; the NSA kills his parents, and then ruthlessly hunts the boy to terminate him.

Enemy of the State – An NSA boss and hit squad attempt to murder a lawyer who stumbles upon evidence of an NSA murder.

Capricorn One – NASA fakes a manned mission to Mars, and then the mission controller plots to kill the astronauts in a staged capsule fire.

The Siege – The National Guard imposes martial law on NYC, rounds up Middle-Eastern men, and imprisons them in a stadium turned internment camp. Defense Intelligence then tortures suspected terrorists for information.

Mission Impossible – A CIA Spymaster attempts to provide an international criminal with a Top Secret list of all CIA field agents. He then kills his entire field operations team except one.

A Few Good Men – A Marine General covers up an illegal “code red” disciplinary action that resulted in a marine’s death.

The Bourne Supremacy/The Bourne Identity – An amnesiac CIA assassin is framed for a botched CIA political assassination and is hunted by his corrupt former supervisor who must kill him to hide the truth.

Good Shepherd – A squeaky-clean young CIA recruit becomes disillusioned and corrupted by the McCarthy-era CIA culture.

The Recruit – A mole within the CIA kills agent trainees working to expose him/her.

S.W.A.T. – A corrupt LAPD SWAT officer helps a high-profile drug lord escape custody. The officer also kills a fellow SWAT member.

Clear and Present Danger – The US Government conducts an illegal war on a drug cartel in Columbia. The President and his National Security Advisor make a deal with the drug lord, and the National Security Advisor, through the conspiring CIA Deputy Director, pulls the plug on the military operation, abandoning covert US troops trapped in Columbia.

Broken Arrow – An Air Force Stealth pilot rejected for promotions intentionally crash-lands a B3 bomber carrying two nuclear bombs. He then extorts the US Government for a huge ransom or he will give the bombs to terrorists.

Swordfish – The CIA hires an accomplished spy to coerce a computer hacker to steal billions in unused government funds left over from a shadowy DEA operation.

The General's Daughter – The murder of a base commander’s daughter brings an undercover detective to West Point Military Academy. The detective discovers a high level cover up of illicit and violent behavior among cadets and Academy brass.

U.S. Marshals – A State Department Diplomatic Security agent frames a former agent for a diplomatic assassination and then joins a US Marshal manhunt for the framed killer. The rogue agent kills a deputy Marshal and attempts to murder the former agent and the US Marshal.

Space Cowboys – A NASA mission chief sells US satellite guidance technology to the Soviet Union. The Soviets later deploy the technology in a nuclear missile launch platform that threatens to destroy the world.

Air Force One – Russian nationalists hijack Air Force One with the help of the President’s Secret Service detail leader, who guns down his entire agent detail and gives their tactical weapons to the terrorists.

The Sentinel – A member of the president’s Secret Service detail, suspicious of a plot to assassinate the president, is framed for the murder of a fellow agent and blackmailed over his affair with the First Lady. In unraveling the assassination plot and protecting the president, he discovers a supervisor within the Secret Service, in charge of security at the G-8 Summit is the assassination mastermind. It could have been worse, though. In the book on which the film is based, the First Lady was plotting with the Secret Service supervisor to kill her husband.

Snake Eyes – A Naval commander participates in a conspiracy to assassinate the Secretary of Defense.

Absolute Power – The President murders his mistress while a burglar hides in a closet and witnesses the crime. The Chief of Staff and the Secret Service cover for the President by making it look like the mistress was killed during a burglary. The Secret Service agents and the Chief of Staff realize a burglar actually did witness the murder, so they conspire to track down and kill the witness.

Is it any wonder that public trust in government is declining when depictions such as these are standard fare from Hollywood? If this list also included television programs such as The Agency and 24, the plots would seem even more ludicrously cynical toward government. The US Government and military have flaws, as they are operated by imperfect beings. There have been scandals and of course there have also been double agents, moles, and unscrupulously ambitious officials. Yet, considering the millions of people who have served in government since the nation's founding, the number who have plotted to assassinate 9 year old autistic boys who can crack super codes is reasonably small. Apparently only Alec Baldwin was anti-government enough to relish that movie villain role.

Who is our enemy? According to Hollywood, terrorists seem far less sinister than our own intelligence or law enforcement agencies. The Hollywood mantra from these films is clear. We have more to fear from the Patriot Act than from Al Qaeda, more to fear from our military than from any foreign foe. The work of military, intelligence, and law enforcement personnel is difficult and dangerous enough in reality, but when public paranoia, fueled by anti-government entertainment, prevents cooperation and trust, national security itself is endangered.

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